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At the beginning of our lives and often at the end, we have important 
medical decisions made for us by proxy consenters including family, legal 
guardians, and/or medical professionals. This places us in particularly vulnerable 
and dependent positions that essentially ‘bookend’ our lives. As a bioethicist, I 
view as among my duties working to improve the experience of medicine for 
vulnerable populations as well as advocating for protections for such patients 
against the poor decision-making of others (and, in rare exceptional cases, even 
themselves).  
I’ve opted for a ‘covering concept’ model for my dissertation, which 
consists of three sizeable papers on related topics. The vulnerable populations I 
focus on in this project are children, the mentally ill, and the elderly. All three of 
these papers touch on issues surrounding the authenticity and limits of informed 
consent, tensions between respecting patient autonomy and promoting patient 




In How to Face the Future: A Model for Delayed Disclosure of Incidental 
Findings from Pediatric Whole Genome Sequencing, I argue that in cases of 
widely-focused pediatric genetic testing, consent for release of a limited class of 
incidental findings should be delayed until the pediatric patient or research subject 
reaches the age of majority. I also propose a model for delayed disclosure in such 
cases.  
In Early Palliative Sedation Therapy and the Challenge of Psychological 
Suffering, I make the case that current end of life palliative care practices in the 
United States rationally commit us to the moral permissibility of palliative 
sedation to alleviate refractory psycho-existential suffering, even in cases where 
death of the patient is far from imminent.  
In Cardiac Pacemakers and Withdrawal of Care at the End of Life, I make 
the case that deactivation of cardiac pacemakers is morally distinct from typical 
instances of withdrawal of care at the end of life. I argue that in highly dependent 
patients, pacemaker deactivation is morally akin to voluntary active euthanasia, 
while in non-highly-dependent patients, pacemaker deactivation only serves to 
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At the beginning of our lives and often at the end, we have important medical 
decisions made for us by proxy consenters including family, legal guardians, 
and/or medical professionals. This places us in particularly vulnerable and 
dependent positions that essentially ‘bookend’ our lives. As a bioethicist, I view 
as among my duties working to improve the experience of medicine for 
vulnerable populations as well as advocating for protections for such patients 
against the poor decision-making of others (and, in rare exceptional cases, even 
themselves). I’ve opted for a ‘covering concept’ model for my dissertation, which 
consists of three sizeable papers on related topics. The vulnerable populations I 
focus on in this project are children, the mentally ill, and the elderly. All three of 
these papers touch on issues surrounding the authenticity and limits of informed 
consent, tensions between respecting patient autonomy and promoting patient 
well-being, and how best to face death. 
In How to Face the Future: A Model for Delayed Disclosure of Incidental 
Findings from Pediatric Whole Genome Sequencing, I argue that in cases of 
widely-focused pediatric genetic testing, consent for release of a limited class of 
incidental findings should be delayed until the pediatric patient or research subject 
reaches the age of majority. I also propose a model for delayed disclosure in such 
cases. In Early Palliative Sedation Therapy and the Challenge of Psychological 
Suffering, I make the case that current end of life palliative care practices in the 
United States rationally commit us to the moral permissibility of palliative 
sedation to alleviate refractory psycho-existential suffering, even in cases where 
death of the patient is far from imminent. In Cardiac Pacemakers and Withdrawal 
of Care at the End of Life, I make the case that deactivation of cardiac pacemakers 
is morally distinct from typical instances of withdrawal of care at the end of life. I 
argue that in highly dependent patients, pacemaker deactivation is morally akin to 
voluntary active euthanasia, while in non-highly-dependent patients, pacemaker 










HOW TO FACE THE FUTURE: A MODEL FOR DELAYED 
DISCLOSURE OF INCIDENTAL FINDINGS FROM PEDIATRIC 
WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 
1. Introduction 
Whole genome sequencing (WGS) is rapidly becoming more affordable 
for use in clinical medical settings. At a price of around $1000, WGS is now 
barely more expensive than more targeted testing and is only growing cheaper as 
technology advances.1 Further, while the genetic bases for many diseases 
currently remain opaque, it is not difficult to imagine a future where we can 
predict with great accuracy an individual’s likelihood of developing a wide range 
of diseases based on personal genome analysis. It is the likelihood of this future 
that makes it necessary to figure out how to deal with such a substantial influx of 
information and, in particular, determine who ought to receive it.  
In this paper, I advocate for delayed disclosure of incidental findings 
which may arise in broad pediatric genetic testing such as WGS, concerning a 
particular subclass of conditions. This subclass of conditions contains incurable or 
highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset disorders which cannot be prevented or 
mitigated by action in childhood (i.e. prior to clinical presentation of the 
disorder). I will argue that delaying disclosure of this specific range of incidental 
findings until pediatric patients reach the age of majority is more consistent than 
                                                          





alternatives with what we morally owe to children, in terms of respecting their 
autonomy and promoting their well-being.  
An adult facing the decision of whether to undergo WGS has difficult 
questions and trade-offs to consider during the consent process. There may be 
some very good reasons to undergo testing. Learning of one’s carrier status for 
particular genetic mutations can help to inform reproductive decisions, and opting 
to be tested on the basis of knowing that a family member is a carrier of a 
particular disease can serve to alleviate the anxiety of uncertainty. However, if 
one undergoes WGS and discovers a high likelihood of developing a specific fatal 
genetic disease, this saddles one with the knowledge of how and even when one 
will likely die, often with an accompanying prediction of future suffering. This 
knowledge has the potential to impose a substantial psychological burden on 
those who possess it. Going through life with the knowledge of even a relatively 
low likelihood of developing any number of horrific diseases has the potential to 
cast a pall over years of perfect health. Aside from concerns regarding the 
psychological well-being of the tested patient, there is the sobering possibility that 
unanticipated genetic information might lead to employment discrimination or a 
denial of insurance coverage. 
There may be many reasons to opt for WGS to intentionally answer some 
specific genetic questions, but what are we to make of incidental findings? 
Incidental findings are those that are not of primary or direct relevance to the 
purpose for which testing was undergone. Whether findings are incidental will be 




someone wants her genome mapped simply in order to obtain her genetic 
information in its entirety, no findings would be incidental. If someone were 
getting tested for BRCA mutations (mutations associated with an increased risk of 
breast and ovarian cancers) specifically, then any findings not directly related to 
the presence or absence of such mutations would be incidental. And, even if 
whole genome sequencing or other broadly-targeted genetic testing were 
undergone as a means to identify the presence of relevant BRCA mutations, any 
findings unrelated to BRCA mutation would be incidental, regardless of the fact 
that a large amount of data was generated. This is because that data was generated 
with the specific aim of identifying a small range of genetic anomalies. With 
WGS, the sheer volume of information generated means that the likelihood of 
incidental findings (if the data generated is analyzed) approaches 100%. If these 
findings have serious clinical import and are disclosed to the tested patient, she 
may be confronted with knowledge regarding her own genetic makeup that is 
unprecedented – as such information would have been impossible to obtain in 
even the quite recent past – and potentially life-altering. Determining appropriate 
rules of disclosure for incidental findings is thus one of the pressing problems 
raised by the growing prevalence of WGS.  
WGS is now seen as a viable and exciting option for use in pediatric 
clinical practice and research.2 While it is still far from common in clinical 
                                                          
2 For example, pediatric genomic sequencing programs are in place at Boston 
Children’s Hospital, NewYork-Presbyterian Morgan Stanley Children’s Hospital, 




practice, it is not difficult to imagine a future where WGS for fetuses and/or 
neonates becomes the norm. My concern in this paper is not with how best to 
disclose incidental findings to adult patients and research subjects. This is because 
adults can give genuinely informed consent for release of such findings, and so 
answering the question of which method of disclosure is best will be basically a 
matter of determining how to weigh the significance of findings and then 
effectively communicate the potential costs and benefits of disclosure to the 
patient. This may be a challenging and interesting endeavor, but I want to focus 
here on a different question: that of how best to disclose incidental findings which 
arise in the course of pediatric WGS. In such cases, parents or guardians must act 
as proxy consenters on behalf of their children. This leads to some unique 
challenges when it comes to determining how best to disclose incidental findings. 
Consider the following (hypothetical) motivating case:  
Five-year-old Ari is set to begin peewee soccer in the fall. Having heard 
about recent sudden cardiac deaths of child athletes, his concerned parents 
enroll him in a cohort study in which children of his age will undergo 
whole genome sequencing to search for the genetic mutations associated 
with long QT syndrome and related conditions which can lead to sudden 
death. Ari’s parents give informed consent on his behalf, and Ari gives his 
assent to participate in the study. In the course of the study, researchers 
discover genetic mutations associated with Huntington’s disease: a fatal 
                                                          




degenerative disorder that will first manifest in mid- to late adulthood. 
There is no way to prevent or pre-emptively ameliorate this disease and it 
is unlikely that a cure will be developed within Ari’s lifetime.3 
This exemplifies the sort of situation with which I am concerned: WGS of a child 
incidentally reveals strong indicators of an adult-onset disease which is incurable 
or highly unlikely to be cured and of which there is no way to prevent or 
preemptively ameliorate the effects (medically speaking). Rosamond Rhodes 
(2006) provides us with a representative list of such diseases: Huntington’s 
disease (HD); early-onset Alzheimer’s disease; and the dominant variant of 
Charcot-Marie Tooth disease.4 All of these diseases can be identified through 
genetic testing, first present in adulthood, are incurable or highly unlikely to be 
cured, and have symptoms that can only be managed or ameliorated once these 
disorders present clinically.  
The question here is not whether to reveal incidental findings to Ari but 
rather whether to reveal such findings to Ari’s parents. Ari’s parents would then 
decide whether and when to reveal the findings to Ari. Is there moral reason to 
disclose this incidental finding to – or withhold it from – Ari’s parents? Should 
Ari’s parents be the ones tasked with deciding whether to have such findings 
revealed? If not, what then? These are questions I aim to answer in this paper. 
                                                          
3 Recent advances in the treatment on Huntington’s disease are quite promising 
(see, e.g., Gallagher 2017), but for the purposes of this example, let us suppose 
that a cure does not seem likely to be developed within Ari’s lifetime. 




I will make the case that delaying the disclosure of incidental findings 
concerning many incurable or highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset diseases 
until the pediatric patient reaches the age of majority and can decide for herself 
whether to receive them is the best way to respect the autonomy and promote the 
well-being of children like Ari. However, delay does come with the risk of 
potentially being unable to re-contact patients and potentially poses a burden on 
our healthcare system as re-contacting may prove expensive, time-intensive, and 
logistically-challenging. These are concerns (among others) which I will be 
addressing in this paper.  
I am preceded in this effort by the excellent work of Abdul-Karim, 
Berkman, Wendler, and colleagues. I take their ethical framework and guidelines 
for when to immediately disclose incidental findings produced from pediatric 
genetic testing to parents to be correct. However, I will here expand upon two 
main elements left underdetermined by their account: (1) in-depth theoretical 
justification for the importance of the moral considerations they appeal to in 
support of their account, and (2) an account of which incidental findings ought to 
be released to pediatric patients once they reach the age of majority, and how 
these findings ought to be released.  
Abdul-Karim and colleagues appeal to the importance of these three moral 
considerations in arguing for a certain class of incidental findings to be 
immediately disclosed to the parents of pediatric patients: benevolence, duty to 
warn, and autonomy. However, they do not explicate these concepts or explain in 




moral considerations: promotion of well-being and respect for autonomy. I take 
these to contain the moral considerations Abdul-Karim and colleagues appeal to, 
as benevolence and duty to warn have fundamentally to do with promoting patient 
well-being. In what follows, I will first argue in favor of my account of delayed 
disclosure on the basis of its being most consistent with respecting the autonomy 
and promoting the well-being of pediatric patients. I will then propose a unique 
framework for delayed disclosure of incidental findings from pediatric genetic 
testing which indicate the tested patient will develop adult-onset disorders like 
Huntington’s disease, early-onset Alzheimer’s, and the dominant variant of 
Charcot-Marie Tooth disease.  
2. Promoting Well-Being  
Let’s first consider how unexpected genetic information might 
compromise a child’s well-being. If releasing incidental findings to children or 
their parents would harm the children (either directly or indirectly through their 
families), this is a consideration that should be taken seriously and weighed 
against the potential benefits of disclosing such findings. Of course, failing to 
release certain incidental findings has the potential to cause significant harm to 
pediatric patients. This is why it is important to take into account the importance 
of a duty to warn, which may pull us toward disclosing such findings. Broadly 
construed, the duty to warn applies when there is a foreseen harm or likelihood of 
some harm that will come to an individual. In medical cases, the duty to warn 
applies to risks of drugs and interventions, as well as discoveries regarding the 




notion of a duty to warn regarding genetic information normally has to do with 
the question of whether medical professionals have the obligation to warn 
potentially affected relatives of patients who have tested positive for a hereditary 
genetic disorder.5 Generally, in cases where a patient opts to not warn a family 
member, patient autonomy and confidentiality trump the importance of the risk to 
family members.6 In the case of pediatric WGS, the situation is a bit more 
complicated. This is largely due to the nature of proxy consent. If the patient is 
not able to give informed consent to receive her own medical information, then 
does the duty to warn the patient simply become a duty to warn the parents? This 
depends upon the nature of the information to be disclosed, but generally the duty 
to warn will apply to parents acting on behalf of their children. 
So what type of information merits warning parents in cases of incidental 
findings which arise from pediatric WGS? This will be determined by the sort of 
findings discovered in the course of testing. If by taking immediate action a 
potential medical harm could be prevented or ameliorated, then the healthcare 
workers involved have a duty to warn the parents or guardians of the child in 
question. For instance, if a genetically-rooted disease could be prevented by 
prophylactic treatment and/or lifestyle changes, then it would be negligent of the 
healthcare workers involved to fail to warn the parents of this. In cases like Ari’s, 
however, it seems that the duty to warn would only apply if there were something 
                                                          
5 For information on relevant court cases dealing with this issue, see McAbee and 
Sherman 1998; Offit et al. 2004 




that could be done medically to prevent or ameliorate the effects of Huntington’s 
disease. In his case, given that no cure seems forthcoming within Ari’s lifetime, a 
duty to warn seems to drop out of the moral equation. 
There are essentially two scenarios for someone like Ari if his parents 
were given the information regarding his definite likelihood of developing 
Huntington’s disease. Either his parents don’t tell Ari, ever, or they choose a 
certain time to tell him. Either way it’s not difficult to imagine how this would 
have a detrimental effect on Ari as he grows up. If his parents never tell him and 
instead quietly save up for his future medical expenses, there is still the likely 
chance that they will treat him significantly differently in light of knowing that 
he’ll almost certainly die prematurely. Now, this might be a good thing. After all, 
perhaps knowing his life will be cut short will give Ari’s parents a greater sense 
of every moment being precious and will help them pay better attention to Ari and 
appreciate his company more than they would have otherwise. It is just as likely – 
and I think probably more likely – that this knowledge would lead to significant 
familial stress and over-protectiveness or over-indulgence. One might respond 
that there are certainly parents who will be able to keep their emotions in check 
and raise a child like Ari as they would otherwise, but I am skeptical that this 
would be the norm.  
If Ari’s parents do opt to tell him at some point, Ari will have to face the 
fact of his premature mortality and find a way to psychologically adjust to the fact 
that his life will fall far short of the standard lifespan. Ari will likely either adjust 




able to have the same sort of lifespan and life narrative that most other people are 
able to experience. These imagined effects assume that Ari’s parents will have 
waited to tell him until he’s old enough to process the information in a generally 
rational manner. If his parents were to choose to tell Ari at age five that he’ll 
eventually develop and die from Huntington’s disease around middle age, it’s 
unclear how this would affect him, although I would wager that, to the extent he 
could understand it, this information would be traumatic to Ari. 
There is a serious lack of solid empirical literature regarding how children 
and family units react to unexpected genetic information.7 However, we can 
tentatively extrapolate from the literature we do have to make a reasonable guess 
as to how incidental genetic findings of a serious sort might impact pediatric 
patients and their families. There are two main concerns here that must be 
examined: concerns regarding adverse psychological effects on the child and 
concerns regarding adverse social effects on the child. In reality, these will likely 
only rarely come apart. After all, social difficulties will often have a negative 
impact on psychological well-being and vice versa. However, it is worth 
considering these concerns each taken on their own, although there will inevitably 
be some overlap in terms of effects. 
                                                          
7 I agree with the following evaluation of the empirical landscape: “Currently, 
there is insufficient evidence to inform a nuanced understanding of how children 
respond to genetic testing. This suggests a strong need for further research that 
uses rigorous approaches to address children’s emotional states, self-perception, 




Let us first consider how children themselves might respond to results of 
predictive genetic testing. While we may not have information on how children as 
young as Ari might respond to such information, there have been studies 
regarding how adolescents respond to the results of such testing. However, 
empirical research on how adolescents react to the results of predictive genetic 
testing is messy and inconclusive. It seems that there are well-being related 
benefits that come about from learning about one’s carrier status for particular 
diseases, but this can also negatively impact one’s well-being. Finding out one’s 
status can impact how one relates to family, plans for the future, and can 
substantially alter one’s self-conception. Responses to the results of genetic 
testing tend to be neither straightforwardly positive nor entirely negative. This is 
true whether or not the patients who opted for predictive genetic testing turned out 
to be carriers for, e.g., Huntington’s disease or BRCA mutations.8 And further, 
these studies concern adolescents who are at or near the age of majority and who 
themselves opted for predictive testing. Oftentimes predictive testing is undergone 
because a relative is a carrier for a particular genetic disorder or testing seems 
indicated for some other clinical reason. In such cases, what is being tested for is 
known, and the main psychological difficulties which come about often involve 
interpersonal and identity issues (e.g. relating to family members who are 
carriers). Opting for predictive testing seems to set some clear expectations in 
place, and even if one reacts to results differently than anticipated, there is still 
                                                          





some base level of preparation and setting of expectations that seems to temper 
the experience of receiving the results of predictive genetic testing.  
It is unclear, however, what impact the unanticipated discovery of 
incidental findings would have on these same adolescents who chose predictive 
testing for a specific disorder. After all, it seems that wholly unanticipated genetic 
information would be far more shocking and generally less welcome than genetic 
information that was specifically sought out. And, further, when we turn to the 
sort of cases I am concerned with, those which involve a child with parents acting 
as proxy consenters, the situation becomes even more complicated. This is 
because we must take into account both how the information might impact parents 
and how it might impact children if those parents opt to disclose the findings to 
them. It is not an impossibility to think that empirical research might come out 
showing that receiving incidental findings from genetic testing which indicate a 
disorder like Huntington’s disease or early-onset Alzheimer’s in a child would 
somehow make the child’s and the family’s lives as a whole demonstrably better 
in terms of well-being than they would have been without such knowledge. 
However, this doesn’t seem likely. If responses to specifically sought-out genetic 
information may be extremely mixed, complex, and involve a lot of ambivalence 
on the part of many of those tested, there is reason to think that unanticipated and 
unrequested genetic information would be even more difficult to process, and I 




well-being of the parents and patients who receive it. 9 However, more empirical 
research is needed to establish this with certainty. 
Since it is the parents who would receive incidental findings in cases like 
Ari’s, it is worth additionally considering how knowledge of Ari’s eventual 
Huntington’s disease might affect the dynamics of the family as a whole. One 
study of particular relevance to the question of how incidental findings of 
conditions like Ari’s might impact a family unit concerns how parents (and the 
children themselves) cope with the prospect of a child dying prematurely. This 
study, conducted by Green and Solnit in 1964, focused on so-called “Vulnerable 
Child Syndrome” and looked at the behaviors of both parents of children expected 
to die prematurely and of the children themselves. This was a highly-subjective 
observational study and the sample size was small, but it’s nonetheless important 
to consider since it is so specifically focused on the element of anticipated 
premature death of a child and its impact on family dynamics. Unsurprisingly, 
anticipating one’s child’s premature death is correlated with anxiety and 
depression on the part of parents. Fear of one’s child dying was also correlated 
with overprotective behaviors on the part of parents as well as social and 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Duncan et al. 2007: 1988 and Duncan et al. 2008:53 for discussion of 
how predictive genetic testing seems to have a mixed impact on adolescents; 
solving some existing problems and alleviating some existing anxieties while at 
the same time the testing itself may generate new problems and anxieties for the 





behavioral problems for the children.10 This study was performed quite a while 
ago and relies quite a bit on personal evaluations (both on the part of researchers 
and participants) but the results line up with common sense in a way that seems 
plausible.  
And, although there is clearly a difference between present chronic illness 
and anticipated illness, the literature on the impact of chronic illness of a child on 
families is worth considering, since we don’t have much to refer to when it comes 
to the very specific and quite new issue of unanticipated discovery of an adult-
onset genetic disorder in a child. Chronic illness is associated with stress in 
families across the board.11 I posit that anticipating the difficulties that come 
along with degenerative genetic illnesses would also place stress on parents who 
know that their children will develop such an illness. 
There is a serious lack of research on the impact of receiving incidental 
findings concerning adult-onset disorders like Huntington’s Disease on the patient 
and her family. So, let’s focus on one sort of degenerative disorder regarding 
which we have many years of data and which may also be identified in childhood 
and before symptoms of the disorder manifest, Cystic Fibrosis, “a serious life-
threatening disease, leading to malnutrition and chronic lung infection.”12 Cystic 
Fibrosis (CF) is similar to other degenerative disorders in that it characteristically 
                                                          
10 See Green and Solnit, 1964. 
11 See, e.g., McClellan and Cohen 2007; Holryod and Guthrie 1986; Hamlett et al. 
1992; Holden et al. 1996 




starts out asymptomatic to mild and progresses in severity over time.13 Neonatal 
screening often catches Cystic Fibrosis before the patient manifests any 
symptoms.14 This leaves parents with the task of planning how to manage 
symptoms as they develop and monitor their child’s progression and health state 
closely.  
Knowing that a child will develop CF is similar to knowing that a child 
will develop Huntington’s Disease (HD) in some relevant respects, as both are 
degenerative disorders that (in HD cases and for some forms of CF) eventually 
lead to death in middle age. Although patients with CF characteristically begin 
manifesting symptoms in childhood and patients with HD do not manifest 
symptoms until the disease presents in middle age, there may still be a long period 
of time between a diagnosis of CF and manifestation of symptoms. This period of 
time before symptoms present in some CF cases is roughly analogous to the 
                                                          
13 “Most patients with cystic fibrosis have gradual but progressive deterioration in 
pulmonary and gastrointestinal functions.” (Cowen et al. 1986: 745) 
14 Neonatal screening for Cystic Fibrosis is, unfortunately, not always the norm. 
Kharazzi and Kharazzi explain: “Cystic fibrosis (CF) is not always readily 
diagnosed without newborn screening (NBS). It has few unique features, it is 
uncommon, and it varies in its presentation. In the United States, half of all 
persons with CF were diagnosed after 6 months of age. The median delay in 
diagnosis is well over 1 year in parts of the United States where CF NBS is not 
used.” […] “[S]tudies show that misdiagnosis leads to increased anxiety, guilt and 






period of time between parents like Ari’s learning that their child will develop HD 
and his first presentation of clinical symptoms. This time period for CF is much 
shorter, but if we can show that the anticipation of the child developing CF has a 
negative effect on family functioning, then we have at least preliminary reason to 
extrapolate to cases of childhood HD diagnoses and conclude that anticipation of 
this sort spread over many more years would likewise negatively affect a family 
like Ari’s. Ultimately, what we’re trying to determine is how the anticipation of 
the development of HD might impact the family dynamic and the development of 
the child.15 To this end, I will examine the effects of having a child with CF on 
family functioning. While doing so, I will try to tease out the specific effects of 
anticipating one’s child will develop CF in order to make an educated guess 
                                                          
15 It is important to note that this import may vary depending on whether or not 
parents decide to tell their child about her HD diagnosis. It seems that whether a 
child knows she will develop a degenerative disorder would clearly have an 
impact on family dynamics. Unfortunately, there is no clear way to distinguish 
between studies where the pediatric patient herself knew of her CF diagnosis and 
studies where she did not. I think the most reasonable thing to assume is that 
parents of CF children will tell their child about her diagnosis in proportion to the 
sophistication of her capacity for understanding it. So, a very young child might 
only be told that she must go to the doctor regularly in order to make sure she 
stays healthy, and an older child would be told that she has a medical issue that 
needs monitoring in order to manage it, and an adolescent would likely be told 
exactly what disorder her parents were worried about what to expect in the future. 
This would be the most reasonable way to release information of this import to a 




regarding how parents knowing their child will develop a disorder like HD might 
affect family functioning. 
While recent research seems to show that the impact of chronic disease on 
the family is not as dire as previously supposed, having a child who is diagnosed 
with CF does seem to have a substantive negative impact on family functioning.16  
McClellan and Cohen concluded in a review of the relevant literature that families 
of a child with CF score lower than control families in “domains of 
communication, interpersonal involvement, affect management, behavior control, 
and role allocation” and that parental stress was significant in CF families.17 
Further, a diagnosis of CF seems to explicitly affect the way that parents treat 
their children: “Parents of CF children report that they tend to be excessively 
protective and indulgent with their children, and they acknowledge that such an 
attitude may be wrong.”18 It’s not clear whether in the documented CF cases 
coddling began before or after the children began to exhibit symptoms, and so it’s 
likewise unclear whether this coddling would extend to children who will 
eventually develop HD. It’s also unclear whether the negative impact of a CF 
diagnosis on family functioning applies in cases where a child receives a 
diagnosis but does not yet exhibit any symptoms of the disorder. In order to draw 
                                                          
16 For evidence that having a child with CF is associated with increased family 
stress, see e.g., McClellan and Cohen 2007, Spieth et al. 2001, Bouma and 
Schweitzer 1990, and Holyrod and Guthrie 1986. 
17 McClellan and Cohen, 2007:222. 




conclusions about how parents who know their child will develop HD might treat 
their child differently than they would otherwise and how the family as a whole 
might be affected by such knowledge in terms of family functioning, we must 
determine whether anticipation of a child developing CF has a negative impact on 
family functioning. Given the similarities between CF and HD, if it can be 
established that family functioning is negatively impacted by a diagnosis of CF 
before the child begins to exhibit any symptoms, this will be at least prima facie 
evidence that the families of children whose parents know those children will 
develop HD will be negatively impacted as well.  
It’s hard to tease apart what portion of familial stress may be due to the 
present challenges of dealing with CF and what is due to the anticipation of a 
child developing CF, but a study by Perobelli et al. concerning uncertain 
diagnoses of CF may give us a clue as to how to do so. An uncertain diagnosis of 
CF means that the available testing for CF was inconclusive and so “a diagnosis 
of CF cannot be made by the current standard diagnostic criteria […] The long-
term phenotypical consequences may be highly variable and some of these 
children might over time develop CF, others could never have any symptoms.” 
(2009:1927) This study supports the claim that having a child with CF is 
associated with significant parental emotional disturbance, but also shows that 
anticipating the possible development of CF is also associated with significant 





[W]hen parents were asked if they believed that their child’s health status 
was causing them any emotional disturbances, there was no differences 
between parents of CF children and parents of children with an uncertain 
diagnosis, [AD] and a very significant difference between the latter and 
parents of control healthy children [HC] (p = 0.0003). When parents’ 
answers were processed separately, a significant difference between group 
AD and HC persisted for mothers (p = 0.02), but not for fathers. (Perobelli 
et al. 2009:1931-1932) 
This seems to show that anticipating one’s child will develop a degenerative 
disorder like CF, even when this is uncertain, places an emotional burden on 
parents. It is reasonable to think that anticipating one’s child will develop HD, 
when this is certain, would impose at least as much if not more stress on the 
family of the diagnosed child. 
The main point of difference between the CF and HD for our purposes is 
the time of onset. I posit that we can expect anticipating a child will develop any 
serious degenerative disorder at any point in the future to be a source of familial 
stress. Actual manifestation of symptoms will likely impose more stress than the 
simple anticipation that the child will develop this illness, but anticipation will 
still have a negative impact on the family. One might question here whether the 
stress I attribute to anticipation in cases of ambiguous diagnosis for CF really just 
amounts to the stress of having to cart a child to appointments and monitor her 
health state closely to see if she manifests signs of developing CF. Perhaps the 




than of anticipation of illness. To this I can only respond that it seems clear from 
the standpoint of empathic perspective-taking and common sense that anticipation 
of one’s child developing a degenerative disorder will cause one stress, which will 
in turn affect one’s family in a negative way. In the case of parents of children 
with an ambiguous diagnosis for CF, the stress reported was likely a combination 
of both anticipating potential illness and also having to monitor their children and 
bring them in for checkups, but it stands to reason that the anticipation would play 
a substantial part in this, especially given that (a) children with an ambiguous 
diagnosis were not yet manifesting symptoms of CF and (b) even healthy children 
need preventative care and regular checkups. It’s unclear exactly how 
burdensome monitoring the child was on the parents, but it seems that further data 
from the Petrobelli study supports the supposition that at least at the time of 
ambiguous diagnosis and shortly thereafter, parents did not perceive their children 
to be any sicker than parents of control children did.19 This seems to be another 
point in favor of attributing stress to anticipation of future illness, since there 
didn’t seem to be immediate health concerns on these parents’ minds. 
Another significant difference between CF and HD is that receiving a 
diagnosis of CF early has substantial medical value, which is why we perform 
newborn screening in the first place.20 This medical value justifies subjecting the 
                                                          
19 In general, parents’ anxiety about their child’s health is reported as stronger in 
group CFD than in group AD (p < 0.05) and HC (p < 0.001), whereas groups AD 
and HC are not different. (2009:1931). 




family to the stress associated with anticipation, even when the diagnosis is 
uncertain. For CF there is tangible medical benefit from knowing early, while for 
HD there is not. If one is going to potentially impose a substantial psychological 
burden on patients and/or patients’ families, there ought to be good reason for 
doing so. One might say that there are plenty of good reasons to let patients’ 
parents know about an incidental finding of HD before that disorder manifests 
clinically, in the same way that one might argue that there could be financial and 
life planning utility to Ari’s family if they knew about his diagnosis. However, as 
I will argue in section 3, concerns about preserving the child’s right to an open 
future to the best of our ability, along with the fundamental uncertainty of whether 
such financial and life-planning-related benefits would accrue from knowing push 
us toward discounting such considerations from our moral calculus. If something 
could be done medically to prevent or ameliorate an illness, then there is tangible 
utility to the family knowing. In the absence of such benefit, one should not 
impose psychological distress on one’s patient and/or her family. Imposing 
inevitable stress on the patient’s family is thus warranted in the case of CF but 
unwarranted in the case of HD and similar adult-onset disorders for which there is 
no cure and for which nothing medical can be done in childhood in order to 
prevent or ameliorate future effects of the disease. 
 
                                                          
generating better clinical outcomes and reducing morbidity of pediatric patients 
with CF, see e.g., Southern et al. 2009; McKay, Waters, and Gaskin 2005; Sims et 




3. Respecting Autonomy 
Autonomy is, simply put, the ability to make free and reasoned choices 
and (at least within certain bounds) to act on those choices. Being able to act 
autonomously requires that one possess the cognitive capacities required to make 
rational choices in accordance with one’s values and ends. Autonomous action 
also requires that one possess (at least minimally) consistent and stable values and 
ends. Access to accurate information and the availability of an appropriate range 
of choices are also prerequisites for autonomous action and interfering with these 
can compromise one’s ability to act autonomously. So, autonomy is a matter of 
capacities on the part of the agent coupled with external circumstances conducive 
– or at the very least not obstructive – to the agent being able to carry out her 
freely-chosen plans.  
We can see how this notion of autonomy may come to bear in medical 
contexts, giving rise to certain obligations for medical professionals. For example, 
failure to make a patient aware of all reasonable treatment options for breast 
cancer would compromise her ability to make an autonomous choice, because the 
patient would necessarily be acting without relevant information. Perhaps the 
option offered to the patient is one she would have chosen anyway, but in the 
absence of other reasonable options (when there are other reasonable options) it 
cannot be said that the patient acted fully autonomously. This is a case where the 
patient’s autonomy has been diminished by a lack of salient information. 
Additionally, being unable to understand and rationally choose between available 




consent form laden with complex medical terminology or cannot make a rational 
choice to due to the influence of drugs or simply not being far-sighted enough to 
reasonably weigh the costs and benefits of the available options, then that patient 
will be unable to make an autonomous choice due to being unable to choose 
rationally. Autonomy can also be diminished in more extreme ways, by closing 
off choices to an individual through coercion – physical or otherwise. If someone 
physically incapacitates me, then a substantial set of options have been closed off 
to me, namely all actions that require ambulation. Likewise, verbal-emotional 
coercion may compromise one’s ability to view choices which ought to be open to 
one as genuinely viable options. One representative instance of this is when 
someone in an abusive relationship doesn’t consider leaving to be a genuine 
option due to coercion on the part of the other partner. Being able to act 
autonomously requires that one can, rationally and free from coercion, choose 
from an appropriate range of options.  
Children are not yet fully autonomous, which is why parents or guardians 
characteristically act as proxy decision makers in medical contexts. The threshold 
for being able to give informed consent for medical treatment is typically set at 
the age of majority. The age of majority thus serves as a heuristic for identifying 
whether a person is able to act autonomously. This is because the psychological 
capabilities associated with being able to make reasoned decisions in line with 
one’s own (stable) values and aims are taken to be present by this point in most of 
the population. It is important to note that, in developing guidelines for disclosure 




approximating a level of decision-making competence is the best we can do in 
terms of developing broad recommendations. It is, of course, possible that in a 
particular case a patient may be able to act autonomously regarding medical 
decision-making before the age of majority (I have in mind here an unusually 
mature older adolescent). When I talk about people being autonomous in this 
paper, this will serve as shorthand for saying that the individual has the cognitive 
faculties necessary to give genuinely informed consent to medical interventions.  
What exactly does it mean to respect the autonomy of pediatric patients? 
Should we mete out respect for autonomy on the basis of the progression of a 
child’s ability to make autonomous choices? This is what parents ideally do as 
their children mature and are given progressively more freedom in their progress 
to adulthood. And a child’s maturing ability to make rational choices on her own 
behalf should surely be fostered by allowing her to have a say in decisions of 
great import which involve her. But this notion of autonomy as a developing skill 
doesn’t seem to offer guidance in regard to the question of whether to inform the 
parents of a child like Ari of incidental findings indicating Huntington’s disease. 
This is because the problem at hand isn’t to what extent a child should be 
included by her parents in cases of medical decision-making, but whether parents 
should be made privy to this information to begin with. The question is precisely 
whether to disclose at all before the child can consent for herself, and the extent 
to which the child approaches the ability to give informed consent is largely 
beside the point. Ari may be able to understand things better at age 10 than he 




proxy consenters would typically be the ones tasked with making the choice of 
whether or not to have such incidental findings disclosed and then, if they do opt 
for disclosure, of whether and how to disclose this information to Ari.21 
What is relevant to the release of incidental findings in cases like Ari’s is a 
respect for the child’s future autonomy. We should, to the best of our ability, 
avoid compromising the autonomy of the patient as a future adult. By this I mean 
that we ought not to compromise adults’ abilities to make autonomous choices by 
making certain decisions on their behalf in childhood, in the absence of some 
compelling and overriding justification. By opting for release of incidental 
findings which could have been delayed until the child reaches the age of majority 
with no foreseen adverse physical or psychological consequences, one runs the 
risk of unjustly compromising the autonomy of the patient as an adult. This is 
because un-consented-to information may shape the child’s life in such a way that 
her choices are needlessly constrained or she is saddled with choices she ought 
not to have without choosing to open up those routes herself.  
Certain things which happen in childhood clearly have the potential to 
constrain a child’s future autonomy as an adult. By “constraining autonomy” I 
                                                          
21 If future research reveals that older adolescents are fully capable of providing 
informed consent in advance of the current age of majority, then the age at which 
individuals can give informed consent should be lowered, and concerns regarding 
the legitimacy of proxy consent will apply to a smaller range of children (but still, 
notably, Ari).  




mean limiting the child’s future choices, or more precisely, a particular type of the 
child’s future choices. While it could be argued that any choice made on behalf of 
a child strictly speaking constrains that child’s future autonomy, I want to focus 
on a limited class of constraints on future autonomy. It is not inherently bad to cut 
off future choices from a child, but it is often bad to make decisions of great 
import for the life plan and life narrative of the child, when those decisions could 
have been made by the child herself once she reaches adulthood. This is why 
things like childhood betrothals and failing to sufficiently educate a child are 
wrong. They unjustly constrain the choices available to that child when she 
reaches adulthood: the opportunity to choose a life partner in the former case, and 
a whole range of employment, educational, and social opportunities in the latter. 
While it is likely that the children in both such cases would be worse off than they 
would be otherwise as a result of this constraint on their autonomy, merely being 
worse off (in terms of well-being) is not the most important aspect of the 
situation. Rather, it can be wrong to constrain the future autonomy of a child in 
this manner, even if so constraining would lead that child to have an overall 
happier or more successful life (as unlikely as this may seem in the 
aforementioned cases). 
 It makes good intuitive sense to think that there are life choices of greater 
and lesser import, some of which may be made in childhood. And, it also makes 
sense to think that among the most important choices are those which play a 
central role in the life narrative of a person. Choices that substantially impact the 




person’s future are just such choices. And notice that these choices often come 
together. The choices that substantially shape one’s future also often shape one’s 
self, and how one conceives of one’s self in terms of identity, character, and 
values will greatly impact how one chooses. But this is all very abstract. What 
exactly it means to substantially shape the life of the pediatric patient in terms of 
life narrative and personal identity and sense of self is in need of explication. To 
this end, I will consider two illustrative examples of cases where such choices are 
wrongly made on behalf of children: childhood betrothals, and surgical sex 
assignment of infants born with ambiguous genitalia.  
Let’s consider more closely the example of childhood betrothals. I am 
limiting this example to cases where two families decide that their children of a 
similar age will be married upon reaching adulthood (or a bit later after finishing 
school, or whenever). This analysis does not apply to marriages which take place 
in childhood or betrothals of children to adults, which are both clearly unethical 
for a whole host of reasons. So, let us consider the more philosophically 
interesting (and less repugnant) case of children who are betrothed to each other 
through an agreement between their families. We know that, in general, people 
who choose their own partners aren’t particularly skilled at selecting partners who 
will last for the ideal lifelong commitment of a marriage.22 It could very well be 
the case that childhood betrothals would produce more successful marriages. This 
might be the case because the partners would likely be compatible for believable 
                                                          
22 “Current estimates of divorce indicate that about half of first marriages [in the 




(albeit unromantic) reasons. Two families who decide together on a childhood 
betrothal are likely to be similar in terms of wealth, social status, and perhaps 
even values. Their offspring will probably have much in common and be able to 
relate fairly well to each other since they will start off on a basis of familiarity 
with each other and each other’s upbringing and mode of life. Perhaps this is 
precisely the sort of relationship which would have a high statistical probability of 
lasting and growing into a deep affection or even love. At the very least, families 
would likely exert pressure which – while ideally not coercing anyone to stay in 
an abusive marriage – might incline the spouses to try harder to resolve issues 
which arise in the course of their marriage than they might otherwise do in the 
absence of such pressure. Perhaps similarity and familiarity, while not exactly the 
Platonic ideal of passion, might foster stability and affection better than going off 
into the world and choosing someone based on a romantic spark or the excitement 
of new and novel background and features would.  
However, even if it were the case that childhood betrothals more 
successfully predicted future happiness and longevity of marriages than choosing 
one’s own partner as an adult, it still seems like something important would be 
lost. There is something inherently worthwhile about choosing one’s own life 
partner, even if one does a poor job of it. Choosing a life partner is a decision of 
immense import for the way one’s life will go and having the freedom to self-
directedly choose a partner is of the sort of special autonomy-based, life-defining 
importance which makes being able to make such a decision worthwhile, even if 




child when she is very young, even if done from a reasoned belief that doing so 
will make her happier in the long run, would be to violate the future autonomy of 
one’s child in an unacceptable and unethical manner. The case of childhood 
betrothals is thus one where autonomy considerations appear generally to trump 
simple considerations of well-being.  
Consider now the more complicated example of surgically assigning an 
intersex infant (i.e. an infant with ambiguous genitalia) a gender at birth. This 
example is illuminating regarding the problem we are considering precisely 
because it is less clear-cut than examples such as childhood betrothals. The 
question is whether, for intersex children, it is better to choose on their behalf 
(making the best guess possible) which sex to assign and take surgical means to 
conform the child’s genitalia to this assigned sex or whether it is better to delay 
this and wait to see which physical and personality traits emerge, ultimately 
allowing the child to choose a sex once they are able to do so. It is important to be 
clear that the decision under scrutiny here is not simply one to raise the child 
either as a boy or a girl. I hold that, for pragmatic purposes, it likely makes the 
most sense to socially assign a gender upon birth.23 The decision under scrutiny is 
whether to take cosmetic surgical steps to either feminize or masculinize 
ambiguous genitalia in infants.24 Such situations may be challenging to resolve in 
                                                          
23 I here accord with recommendations given by Diamond and Sigmundson, 1997.  
24 In practice, feminization has served as a sort of default for surgeons, since the 
procedure itself is much simpler than attempting to construct a penis would be. 




terms of weighing costs and benefits and giving appropriate respect to the 
patient’s autonomy, especially given the serious lack of empirical data available 
comparing outcomes between intersex children surgically assigned a sex in 
infancy and those who were not.  
Those in favor of surgical sex assignment in infancy typically argue that it 
would be socially, psychologically, and sexually damaging for an intersex child to 
go through childhood and adolescence with ambiguous genitalia.25 They even 
claim that a child having ambiguous genitalia may interfere with parental bonding 
and undermine the stability of that child’s family relationships.26 However, I 
maintain that sex assignment in infancy is a case where, generally, the importance 
of preserving the child’s future autonomy ultimately outweighs such concerns. 
Surgical sex assignment in infancy and the culture of secrecy built around it 
seriously impede the child’s ability to make a choice of immense import regarding 
                                                          
25 “Some children with intersexuality require genital surgery for acute medical 
reasons. In the majority of cases, however, genital surgery has been performed for 
psychosocial reasons in order to confirm the assigned gender by genital 
appearance and, thereby, to facilitate gender-appropriate rearing, help develop a 
gendertypical body image, and avoid social stigma” (Meyer-Bahlburg, 2008: 
347). 
26  E.g., “Prolonged periods of nondecision are thought to run the risk of 
chronically ambiguous or inconsistent sex typing by the family, or of rejection of 
the child altogether” (Meyer-Bahlburg, 2008: 346). And, “[i]t is generally felt that 
surgery that is carried out for cosmetic reasons in the first year of life relieves 
parental distress and improves attachment between the child and the parents. The 




a feature that greatly shapes his or her life narrative and identity. Not only is the 
child surgically assigned a sex that might turn out not to coincide with their self-
conception later on, but parents have historically been encouraged to keep the fact 
that the child was born intersex secret from everyone except the child’s medical 
professionals.27 This means that the child is growing up without crucial 
information that may help to open up choices and options regarding their life plan 
and identity that would not otherwise present themselves. If an individual cannot 
act on adequate information regarding their biological sex (and medical status 
more generally) then their autonomy has been seriously compromised. Choosing 
sex assignment surgery for a child in infancy additionally renders certain choices 
– such as the choice to live as a man even after undergoing feminization surgery 
as an infant – much more difficult to make than they would otherwise be. Even if 
proponents of surgical sex assignment in infancy were correct that having 
ambiguous genitalia would distress and negatively impact the social and sexual 
development of intersex children, there would still be value to delaying decisions 
regarding sex assignment surgery until the child themself is capable of having a 
substantive say regarding whether they identify as a boy, a girl, or neither.28 In 
                                                          
27 See Beh and Diamond, 2000: 50-55. 
28 I agree with Beh and Diamond that “[m]edical uncertainty, the infant’s inability 
to consent to this life-altering treatment and the child’s right to an open future 
suggest that a “moratorium” on infant surgery is the best course when surgery is 





having a sex surgically assigned at infancy, the child’s future autonomy has been 
significantly and wrongly constrained. 
This concern for future autonomy largely coheres with caring about what 
Joel Feinberg first termed the “right to an open future” for children.29 While I’d 
like to avoid being prodigal in the assigning of rights, I do think that the “right to 
an open future” corresponds to some important moral considerations, 
considerations which generate substantial duties on the part of parents, medical 
providers, and even the state. The right to an open future consists of what 
Feinberg labels “rights-in-trust.” Joseph Millum explains what “rights-in-trust” 
amount to for Feinberg: 
[F]or each autonomy right held by autonomous adults, there exists a 
corresponding right-in-trust held by children who are not yet autonomous, 
but are expected to become so. These autonomy rights are, by definition, 
rights whose exercise depends on the bearer having the capacity for 
autonomous action, and therefore cannot be exercised by a child. 
However, they can be violated before the bearer acquires this capacity.30 
This means that for rights that belong to adults such as a right to privacy and a 
right to bodily autonomy, there are corresponding rights-in-trust for children. 
These are rights that do not belong to the child yet (or do not belong to the child 
in the fully developed forms that belong to adults), but nonetheless may be 
                                                          
29 See Feinberg, 1980. 




preemptively violated. There is an obvious question of scope which must be 
addressed when characterizing such rights. Indeed, one of the main criticisms of 
the concept of a right to an open future as Feinberg characterizes it is that it is 
unclear how demanding the standard for respecting a child’s right to an open 
future should be.31 If there is indeed a right-in-trust which corresponds to each 
and every autonomy right held by an autonomous adult, then it seems that 
depending on how we conceptualize rights we may end up with a right to an open 
future that precludes an absurd amount of parenting decisions from being made 
without thereby violating a right-in-trust. An adult, after all, has the right to make 
a substantial range of choices for herself, so long as those choices don’t violate 
the rights of others. But, merely by making decisions on behalf of their children in 
childhood, parents are necessarily closing off certain future decisions from their 
children, and thus potentially violating rights-in-trust concerning those decisions. 
However, it would be ridiculous to say that parents are morally required to keep a 
maximal set of options open to their children in order to avoid violating their 
children’s right to an open future. It is well within the autonomy rights of an adult 
to decide to make a living as a trapeze artist, but parents aren’t morally required to 
force children to do gymnastics in order to keep this option open for them. 
Further, parents are not even required to allow their children to do gymnastics in 
order to keep the option of future trapeze artistry open for those children. It seems 
that for plenty of options an adult may have the right to autonomously select, 
                                                          





parents have no positive or negative duties to keep those options open for their 
children.  
I propose that we here focus on a limited class of rights-in-trust which 
concern one’s ability to make particular decisions for oneself, perhaps framed in 
terms of a more general “right to self-direction” under the conceptual umbrella of 
which are more specific rights and corresponding obligations. For the project at 
hand I hold we ought to limit the scope of a right to an open future to certain 
pivotal and self-defining life decisions. The special importance of such life-
shaping, identity-establishing choices is – at least in part – what makes childhood 
betrothals and surgical sex assignment at birth wrong. Choosing one’s own life 
partner is a choice which will have an immense role in shaping one’s life. And 
surgical sex assignment at birth greatly impacts the identity and sense of self of 
the child. In light of this, to choose a life partner for one’s child or opt for surgical 
sex assignment if one’s child is born with ambiguous genitalia would be to violate 
the child’s right to an open future.  
However, it seems that there are many life- and identity-shaping choices 
which would be totally legitimate for parents to make on behalf of their children. 
Take the example of letting a child know that she stands to receive a sizeable 
inheritance upon graduating from college. This knowledge would likely have a 
substantial impact on that child’s sense of self and life plan. For instance, if the 
child is at all prudent, she will incorporate going to college into her life plan. 
Knowing that she has an inheritance waiting for her will likely influence what she 




worry about financial hardship means that she will not be pushed into any 
particular career route out of desperation. And, in terms of self-conception, she 
will be unlikely to identify as proletarian. A child’s knowledge that she will 
receive a sizeable inheritance will shape her life and likely identity in profound 
ways, but it seems well within the rights of parents to disclose this information to 
their child. Further, the child would not have been wronged by having a decision 
to disclose made on her behalf. Bestowing a sizeable inheritance has the effect of 
opening up a child’s future in terms of her range of choices rather than closing it 
off.32 This decision does not constrain the child’s autonomy in the way that an 
arranged marriage or surgical sex assignment would. When it comes to making 
life-shaping decisions on behalf of children, whether those decisions constrain a 
child’s future autonomy matters. Arranged marriages and surgical sex assignment 
are wrong not only because they make a life- and identity- shaping choice of great 
                                                          
32 It is worth here asking whether knowing about a future inheritance would itself 
open up a child’s range of future choices. After all, plenty of individuals who 
grow up knowing they have a substantial inheritance to look forward to end up 
leading lazy and dissolute lives. And, not only that, but these individuals seem to 
end up leading very similar sorts of lazy and dissolute lives. Perhaps knowing 
about a sizeable inheritance actually has the effect of closing off one’s life in such 
a way that one is likely to become a feckless social parasite. Despite the seeming 
ubiquity of this sort of life, I hold that knowledge of a future inheritance would in 
fact have the effect of opening up one’s future, even if some of the options it 
makes available are not ideal in terms of a standard of objective meaning or 
goodness in life. Further, it seems that the way in which one was raised would 
affect one’s future plans to a greater extent than the knowledge that one will have 




import for a child, but also because they have the effect of greatly narrowing the 
child’s range of future life options, and very important options at that. 
Rights in trust are thus rights to certain decisions. These decisions are 
those that will substantially shape the life and identity of the pediatric patient. 
Who to marry and what gender to live as (if one is born intersex) are examples of 
such decisions. Choosing whether or not to be made aware of potential incidental 
findings concerning incurable or highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset disorders 
is also a decision of this sort. However, it is not enough to simply say that all such 
choices must be left open to children, or else those children will have been 
morally wronged. In the same way that sometimes the rights of individuals may 
be justifiably violated to protect those individuals or others, sometimes the rights 
in trust of children may be rightly overridden by other moral considerations. 
Violating a child’s right to an open future ought not be done unless there 
are weighty countervailing moral considerations, such as serious harm or the 
imposition of physical, mental, and/or social deficits on the child. Such 
countervailing moral considerations are even weightier when they concern the 
sort of thing that would have the effect of closing off the future of the child. 
Further, certain decisions which would have the effect of opening up a child’s 
future and thus enhance her future autonomy rather than constrain it may be 
morally permissible to make on behalf of a child, even if to do so might strictly-
speaking violate a particular right-in-trust of that child. For example, taking action 
to prevent one’s child from losing a leg would have the effect of opening up the 




opportunity to participate in the Paralympics. This might strictly-speaking violate 
a right-in-trust of the child concerning self-direction, but such a violation would 
be clearly justified. Appropriate respect for the rights-in-trust of a child does not 
require that maximal choices be left open, only that particularly important self- 
and life-narrative-defining choices be left open to the child. 
4. Criteria for Delayed Choices  
I hold that the choice of whether to have incidental findings of adult-onset, 
incurable or highly unlikely to be cured, un-mitigatable (at least until clinical 
presentation) illnesses disclosed to parents of children who undergo WGS falls 
within the class of choices which ought to be delayed until a child reaches the age 
of majority and can decide for herself. I propose the following criteria for 
determining that a choice should be delayed until a child reaches the age of 
majority and can make the decision herself: (a) the choice concerns something 
that has the potential to substantially shape the life of the pediatric patient – both 
in terms of life narrative and personal identity/sense of self; (b) persons could 
reasonably disagree as to what the correct choice to make would be; (c) it’s 
unclear what the pediatric patient would choose for herself, if she were competent 
to choose; and (d) the choice can be delayed without medical harm to the patient. 
These are meant to be jointly sufficient criteria for refraining from releasing 
incidental findings to parents of pediatric patients, but this is not to deny that there 
may be situations where withholding incidental findings from parents would be 
justified on different grounds. With regard to the topic at hand, I hold that (a) the 




that has the potential to substantially shape the life of the pediatric patient – both 
in terms of life narrative and personal identity/sense of self; (b) persons could 
reasonably disagree as to what the correct choice to make would be – both 
concerning release of findings to parents as well as whether to opt for release of 
findings oneself; (c) in most cases, it will be unclear what the pediatric patient 
would choose for herself; and (d) the fact that the choice concerns disorders for 
which nothing can be done medically in childhood or before clinical presentation 
means that the choice can be delayed without medical harm to the patient.  
I have argued that criterion (a) is met and motivated why criterion (a) 
matters morally as it relates to respect for the patient’s future autonomy. As I have 
argued, releasing such incidental findings to a child’s parents has the potential to 
shape that child’s life and future, even if the parents opt to not disclose to the 
child. But the content of the choice itself is also of great import here. Knowing 
that one will develop such a disorder has the potential to profoundly shape one’s 
life and identity. Pivotal life choices such as choosing a long-term partner, 
deciding whether to have children, which career to pursue, what personal projects 
to pursue, and so on will be shaped by either knowing or not knowing that one 
will develop such an illness. The child should be able to choose for herself 
whether she wants to risk a future constrained by such knowledge, or whether she 
wants to live her life in the absence of such certainty. While it may be difficult to 
determine exactly how to weigh potential constraints on autonomy imposed by 
knowing on the one hand and not knowing on the other, the choice of whether to 




child herself. This is reason to take the choice of disclosure out of the hands of 
parents and preserve it for the pediatric patient once she is able to make it for 
herself. I will now motivate the importance of criteria (b)-(d) and argue that they, 
too, are met regarding the choice of whether or not to receive incidental findings 
of incurable or highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset disorders produced in the 
course of pediatric WGS. 
Criterion (b): People can reasonably disagree as to what the correct choice to 
make would be. 
If persons can reasonably disagree as to what the correct choice to make 
would be, then it follows that, in general, a patient herself could reasonably select 
either alternative. This fact alone could support either disclosure or nondisclosure. 
However, if there is room for reasonable disagreement and criteria (a), (c), and (d) 
are also met, then a choice ought to be delayed until the patient herself is 
competent to choose. I will argue that the choice of whether or not to receive 
findings of incurable or highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset disorders from 
pediatric WGS is one where persons could reasonably disagree as to what the 
right decision to make would be. This is because a preference to either possess or 
not possess such information is eminently reasonable, and additionally, it is 
possible to have an extremely strong preference one way or the other and to have 
even such strong preferences be reasonable. Such preferences will be rooted in 
what the individual values and subjective features of the individual will greatly 
shape what the individual would choose. Depending on one’s outlook on life and 




prefer not to find out about any lethal and incurable or highly unlikely to be cured 
disorders one will develop or to prefer to know maximal information in order to 
plan for the future. Depending on the value one places on, e.g., reducing anxiety 
vs. having control over one’s future, holding either preference could make perfect 
sense. Further, holding either preference strongly could make perfect sense. After 
all, knowledge that one will develop an incurable or highly unlikely to be cured, 
ultimately fatal, adult-onset disorder has the potential to significantly shape one’s 
life and sense of self. There is no fact of the matter as to whether it is objectively 
better to go through life blissfully ignorant of disease in one’s future or with full 
knowledge of such disease. What is best will depend upon features of the 
individual and her subjective values and preferences.  
There’s no perfect algorithm to use here, so we ought to bear in mind that 
both giving and withholding incidental findings has the potential to compromise 
patient autonomy. We should then integrate harms, benefits, and the inherent 
value of possessing certain choices, such as the choice of one’s own life partner, 
into account when determining whether autonomy has been unjustly constrained. 
In this way, we can evaluate and choose between two courses of action, both of 
which have the potential to unjustly constrain a patient’s autonomy. Precisely 
because weighing considerations in this manner is so difficult, reasonable people 
may disagree regarding whether opting for disclosure and risking the possibility 
of receiving knowledge of an incurable or highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset 
disorder is the best choice, or whether it would be best to live one’s life in 




may vary dramatically from individual to individual, the choice of whether to opt 
for disclosure ought to be delayed until the individual herself is able to make it. In 
such a case, there is no right decision to make on the patient’s behalf, and any 
decision made will reflect the proxy consenter’s idea of what would be best. 
There is no decision that is objectively best and a very real possibility that a proxy 
consenter would be choosing against what the patient herself would view as best, 
could she rationally understand and weigh her options.  
Criterion (c): It’s unclear what the pediatric patient would choose for herself, 
were she competent to choose. 
While it may be possible for reasonable people to disagree regarding the 
correct course of action in many cases, it might nonetheless be clear what the 
patient herself would choose, were she competent (e.g. through advance directives 
and/or persistent and consistent stated preferences). Criteria (b) and (c) go hand in 
hand. But, criterion (c) might not apply to some circumstances to which criterion 
(b) does apply. That is, even if reasonable disagreement is a possibility, it might 
be the case that the preferences of the patient are clear or easily-inferred. This is 
less of a possibility in the case of children than it would be in certain cases where, 
e.g., the elderly need the help of a proxy consenter. In such cases there might be 
many prior preferences and stated desires to draw upon in making a decision on 
the patient’s behalf, whereas children in general do not have the decision-making 
and reasoning capacity required in order to form and maintain rational and stable 
preferences. When an elderly patient is unable to provide informed consent due to 




draw upon in inferring what the patient would want, were she competent to decide 
on her own behalf. With pediatric patients, there is no such repository of 
rationally-endorsed and stable stated preferences. The cognitive limitations of 
children which preclude them from being able to provide informed consent, 
combined with uncertainty regarding what preferences children would endorse 
were they competent (or may come to endorse as adults) gives us good reason to 
hold that – in the absence of countervailing considerations – criterion (b) will be 
met in the case of choosing whether or not to be made aware of incidental 
findings of incurable or highly unlikely to be cured, adult-onset disorders from 
pediatric WGS.  
Criterion (d): The choice can be delayed without medical harm to the patient. 
The choice of whether to be made aware of the sort of incidental findings 
that this project concerns could be delayed without medical harm coming to the 
patient. This is because the range of relevant findings is limited to those which 
concern disorders that are incurable or highly unlikely to be cured and for which 
nothing medically can be done to ameliorate the effects before the disorder 
presents clinically. The necessity of criterion (d) being fulfilled has thus been 
already built into my account. 
An Objection: What About Planning for the Future? 
The natural objection to press here is this: even if nothing can be done 
medically to prevent, cure, or mitigate a child like Ari’s condition by taking action 




Huntington’s disease could help Ari’s parents to plan financially for his medical 
care and perhaps might help them to organize their life priorities in such a way 
that Ari has as good of a life as possible, in spite of this life inevitably ending 
prematurely. And it does seem that one way in which parents’ knowledge that 
their child will develop such a disorder might be beneficial is that it might enable 
them to better plan financially for their own future and the future of their child. If 
parents know that their child will develop a degenerative disorder in middle age, 
this will enable them to plan on better information than they would otherwise, and 
hopefully to save up for future medical expenses. Additionally, this could have a 
substantial impact on future planning for events like retirement. If parents know 
that there is a very real possibility that they will be supporting a child – at least in 
part – through the course of a fatal degenerative disorder, parents’ priorities in old 
age may look a lot different from those of individuals who do not have such 
considerations to take into account.  
If the child herself is told at some point that she will develop an adult-
onset incurable or highly unlikely to be cured degenerative disorder, this 
information would likely have an impact on her career planning as well as general 
life structuring. In fact, this information may prove a great boon in terms of 
adjusting expectations and setting realistic life goals that can be accomplished 
within a necessarily truncated timeframe. Clearly considerations such as saving 
for retirement will be less salient to someone who knows that she will likely die 
before reaching retirement age. And decisions such as whether to have children 




having children, opt to have children earlier in life than one would otherwise, or 
simply opt to have fewer children than one would otherwise if one knows that one 
won’t be around for a good portion of their lives and/or to help one’s partner raise 
them. Additionally, for the patient (as we established earlier regarding her 
parents), financial planning will likely be greatly affected by her possessing such 
information. Priority-setting in general will be affected as well. There is, after all, 
not much point in putting off fun things for the future when that future is itself 
unlikely. So, in light of all this, how can I justify limiting considerations here to 
those involving medical harm and benefit rather than including those 
considerations which may affect planning of both financial and a more general 
life-trajectory-related sort? I will here make two arguments to support my 
position: that the importance of an open future overrides the importance of such 
planning, and that there is no guarantee that such benefits would accrue from 
knowing. 
The importance of an open future overrides the importance of such planning. 
 The main tension here is between the utility of planning and the value of 
an open future for the child. It’s already been established that the choice of 
whether or not to be made aware of incidental findings of incurable or highly 
unlikely to be cured adult-onset disorders from pediatric WGS is one of those 
potentially life- and identity- shaping choices which the right to an open future is 
meant to preserve, in the absence of overriding moral considerations. And, it’s 
been established that persons could reasonably disagree as to whether it would be 




information and thus avoid having one’s life shaped by such information and the 
anxiety of knowing. So, the question here is, does the utility of planning for Ari’s 
parents (and Ari if they decide to tell him) outweigh Ari’s right to an open future? 
It does not, I contend. Knowing who one’s child would marry would surely aid 
parents in planning for their child’s future, financially and otherwise, but the 
utility of this knowledge does not override the child’s right to choose her own 
partner. In the same way, the importance of the pediatric patient herself being able 
to decide whether or not to be made aware of any available life- and identity- 
shaping incidental findings overrides the importance of financial and life-planning 
on the part of her parents or the patient herself, if the parents opt to disclose this 
information to her.33 
There is no guarantee such benefits would accrue from knowing 
The contention that the utility of financial and general life-planning should 
be accounted for when determining whether parents should be given the option to 
have incidental findings released immediately relies upon a rose-tinted view of 
how most parents would react to such a situation. This is not to say that there 
aren’t plenty of parents who would responsibly plan for the future of a child who 
they know will develop Huntington’s disease and try their best to ensure that he 
                                                          
33 One might ask at this point whether Ari’s parents might not provide Ari the 
option of receiving his findings once he reaches age 18. This would, presumably, 
still leave Ari’s future open. However, as I argued in section 2 of this paper, I 
hold that disclosing to Ari’s parents is, in itself, the sort of thing that could 




has the best short life possible. What I mean to say is that there is no saying how 
all or even most parents would react to knowing that their child’s life will 
necessarily be cut short by a painful degenerative disorder.  
It’s not outside the realm of possibility that Ari’s parents might treat him 
more coldly than they would otherwise in an effort to not get too attached and 
insulate themselves emotionally from the pain of loss. Or, perhaps Ari’s parents 
are the cool, calculating types who don’t see much point in enrolling Ari in a 
private kindergarten rather than the abysmal public school in their district. After 
all, if solid elementary education correlates to later earnings and Ari’s life will 
likely be cut off in his prime working years, what’s the point of investing in 
expensive primary education? Or, perhaps more realistically, his parents will 
simply not want to deal with thinking about the fact that Ari will die prematurely 
and would make whatever life and financial decisions they would anyway, with 
no tangible benefit to Ari of them having this information. Perhaps Ari’s parents 
would live their lives as they would have done anyway, only sadder.  
The scenarios outlined above may express an unrealistically pessimistic 
view of how Ari’s parents might respond, but they underscore the point that there 
is a vast range of possible responses to learning that one’s child will develop an 
incurable adult-onset genetic disorder. Once non-medical circumstances and 
conjecture regarding priorities which may differ greatly from family to family are 
brought into a determination of whether certain considerations override a child’s 




deeply uncertain endeavor. Moreover, in light of this uncertainty, we should opt 
for delayed disclosure. 
5. Taking Stock 
In light of the importance of respecting the future autonomy of children 
like Ari, coupled with the unclear and likely negative psychological effects on 
Ari’s family (and families like his) of receiving incidental findings of 
Huntington’s disease (and similar genetic disorders), we have substantial reason 
to delay release of at least a certain class of incidental findings from pediatric 
WGS until the patient herself reaches the age of majority. While I have gone into 
greater detail in examining the relevance and importance of respect for autonomy 
and promotion of well-being, Abdul-Karim and colleagues precede me in pointing 
to these considerations as favoring a tiered consent process for release of 
incidental findings from genetic testing on children. However, they only make 
explicit recommendations for which type of findings from broadly-focused 
pediatric genetic testing warrant immediate release. This leaves it open for me to 
build on their account and provide a model for findings which warrant delayed 
disclosure. Before extending Abdul-Karim et al.’s account, I will briefly outline 
the model they provide, note what remains to be done, and then outline my unique 






6. Abdul-Karim et al.’s Proposal Regarding Which Incidental Findings to 
Release to Parents Upon Discovery 
Abdul-Karim and colleagues put forward an account of what sort of 
incidental findings ought to be disclosed to the parents of pediatric patients 
immediately upon discovery:34 
[I]nvestigators should, at a minimum, disclose incidental findings of 
genetic variants with known, urgent clinical significance for the children 
enrolled in the study. We propose the following criteria for evaluating 
whether a finding has “known, urgent clinical significance”: 1. Knowledge 
of the finding must have a clear and direct benefit that could be lost if the 
disclosure was postponed until the child reaches the age of majority, such 
as information that could substantially alter medical decisions in the short 
term. 2. The potential benefit of knowing the information must clearly 
outweigh the potential risks of anxiety and other psychosocial harms that 
could result from this knowledge. 3. Genetic variants related to 
multifactorial conditions that also have strong environmental components, 
such as heart disease or diabetes, should be disclosed only if they indicate 
a substantial increase in risk.35 
                                                          
34 Abdul-Karim et al. also leave it open that a sufficiently cognitively-advanced 
child like an adolescent might properly receive such findings along with their 
parents. 




This is a minimal account of disclosure, and it is left open that some findings 
which do not meet these criteria might be appropriately disclosed immediately. 
For instance, in some cases where a child may prove to be a carrier for an 
incurable and impossible to mitigate (through action before clinical presentation) 
adult-onset condition, future reproductive considerations on the part of the parents 
may be weighty enough to override reasons for delaying return of such findings 
until the child reaches the age of majority. By this I mean that if the child will 
almost certainly develop disease X, and further that any siblings of this child will 
almost certainly develop disease X as well, we may be justified in immediately 
disclosing these findings to the child’s parents (assuming that the parents are able 
and might potentially decide to have more children). In a range of cases where 
there is a real and imminent risk of harm to future children, countervailing 
reproductive considerations for the family of the child test subject may motivate 
immediate disclosure. If, for instance, medical providers had reason to believe 
that Ari’s parents were planning on having future children, or even that they might 
have future children, this might warrant immediate disclosure (to his parents) of 
the incidental finding of HD. Abdul-Karim and colleagues maintain, and I agree, 
that in certain situations, disclosure may be warranted, even if a finding does not 
fall within the guidelines laid out by this account. However, this should be left up 
to the discretion of the relevant healthcare providers.  





I will adopt Abdul-Karim and colleagues’ criteria for which incidental 
findings from pediatric WGS warrant immediate disclosure to a child patient’s 
proxy consenter. In what follows, I will extend this account and provide my own 
set of guidelines for which incidental findings ought to be disclosed to patients 
upon reaching the age of majority (rather than being disclosed immediately or not 
warranting disclosure at all). I will also develop guidelines for what procedure 
ought to be followed in re-contacting patients and potentially disclosing such 
findings. 
7. Specifying Which Findings Ought to Be Subject to Delayed Disclosure and 
How to Disclose Them 
Abdul-Karim and colleagues have laid out a solid account of which 
incidental findings ought to be disclosed immediately, but it is still an open 
question whether any remaining findings ought to be disclosed once the patient 
reaches the age of majority and, if so, how. I hold that the information that should 
be released upon the patient reaching the age of majority is information of clear 
medical import, but for which nothing could have been done of clinical import 
before the patient reached the age of majority. Further, the information should 
concern adult-onset disorders which are incurable or highly unlikely to be cured. 
However, there may be further considerations (e.g. sufficiently weighty social, 
reproductive, or financial concerns) which tip the scales in favor of immediate 
release to proxy consenters. Whether such considerations reach the threshold of 
significance required to prompt immediate disclosure should be determined by a 




import should not even be considered for release at any point. These are the sort 
of findings of which the patient need never even be made aware. Receiving 
findings of unclear or marginal clinical significance would likely be distressing 
for the patient, as well as clinically useless. 
Next, the method for disclosure should be established. There are better and 
worse ways to go about releasing incidental findings to a patient once she reaches 
the age of majority. Simply providing a patient with a printout of her genome and 
wishing her luck would be far from the ideal method of disclosure. The ideal 
method of disclosure ought to run the least risk of harm to the patient while at the 
same time leaving open a route to obtaining incidental findings if the patient 
wishes to do so. Additionally, as always, it is imperative that the patient 
understand what is going on and the potential consequences of having distressing 
findings disclosed to her. The patient should be able to provide genuinely 
informed consent on the basis of the information given. 
The ideal model would look something like this: upon reaching the age of 
majority, everyone who underwent WGS as a child is contacted and told that there 
may or may not be incidental findings of clinical import related to childhood 
WGS. The subject is also told that everyone who was tested is being contacted, to 
prevent her from concluding that something of clinical import must have been 
found in order for her to be contacted. The person contacting the patient must be 
wholly agnostic as to the existence of clinically significant findings.  At this point, 
the subject may opt to pursue this further or not. If she opts out, or ignores 




begin. If she opts in, and there are no clinically significant findings, she’ll be told 
that there are no clinically significant findings, and the process will end. If she 
opts in, and there are findings of clinical significance, then she will go through the 
same consent process that she would in the case of any incidental findings for 
adults.  
 It is true that contacting each and every former pediatric patient who 
undergoes WGS will mean contacting a large number of people, but if an 
efficient, standardized protocol for re-contacting is established it needn’t pose too 
burdensome a pragmatic challenge for clinicians and researchers. After all, e.g., 
subjects in cohort studies and individuals who donate bone marrow are contacted 
on an extended basis, and so it seems like there are ample precedents for figuring 
out a method of patient tracking and re-contacting. 
8. A Model for Delayed Disclosure 
I will now outline a model for delayed return of a limited class of 
incidental findings from pediatric WGS. This model will specify the sort of 
genetic disorders and diseases to which it applies (Conditions on Disease), 
circumstances necessary in order for the model to hold (Conditions on 
Circumstances), and what release of incidental findings will look like after the 
patient reaches the age of majority (Conditions on Release). 
i. Conditions on Disease 
The sort of diseases and medical conditions to which this model applies 




low likelihood of cure.36 It must also be the case that there is no way to mitigate – 
in medical terms – the effects of the disease by taking action in childhood, or 
before the disorder presents clinically. Candidate disorders for currently incurable 
disorders include Huntington’s Disease, Early-onset Alzheimer’s, and the 
dominant variant of Charcot-Marie Tooth Disease. Additionally, since I am 
primarily concerned with protecting the pediatric patient from being saddled with 
unasked-for information regarding a truly bleak medical future, disorders with a 
very low likelihood of cure will also be included in my delayed return model. 
Genetically-based disorders like Familial Adenomatous Polyposis Coli “(an 
inherited disorder of the bowel associated with a very high incidence of early 
onset bowel cancer)”37 and Early-onset Breast or Ovarian Cancer “(an inherited 
disposition to develop breast or ovarian cancer in early adulthood)”38 do not have 
good prognoses for 5-year survival, even with treatment and would thus fall under 
the umbrella of disorders included in my delayed return model.39  
There is a clear concern here as to how we are to determine which 
disorders to include; arbitrarily choosing a percentage of probability of cure and 
                                                          
36 It is important to note here that what a ‘cure’ amounts to may be disease-
dependent. Some diseases may be eliminated entirely from the patient’s body, 
while the progression of others may be merely delayed or slowed to a sufficient 
extent (I have in mind here certain cancers which may be eliminated from the 
patient’s body but are likely to recur at some point within the patient’s lifetime.)  






making that the cutoff for delayed disclosure would be far from ideal. In order to 
determine whether a particular disorder is unlikely enough to be cured to be 
included in my delayed disclosure scheme, I propose that we once again rely upon 
the notion of reasonable disagreement. Specifically, we should take a large 
representative sample of the population and present them with different candidate 
disorders and likelihood of successful treatment, and the point at which a plurality 
of people say that they either would not want to know or would be indifferent to 
knowing about developing a disorder far in advance of clinical presentation would 
serve as the threshold for determining whether or not delayed disclosure is a solid 
option for findings concerning that particular disorder.  
This is an admittedly rough sketch of how things would work, but I have 
in mind a preference elicitation method where people are presented with cases in 
which the likelihood of successful treatment grows steadily higher. Then, for each 
case, they would be asked if they would opt for disclosure significantly before the 
disorder presents clinically. If there are limited enough candidate disorders, all of 
the disorders under consideration could be included. And, if there are many 
candidate disorders, then disorders with similarities in terms of symptoms, 
morbidity, and time of onset could be sorted into bins and individuals being 
surveyed could be presented with representative disorders from each bin. When it 
comes to disorders which are currently incurable but for which a treatment is 
likely to be developed, the preference elicitation method should be adjusted for 
the possibility of such a treatment being developed, perhaps even building in both 




of success of that treatment. In this way, which disorders should be included in 
my delayed disclosure model could be determined in a rigorous and empirically-
grounded manner.    
ii. Conditions on Circumstances 
This account only applies to situations where there is enough stability and 
bureaucratic competence in institutions that re-contact is likely to be possible. 
Additionally, there must exist sufficient information security to maintain patient 
privacy and prevent genetic information from falling into the wrong hands. 
Maintaining data privacy is a problem that is not unique to this context. Even if 
incidental findings were to be immediately disclosed to parents, they would 
presumably be stored in the same electronic format as findings for delayed 
release. It is sufficient that genetic information is stored at the same level of 
security as are other medical records.40 Finally, in order to keep contact 
information for patients up to date, their parents or guardians should be regularly 
contacted every couple of years or so to confirm that information is accurate and 
current. 
 
                                                          
40 The only way that security would absolutely not be a concern would be if one 
either disclosed findings to parents without recording the findings, or didn’t 
disclose findings to parents and also didn’t record the findings. In certain 
exceptional cases, perhaps telling the parents and not recording findings might 




iii. Conditions on Release 
I think it best to do a blanket re-contacting of all test subjects, rather than 
just focusing on those who have incidental findings which may be of clinical 
import. When the patient reaches the age of majority, she will be re-contacted and 
informed that she participated in genetic testing, that there may or may not be 
incidental findings of clinical import for her from that testing and asked whether 
or not she is interested in being made aware of such findings.  The patient should 
also be told that everyone who participate in testing of the same sort is being re-
contacted. By which I mean, the patient will be reminded or made aware of the 
fact that she underwent WGS as a child, and then told that there is a chance of 
incidental findings of clinical import for all subjects. There may or may not be 
any incidental findings of clinical import in her particular case, and she may opt 
in or out of finding this out, once she has an idea of the risks she runs either way. 
This will avoid the situation where a patient is re-contacted, told that something of 
import was found, and then asked whether she wants to be made aware of those 
findings. This is saddling the patient with a choice she may very well prefer to be 
exempted from, given that a finding of import is probably a finding with bad 
implications. To call someone up and ask “We found some genetic information 
we thought you might want to know. Do you want to know?” would essentially 
amount to presenting her with the information that something is significantly 
worrisome about her genetic makeup, which could be as troubling and have as 
much of a negative impact on her life as knowledge of a specific genetic 




If the patient simply ignores attempts to re-contact, then her decision to do 
so should be respected. Re-contact should not be attempted more than 2-3 times, 
after which failure will be taken to indicate a lack of interest on the patient’s part. 
If the patient opts in to begin the disclosure process she will have to meet with a 
medical professional who can explain the sort of potential findings which might 
be revealed and give her an idea of the import of such findings. She will thus have 
to go through a process to ensure informed consent for the return of any incidental 
findings from her childhood testing. If the patient provides informed consent, and 
if there are findings of any substantial significance, she will then meet with a 
genetic counselor in order to determine both the potential clinical significance of 
and how to psychologically process the findings. The patient will be free to opt 
out at any stage in this process. 
So, this process for re-contacting has the following steps (1) re-contact all 
subjects, explain there may or may not be incidental findings from their genome 
being mapped in childhood and that everyone who underwent pediatric WGS will 
also be re-contacted. Allow the subject to opt in or out of being made aware of 
such findings. (2) If the subject opts in, tell her whether or not there are findings 
of clinical import. (3) If there are findings of clinical import, have the subject 
meet with a professional to go through a consent process that gives her an idea of 
what the findings may be and the implications they may have for her life going 
forward. Given that these findings are limited to a relatively small set of incurable 
or highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset disorders for which nothing can be done 




presented to her in terms of general types of conditions of this sort, and these 
categories will be limited. Hopefully this will make the process minimally 
burdensome. At this point, the subject may opt in or out of receiving her specific 
findings. (4) If the subject opts in, a genetic counselor will reveal and run through 
the findings with her. Special attention should be paid to making the subject be 
aware of relative risks and how to interpret her findings in terms of risk. 
Guidelines for Delayed Disclosure: 
Conditions on Disease*: 
D1. Adult-Onset. Clinical symptoms would not manifest before 
patient reaches age of majority. 
D2. Incurable or highly unlikely to be cured. Disease in question is 
currently incurable or highly unlikely to be cured. 
D3. Unmitigatable. Nothing medically can be done in childhood to 
affect the course of the disease. 
*That all conditions are met should be verified by a board of 
medical professionals. 
Conditions on Circumstances: 
C1. Significant Likelihood of Re-contact. Re-contacting patients at 
the age of majority will -- in all likelihood -- be possible. 
C2. Sufficient Information Security. Genetic data will be stored at 




C3. Regular Check-In. Check-ins should take place every couple 
of years in order to make sure that contact information stays 
current. 
Conditions on Release: 
R1. Re-contact at Age of Majority. Re-contacting will take place 
upon the patient reaching the age of majority. 
R2. Patient Opts In. Once re-contacted, it will be up to the patient 
to opt in to release of incidental findings. 
R3. Opt In Triggers Secondary Consent Process. The patient will 
provide informed consent to receive incidental findings. 
9. Potential Challenges 
9a. Parental Autonomy Concerns 
One might object that my proposal restricts parental autonomy in a 
troubling manner. After all, parents have incredible latitude in how they raise their 
children and the decisions they may make on their children’s behalf. Parents may 
choose not to vaccinate their children, they may choose to homeschool their 
children in accordance with strict Biblical principles, to raise their children on a 
macrobiotic diet or to consult a naturopath for all but the most dire medical 
conditions. To restrict parents from making such decisions, regardless of whether 
or not we agree with them, would be to perniciously undermine parental 




information they are permitted to acquire on their child’s behalf may even go so 
far as to undermine the family unit, its goals, and collective decisions.41 In light of 
this, how can I justify restricting the range of incidental findings available to 
parents, subverting current parental autonomy in favor of the future autonomy of 
the child? 
Parents rightly have many areas of discretion when it comes to choice-
making on behalf of their children, but being a parent doesn’t make someone a 
medical expert or even a particularly good reasoner. Parents aren’t allowed to 
violate seatbelt laws because they think seatbelts harmfully place pressure on the 
body’s essential meridians or completely substitute meditation practice for 
schooling because they think all knowledge is innate and must be drawn out 
rather than learned. It’s not outrageous to limit the incidental findings made 
available to parents out of a concern for the well-being of the child, just as it’s not 
outrageous to limit parental authority in any number of other ways. 
Parents often have great latitude when it comes to making medical 
decisions on behalf of their children. This is evident from cases of parents who try 
– sometimes successfully – to bar their children from receiving conventional 
medical treatments and talk in the bioethical literature about how taking medical 
decisions out of the hands of parents threatens ‘familial objectives’ or fails to give 
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adequate weight to ‘the familial perspective’.42 The idea behind taking ‘familial 
objectives’ or ‘the familial perspective’ seriously is that the family is a largely 
autonomous unit that operates on norms that may differ from the norms of the rest 
of society, or even with basic liberal ideals. The importance of the family as 
something grounded in intimate relations and shared familial norms and interests 
is taken to be a weighty moral consideration when family norms and interests 
come into conflict with competing norms and interests. Ferdinand Schoeman 
explains: 
The state's relation with the child is formal while the parental relation is 
intimate, having its own goals and purposes. While the liberal canons 
insist on the incompetent one's best interest, parents are permitted to 
compromise the child's interests for ends related to these familial goals 
and purposes. Parents decisions should be supervened, in general, only if it 
can be shown that no responsible mode of thinking warrants such 
treatment of a child.43 
The state encroaching on the autonomy of the family sphere is generally seen to 
be bad on this sort of view, although the badness of this may be overridden by 
other considerations like the welfare of children in extreme cases where “it can be 
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Schoeman 1985.  




shown that no responsible mode of thinking warrants such treatment of a child” as 
Schoeman puts it. 
I do not agree that restricting the decisions parents are able to make on 
behalf of their children necessarily denies the importance of the family’s 
perspective and objectives, nor do I entirely understand how appeal to the familial 
perspective amounts to much more than a more palatable presentation of the 
parental perspective. As Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock perceptively point out:  
Given the very great inequality of power between parents and children, 
reference to the family’s interest or “familial objectives” is all too likely to 
serve as a cover for the parents’ interests precisely in those cases in which 
the latter conflict with those of the child.44 
The stance I am taking here is controversial, but I hold that there is good reason to 
restrict parental rights in many cases of medical decision making. This is due, at 
least in part, to widespread medical illiteracy.45 It’s surely unfair to expect 
everyone to have the same level of knowledge of medical data and how to 
interpret it as medical professionals ideally should, but this lack of understanding 
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of U.S. adults had proficient health literacy.” and “[o]ver a third of U.S. adults—
77 million people—would have difficulty with common health tasks, such as 
following directions on a prescription drug label or adhering to a childhood 




should entail restrictions on the types of decisions that should be made by those 
with little to no medical expertise on behalf of others for whom they are 
responsible.   
In reality there may be a lot of freedom for parents to make poor medical 
decisions on behalf of their children, but I contend that there often shouldn’t be. 
While the question at hand is whether my model for delayed disclosure of 
incidental findings unjustly constrains parental autonomy, I hold that it does not, 
and that there are likely other cases where similar restrictions on parental 
decision-making may be desirable. I will here endorse some general rationality 
and expertise-based criteria for restricting parental autonomy in some cases of 
medical decision-making. So, a parent may choose a cancer treatment for her 
child from among the available options presented by a competent physician, but 
she may not choose to treat her child’s cancer solely with sage oil or coffee 
enemas. In the same way that a parent cannot refuse a life-saving blood 
transfusion on behalf of her child, a parent cannot make decisions on behalf of her 
child that are so misguided as to bring about the same outcome, even indirectly.  
It is clear that a respect for and prioritization of parental autonomy ought 
not extend to situations where a parent is inclined to make a decision that will kill 
her child. But how does justification for such a restriction on parental autonomy 
relate to whether or not parents ought to have the authority to receive incidental 
findings of incurable or highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset diseases for their 
children? While the decision to receive conventional cancer treatment or a life-




justification for restricting parental autonomy applies to less extreme, but 
nevertheless quite important, medical decisions. Sometimes adequately respecting 
a child’s future autonomy entails restricting the autonomy of parents. And, in 
cases where there exists both the potential to seriously constrain the future 
autonomy of the child coupled with serious concerns regarding the impact of a 
decision on the child’s well-being, parental decision-making authority ought to be 
constrained if possible in favor of allowing the child to make her own choice once 
she is competent. Whether to be made aware of incidental findings of incurable or 
highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset disorders is just such a case. Our status as 
autonomous agents confers upon us a right to make poor decisions on our own 
behalf, but not to make poor decisions on behalf of others, in the same way that a 
right to make our own decisions does not entail that we have a right to make 
decisions that seriously harm others without some overriding justification for 
doing so.46  
                                                          
46 A reasonable question to ask here is whether medical professionals have a right 
to make poor decisions on behalf of their pediatric patients. Would medical 
professionals be less likely to make poor decisions than parents would? I hold 
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incompetent medical professionals, but I do think that the general populace is 
more likely to be deeply incompetent in regard to medical decision-making than 
medical professionals would be. If this were not the case, it would be unclear 





9b. Potential Restrictions on Testing 
This challenge to parental autonomy additionally points to an issue beyond 
the matter of incidental findings -- that of how to handle the widespread genetic 
testing of children and neonates which looms on the horizon. My position might 
theoretically commit me to endorse placing limitations on the sorts of conditions 
that parents may test their children for in the first place. If it is the case that being 
saddled with the knowledge of incurable or highly unlikely to be cured adult-
onset conditions is damaging to the well-being of children and having such 
knowledge forced on them does compromise these children’s autonomy, then it 
seems that preventing parents from having targeted testing done on their children 
for such conditions might be morally justified on the same grounds.  
I hold that the way in which we handle incidental findings of the sort with 
which my model is concerned should also be the way in which we address the 
prospect of generating non-incidental findings of the same sort. That is, either 
certain conditions (incurable or highly unlikely to be cured, unmitigable, adult-
onset conditions) simply should not be tested for, or, if such testing is conducted, 
the findings should be withheld until the patient reaches the age of majority and 
can provide informed consent to either receive or not receive the findings. In 
general, genetic testing shouldn’t be performed in the first place unless it is 
medically indicated and/or necessary for medical research. In some research 
contexts, the issue of return of incidental findings is precluded by the design of 
the project itself. For example, in cases of biobanking, full anonymization may be 




on behalf of their child to this anonymization, which entails that any information 
gleaned from sequencing the child’s genome cannot be returned. In this sort of 
case, WGS is undergone to benefit medical science rather than the individual 
whose genome is being sequenced.  In the case of non-anonymized medical 
research, results should simply be disclosed or released to the child upon reaching 
the age of majority in the manner I have suggested. In cases of clinical testing 
which may produce incidental findings, my model for delayed disclosure should 
be followed. 
The growing and projected availability of commercial genetic testing 
complicates this issue as parents may someday be able to test their children to see 
if they are carriers for diseases like early-onset Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s 
disease without having to go through a medical professional. However, this would 
be wrong of the parent to do. There are many adults with a family history of 
genetic disorders like Huntington’s who opt not to be tested.47 It seems wrong to 
deprive the child of being able to make that choice for herself once she’s 
competent to do so. The position put forward in this paper regarding proper 
limitations on proxy consent for return of certain incidental findings will likewise 
constrain the reach of proxy consent in cases of non-incidental findings of the 
same sort.  
 
 
                                                          





The biggest pragmatic challenges to this proposal are the logistical 
problems of re-contacting and the possibility of failure to re-contact. It may be 
difficult to keep track of children until they reach the age of majority, especially if 
they are very young when the testing occurs. This is of particular concern in the 
United States, where medical records have yet to be standardized across 
institutions. Unless their parents are very conscientious about informing the 
hospital or research institution about address and phone number changes, it would 
be easy for individual patients or subjects to fall through the cracks.  
The best way to make sure that contact information remains current would 
be to check in with the parents regularly (perhaps every couple of years). There is 
some precedent for this, particularly in cohort studies and other situations where 
information on particular patient populations is collected over time. However, this 
leaves a lot of latitude for non-compliance or simple mistakes interfering with 
one’s being able to effectively contact the now-adult subject once she reaches the 
age of majority. The parents could simply forget to return calls when these 
periodic check-ins occur, and the research institution might give up after a couple 
of attempts to establish contact. 
Fortunately, there is some hope that patients could soon be tracked from 
institution to institution, without necessarily needing to re-establish contact to 
determine if information is current. If a patient moves from one state to another, 
and their new primary care physician shares electronic records with the old one, 




assuming the family hasn’t gone off the grid entirely and has current contact 
information listed with some institution in the system – it will be possible to keep 
track of the patient even over many years. At the moment, we are in the midst of a 
difficult transition to electronic record-keeping and sharing of medical 
information.48 There are still many problems to resolve in order to ensure that 
hospitals and other medical research institutions can share patient records across 
different platforms. However, once medical records are shared between all or 
nearly all hospitals (at least in the United States), it should be much easier to keep 
track of patients over a prolonged period of time. 
10. Conclusion 
I have made the case that delaying the disclosure of incidental findings 
concerning incurable or highly unlikely to be cured adult-onset diseases for which 
nothing can be done medically in childhood until the pediatric patient reaches the 
age of majority and can decide for herself whether to receive them is the best way 
to respect the autonomy and promote the well-being of children like Ari. I have 
expanded upon Abdul-Karim, Berkman, Wendler, and colleagues’ ethical 
framework and guidelines for when to immediately disclose incidental findings 
produced from pediatric genetic testing and developed and motivated my own 
account of which incidental findings ought to be released to pediatric patients 
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Wachter, Robert M. The Digital Doctor: Hope, Hype, and Harm at the Dawn of 




once they reach the age of majority, and how these findings ought to be released. I 
maintain that the model I have built here for delayed disclosure of incidental 
findings is most consistent with respecting the autonomy and promoting the well-
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EARLY PALLIATIVE SEDATION THERAPY AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SUFFERING 
Introduction 
Recently, a physically-healthy 24-year-old Belgian woman named Emily 
was granted medical assistance to end her life due to unbearable psychological 
suffering as the result of persistent and severe depression.49 Many agree that we 
should provide medical aid in dying (e.g. physician-assisted suicide, active 
voluntary euthanasia, withdrawal of care necessary to sustain life) to terminally ill 
patients who find themselves in excruciating and intractable pain.50 But cases like 
that of Emily raise some difficult ethical questions. If individuals may opt for 
physician-assisted dying due to unremitting psychological pain in the absence of 
terminal illness, this leaves us with some troubling epistemic uncertainty, 
especially regarding questions of how to determine the severity of the patient’s 
suffering, how to determine the refractoriness of pain, how to decide whether a 
particular treatment ought to be tried before labeling a patient’s suffering 
refractory, and which psychological factors preclude competent medical decision-
making. 
In the United States, physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is currently legal in 
only a handful of states. How exactly PAS is regulated varies from state to state. 
For instance, according to Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act (DWDA), on which 
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physician-assisted suicide legislation in other states has been based, in order to 
receive assisted suicide, a person must have a terminal illness, a prognosis of 6 
months or less to live, approval from at least one physician that she is competent 
to make such a decision, and approval from a psychiatrist or psychologist if her 
decision-making competence is unclear.51 This system precludes the sorts of 
situations which generate the difficult ethical questions that arise from physician-
assisted dying to relieve psychological suffering. By limiting the availability of 
physician-assisted suicide to those who are terminally ill and at the end of their 
lives, the question of whether to accommodate cases of intractable and severe 
psychological suffering in the absence of terminal illness by providing medical 
aid in dying does not even arise. 
However, there is an end-of-life (EOL) intervention available throughout the 
United States which can be employed to relieve unremitting psychological 
suffering: palliative sedation therapy (PST). And, even though it currently only 
takes place in EOL contexts, I will argue that endorsing its moral permissibility 
for use at the end of life rationally entails that we endorse it for use in the absence 
of terminal illness and when death is far from imminent, if criteria of sufficiently 
severe refractory suffering and patient consent obtain. This is because if severe 
suffering, refractoriness, and consent are present in both cases, it is unclear why 
we ought to permit a patient to opt for PST in the EOL case but not in an earlier 
case which is identical in morally relevant respects. Thus, a commitment to the 
                                                          




moral permissibility in EOL cases further rationally commits us to the moral 
permissibility of early PST.   
I will first show how considerations of respect for patient autonomy and well-
being (specifically in terms of the patient’s dignity) ground the moral 
permissibility of PST. I will then argue for the rational entailment from EOL PST 
to early PST and consider the problems of how to determine sufficient severity 
and genuine refractoriness of psychological pain and how to determine reasonable 
means to take in establishing refractoriness outside of an EOL context (where this 
is much less clear than it is in temporally-limited EOL cases). I will further 
address the question of when psychological illness precludes competent decision-
making and whether it might not in some cases be morally right to end the lives of 
incompetent psychiatric patients who have nonetheless exhibited an established 
and persistent desire to die, and whose suffering appears genuinely refractory (as 
Jukka Varelius argues).52 Finally, I will sketch out a possible way to limit cases of 
early PST by explicitly endorsing a requirement for severity of pain that is 
inversely proportional to the amount of time a patient is expected to live.    
PART 1: ESTABLISHING A RATIONAL COMMITMENT TO THE 
MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF EARLY PST 
1a. Defining Palliative Sedation Therapy 
Palliative Sedation Therapy (PST), also referred to as “palliative sedation” 
or “terminal sedation”, is an intervention that may be employed by physicians at 
                                                          




the end of a patient’s life to relieve intractable pain by dropping the patient below 
the level of consciousness until she eventually passes away.  PST is defined by 
Susan Chater and colleagues as follows: 
[D]eliberately inducing and maintaining deep sleep […] in very specific 
circumstances. These are: 1) for the relief of one or more intractable 
symptoms when all other possible interventions have failed and the patient 
is perceived to be close to death, or 2) for the relief of profound anguish 
that is not amenable to spiritual, psychological, or other interventions, and 
the patient is perceived to be close to death.53   
PST may be used to treat both physical and psychological symptoms. The 
requirements for employing PST are that the patient be suffering from refractory 
physical or psychological symptoms, that death be close at hand, and that consent 
be obtained from the patient herself and/or her surrogate decision-maker. 
Refractory symptoms are those which cannot be adequately alleviated by any 
other means (e.g. psychotherapy, drugs, spiritual and/or familial support and so 
on). Patients are administered sedatives which keep them in a state of 
unconsciousness and food and fluids are often withheld.  PST can last from hours 
to weeks, but typically a patient will die within the first few days.54 
Although some object to the use of Palliative Sedation Therapy on the 
grounds that it is akin to euthanasia, it is widely employed and generally 
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acknowledged to be a beneficial and morally permissible medical treatment.55  
One of the main reasons that PST is legal throughout the United States while 
active euthanasia remains illegal in all but a handful of states is because PST is 
prima facie easily differentiated from active euthanasia in terms of the rule of 
double effect. I will rely here upon Timothy Quill, Rebecca Dresser, and Dan 
Brock’s definition: 
According to the ethical principle known as the “rule of double effect,” 
[when certain conditions are met] effects that would be morally wrong if 
caused intentionally are permissible if foreseen but unintended. […] 
Classic formulations of the rule of double effect emphasize four key 
conditions. [1] The first concerns the nature of the act, which must be 
good, such as the relief of pain, or at least morally neutral and not in a 
category that is absolutely prohibited, such as the killing of innocent 
persons. [2] The second concerns the agent’s intention. The “good effect 
and not the evil effect must be intended.” The bad effect, such as 
respiratory depression after the administration of opioids, may be 
“foreseen, but not intended.” [3] The third condition is the distinction 
between means and effects. The bad effect, such as death, must not be a 
means to the good effect, such as the relief of suffering. [4] The fourth 
condition is the proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect. 
                                                          





The good effect must outweigh the bad effect. The bad effect can be 
permitted only when there is “proportionally grave reason” for it.56 
It is easy to see how the rule of double effect might justify PST but not active 
euthanasia.57 PST satisfies all four of the criteria outlined above by Quill, Dresser, 
and Brock: (1) In PST cases, the act is good in that it relieves pain. (2) The agent 
(usually understood to be the relevant physician) intends to relieve the patient’s 
pain through sedation. (2-3) Death in this case is foreseen but not intended, and it 
is not a means to the end of pain relief, but rather a side-effect of achieving that 
end. (4) And, in PST cases, the good effect of pain relief is proportional to the 
“evil” effect of death. This is because the patient is suffering greatly, to such an 
extent that permanent unconsciousness is desirable. Even if the patient were not 
sedated, this suffering would in all likelihood continue until the patient passes 
away from her underlying illness. If being unconscious for the remainder of one’s 
life is preferable to being conscious given the degree of suffering consciousness 
entails, I think it’s reasonable to say that the patient would be better off dead. If 
the patient’s quality of life is so low that she prefers to be rendered unconscious, 
and if there’s no reason to think the patient’s suffering will eventually abate (as it 
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(see, e.g., Jansen and Sulmasy, 2002). However, it is commonly the case that the 
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would if the patient were suffering from an illness from which she would be 
expected to recover, or temporarily sedated in order to let her heal from some sort 
of trauma) then the bad effect of death would, for that patient, be proportional to 
the good effect of relieving the patient’s suffering. In cases of active euthanasia, 
on the other hand, death is a clear means to the end of relieving suffering. Ending 
the patient’s life is itself the method employed to alleviate suffering rather than an 
anticipated side-effect of another method of pain relief.  
Even if one holds that PST is morally permissible while active euthanasia 
is not, it is still the case that we can have reason to administer PST to the not-
imminently-dying while maintaining accordance with the rule of double effect. 
This is because the intention to relieve severe and intractable suffering holds 
regardless of whether the patient is terminally ill or not. I would argue that, if the 
same degree of intractable suffering is present in a patient who is not imminently 
dying and one who is, there is no reason to limit the administration of PST to the 
former. If PST is the only means of relieving such pain, then it seems equally 
justified in both sorts of cases.  
This will be so unless it is the case that death is a greater bad the earlier it 
occurs such that the bad effect of death will not be proportional to the good effect 
of suffering relief. The notion that death is worse if it occurs earlier in life, or that 
death is worst if it occurs during a certain pivotal time period in one’s life, is put 




10 onward, death is worse for an individual the more good life years are lost.58 
This is an intuitive notion. After all, a death after one has had the opportunity to 
live a long and full life seems like a much lesser evil than a death in one’s prime, 
or even before one’s life has had a chance to really begin. 
However, it also seems to be the case that more suffering is worse than 
less suffering, and so the total badness of suffering is worse the longer it lasts. If 
this is true, then the necessity of relieving suffering may be greater if it is 
anticipated that the patient will suffer greatly for many years. Verhagen and 
Sauer, for instance, found in a sample of cases of neonatal euthanasia in the 
Netherlands under the Groningen Protocol, that long life expectancy was a 
consideration in favor of euthanasia in over 50% of the cases sampled. This was 
because “[t]he burden of other considerations is greater when the life expectancy 
is long in a patient who is suffering”.59 Temporal length of suffering seems to be 
an important consideration in determining whether medical aid in dying is 
warranted. How are we to weigh the increased badness of death earlier in life 
against the increased suffering that accrues to a longer timespan? 
Many of the general assumptions that undergird accounts of the badness of 
death do not apply to the sorts of patients who would opt for PST when not-
imminently-dying. The tragedy of dying early is the loss of good life years, and so 
if the life years lost do not meet some minimum threshold of goodness in quality 
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of life terms, it seems that death would be less bad for the person than it would be 
if she had life years of adequate quality to look forward to. If psychological 
suffering has made it such that a person won’t be able to do the things that make 
human life valuable then, in such a case, an early death might not be any worse 
for that person than it would be if she were elderly. We might say that death is 
more tragic in a sense, but we wouldn’t have real reason to say that death would 
be worse for the individual if she is, e.g., in her early twenties, given sufficient 
severity and persistence of suffering.  
1b. Justification for the Moral Permissibility of PST in the Terminally Ill 
I will here explicate two primary moral considerations by appeal to which 
PST is often justified: respect for patient autonomy and promotion of patient well-
being (and specifically dignity related well-being considerations). First, it is 
important to take the importance of patient autonomy into account. Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress provide a canonical notion of autonomy in 
biomedical ethics, which they summarize as follows: 
Personal autonomy encompasses, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from 
both controlling interference by others and from certain limitations such as 
an inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice. The 
autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan 




controlled by others or incapable of deliberating or acting on the basis of 
his or her desires and plans.60  
In order to be an autonomous person, one must at the very least be uncoerced by 
others and possess the cognitive capacities necessary in order to understand one’s 
choices and make plans. I will add that in order to act autonomously, one must 
have enough relevant information to make a choice (as lacking such information 
can lead to an “inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice”) as 
well as at least a minimal ability to act upon the world. 
The notion of autonomy I endorse here is fundamentally individualistic 
rather than relational as it focuses on the agent herself as a discrete choice-maker 
rather than building how the agent is socially-situated explicitly into the criteria 
for autonomous action. However, it should nonetheless be able to withstand some 
common objections leveled by certain feminist philosophers against 
individualistic notions of autonomy. The central criticism of individualistic 
notions of autonomy by proponents of relational theories of autonomy often turns 
on the truth that sometimes things get in the way of patients being able to freely 
choose between the choices provided to them. In particular, autonomy may be 
diminished due to facts about how the individual is socially-situated on a personal 
and/or institutional scale interfering with an individual being able to know what’s 
actually good for her. Susan Sherwin articulates an objection to individualistic 
                                                          




notions of autonomy based on their alleged insensitivity to important features of 
an agent’s broader social context as follows: 
[W]e must pursue a more careful and politically sensitive interpretation of 
the range of possible restrictions on autonomy than is found in most of the 
nonfeminist bioethics literature. We need to be able to look at specific 
decisions as well as the context that influences and sometimes limits such 
decisions. [T]raditional conceptions [of autonomy] are inadequate to the 
extent that they make invisible the oppression that structures such 
decisions.  By focusing only on the moment of medical decision making, 
traditional views fail to examine how specific decisions are embedded 
within a complex set of relations and policies that constrain (or, ideally, 
promote) an individual’s ability to exercise autonomy with respect to any 
particular choice.61 
Sherwin would presumably find the account of autonomy I endorse 
unsatisfactory. However, we need not think explicitly in terms of structures of 
oppression in order to “get the right answer” in the sort of cases with which 
Sherwin is likely concerned.  
For example, suppose a heterosexual married couple comes into a plastic 
surgeon’s office for a breast augmentation consultation and the husband is quite 
overbearing and insistent on his wife’s viability as a candidate and the necessity 
of the surgery, while the wife herself appears squeamish and unhappy. Sherwin 
                                                          




would say that there is a structure of oppression here that the plastic surgeon 
ought to be sensitive to and so on. On my notion of autonomy, it may be the case 
that the wife is being coerced (financially or emotionally) to undergo the surgery, 
thus compromising her ability to make an autonomous decision. Or, what I think 
is more likely, sub-coercive pressure by her husband has skewed her conception 
of what is good for her. I believe that both Sherwin and I would agree that the 
physician should talk to the wife alone and try to determine whether or not the 
surgery is actually something she wants. If not, he should refuse to perform the 
surgery.  
The main difference between the proponent of relational autonomy and 
myself here is that I hold that if the wife convincingly expresses that she is opting 
for surgery of her own volition and is committed to her choice, the physician 
should demonstrate respect for her autonomy and consent to perform the surgery. 
For certain proponents of relational autonomy, this particular choice might be the 
sort of thing that can never be autonomously chosen in virtue of the relation 
between its content and pernicious social pressures and norms.62 That is, on a 
strongly substantive view of relational autonomy, no woman could ever 
autonomously consent to (at the very least) purely cosmetic breast augmentation 
surgery. However, I take this sort of view to be troublingly paternalistic and 
deeply problematic for reasons I am not able to adequately explore here. Suffice it 
                                                          




to say that I am deeply skeptical that one’s capacity to act autonomously is 
dependent in this way on the content of what one chooses.  
Medical aid in dying is often given because the patient has autonomously 
chosen it or because she has lost her autonomy and it is clear (ideally as stated in 
an advanced directive) that she would not have wished to persist in her current 
state. PST is chosen either by the patient herself or her proxy consenters. 
Informed consent requires that the consenter can autonomously choose between 
her available options. Loss of autonomy is the top concern patients cite in opting 
for physician-assisted suicide in Oregon.63 It is unclear exactly what the patients 
in Oregon understood autonomy as consisting in; we can probably assume that for 
most it was not rooted in some sophisticated philosophical understanding of 
voluntariness in action. However, all that is necessary to reasonably endorse the 
importance of autonomy in one’s own life is an understanding of a commonsense 
notion of autonomy and the role it plays in persons’ lives. And it seems that such 
a commonsense notion of autonomy would not very difficult to grasp, as it is 
clearly very important – in the absence of overriding considerations – that a 
person is able to make choices regarding how her life will go. A life without the 
capacity for self-direction is a life that is greatly depreciated in value in terms of 
the individual’s happiness. A diminished ability to make choices and act on these 
choices contributes greatly to a patient’s quality of life being severely 
compromised at the end of her life. PST is justified in part by the value of 
                                                          




autonomy because it can be autonomously chosen, and it is the sort of choice that 
can be made with the aim of preventing a loss of autonomy as well. Respecting 
the autonomous choice of PST by a patient is to respect and affirm an exercise of 
her autonomous will regarding an immensely important decision in the narrative 
of her life.  
Further moral motivations for PST concern promoting the patient’s well-
being, specifically as this depends upon her sense of dignity. At the end of life, a 
patient’s sense of her own dignity may be severely compromised by pain and 
dependence upon others, so it is worth considering dignity specifically in fleshing 
out well-being related factors which motivate PST. Autonomy and dignity clearly 
have much to do with the patient’s well-being. Someone who is unable to make 
and pursue self-directed plans will likely have a life of seriously diminished well-
being, and someone who takes herself to possess little dignity will likewise have 
her well-being negatively impacted. Often compromised autonomy and 
compromised dignity will come together, as a person’s sense of her own dignity is 
often dependent upon what she is able to do for herself rather than depending on 
others. Here I am limiting well-being to terms having to do with quality of life 
(QOL) evaluations, where a life of low enough quality can be negative in terms of 
well-being and, if bad enough, simply not worth living. I take the notion of well-
being to be most relevant here to be one that is understood in terms of health 
states and QOL evaluations / preference elicitations, as they are at least roughly 
measurable and quantifiable. While QOL understood in terms of health state 




indicator that a patient is doing poorly and, at least in EOL contexts, a poor 
enough quality of life ought to justify taking drastic measures to avoid a miserable 
death. 
Dignity in the empirical sense (i.e.  “empirical dignity”) is a moral 
consideration and component of well-being that supports PST at the EOL. A 
patient’s empirical dignity has fundamentally to do with her sense of self and 
maintaining a level of successful functioning both in terms of physical bodily 
functioning and in terms of social functioning (the two often go hand-in-hand). 
We may easily differentiate between the dignified and the undignified in everyday 
life, but it's difficult to determine what exactly we are identifying when we 
evaluate an individual as dignified or undignified. Dignity in the empirical sense 
is a person’s view of herself as having a special status, one at least on par with the 
same sort of status as possessed by others. This sense of dignity is particularly 
dependent upon a person’s conception of herself and her place in the world. 
Harvey Max Chochinov and colleagues worked to construct an empirical model 
of dignity in patients at the end of life (aptly titled the “Dignity Model”) which I 
take to be adequate for present purposes. On this model, the following factors–
divided into four relevant categories –may diminish a patient's sense of dignity: 
Psychological: 
Depression or anxiety 
Difficulty with acceptance [of own mortality] 
Inability to mentally fight 






Experiencing distressing symptoms 
Not being able to carry out usual routines 
Not being able to carry out usual roles 
Inability to attend to tasks of daily living 
Inability to independently attend to bodily functions 
Changes in physical appearance 
 
Existential: 
Thinking how life might end 
Uncertainly about illness 
Not having a meaningful spiritual life 
Not feeling any longer like who you were 
Feeling life has no purpose 
Not feeling worthwhile or valued 
Not feeling you have made a meaningful contribution 




Not feeling adequately supported 
Feeling a sense of burden to others 
Not being treated with respect or understanding64 
 
 
It’s not the case that we must take each and every one of the above factors into 
account when determining whether an intervention promotes this sort of dignity in 
a patient. However, when looked at as a whole, such a list provides us with a 
                                                          




fairly clear conception of what factors may impact an individual's sense of 
dignity. There will be variation between individuals when it comes to which 
specific factors contribute to their sense of dignity (e.g. certain factors may vary 
across cultures) as well as how important their own dignity is to them, but it is 
reasonable to hold that there are at least some broad unifying factors which most 
people take to be important to their dignity. 
A protracted process of dying often involves having to experience the 
deterioration of one’s mind and body until one is almost entirely dependent upon 
others for the necessities of daily life. No one wants to lose control of one’s body, 
have one’s activities constrained by chronic pain, or rely on others to take care of 
daily activities such as bathing and eating, to name just a few factors which might 
compromise one’s sense of one’s own dignity. When a patient’s empirical dignity 
is compromised by illness this is a bad in itself and can greatly damage that 
patient’s well-being and distress the patient, reducing their quality of life even 
further. States like being bedridden, having to be helped with basic tasks like 
using the toilet, bathing oneself, and eating, and a state of extreme dependence 
generally (and which, in EOL contexts, will often last indefinitely) all seriously 
compromise a patient’s empirical dignity.65 PST may be opted for out of a desire 
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to either alleviate the individual’s suffering when she is in that state, or to 
alleviate her distress at the prospect of falling into that state.  
One requirement to receive euthanasia in accordance with the Dutch 
Euthanasia Act is that “the physician must be convinced that the patient’s 
suffering is unbearable”.66 In section 2a. I will argue that, in general, 
unbearableness is too high a threshold to set for the severity of suffering that 
warrants medically-assisted dying. Nonetheless, it is clearly important that 
patients have, at the very least, a bearable level of well-being. Now, it is true that 
whether a patient’s level of well-being is bearable from her point of view will 
depend at least partly upon subjective evaluations on the part of the patient. 
However, I think it is possible to sketch in broad strokes some general features 
that contribute to making one’s life bearable. Being able to pursue activities and 
projects one enjoys without being racked with pain is important to having a 
bearable level of well-being. On a more fundamental level, being able to function 
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will be bound up in empirical notions of dignity, and the way in which the 
individual views herself as possessing dignity will be affected by social factors to 
a greater or lesser extent (depending on the person and her society). However, I 
want to focus on empirical dignity from the perspective of the patient rather than 
from the perspective of society. It is true that myriad social factors may affect a 
patient’s sense of her own dignity, but if those are only important insofar as they 
affect how the patient sees herself–as I take them to be–then I see no need to 
consider a separate, socially-oriented notion of dignity here. I will also set aside 
for the current project a Kantian notion of dignity as inherent worth in persons. 




at all without being racked with pain seems to be a prerequisite for having a 
bearable level of well-being. When pain interferes with basic functioning to a 
great extent, this will seriously compromise an individual’s well-being. And, 
while the point at which life becomes intolerable in the face of that pain may 
differ from individual to individual, unbearable pain will usually or always be 
characterized by seriously impairing the individual’s ability to function. It is also 
important that the patient either avoid compromised autonomy and/or empirical 
dignity if this is what she wants and freely chooses, or, if her autonomy and/or 
empirical dignity have already been compromised, that she needn’t continue to 
endure living in a state she finds intolerable. PST enables the patient to escape 
from this intolerable state at the EOL, in cases where such suffering becomes both 
severe and refractory. 
1c. Psychological Suffering 
 It’s not just terminal biophysical illness that can render a patient’s life 
intolerable to her. Psychological suffering can be at least as painful as physical 
suffering, and so we have good reason to take psychological suffering as seriously 
as we take physical suffering. In many real-life circumstances it is near-
impossible to impossible to tease the two apart. Particularly in end-of-life 
situations where physical illness is often accompanied by psychological and 
existential distress, psychological problems like agitation and confusion may be 
directly caused by or bound up with physical suffering like dyspnea (shortness of 
breath) or even the disorienting effects of pain medication used to treat the 




Pain is complicated and may have vastly different causes and characters. 
Moreover, the fact that the root cause of psychological suffering may be “all in 
one’s head” in no way renders it less painful or less genuine than something with 
clear biophysical correlates. This entails that the same obligations which accrue to 
medical providers in the face of straightforwardly biophysical pain equally apply 
in cases of psychological suffering. As I’ll argue later in this paper, psychological 
illness poses some unique challenges when it comes to determining refractoriness 
of pain and decision-making competence on the part of the patient. However, 
these challenges do not lessen the importance of taking psychological suffering 
seriously.  
1d. A Troubling Entailment 
PST involves: 
i. the presence of severe and refractory patient suffering (physical or 
psychological) 
ii. chemical sedation to unconsciousness 
iii. requested by the patient or proxy consenter 
iv. taking place in an end-of-life context (and/or terminal illness) 
Now suppose that genuinely refractory symptoms were present earlier in life. 
Chemical sedation (ii) is used to relieve severe refractory suffering (i) with the 
consent of the patient or proxy (iii) in order to protect and/or promote patient 




is, in the presence of genuinely refractory suffering, it is unclear what difference 
the patient being at the end of her life ought to make.  
I take it to be the case that an endorsement of PST at the end of life leads 
us to further endorse PST far earlier in life and in the absence of terminal illness. 
(I will employ as shorthand “early PST” to refer to cases of PST where the patient 
in question’s death is not imminent and “EOL PST” to refer to cases of PST 
which take place at the end of a patient’s life.) If someone is not terminally ill, but 
nonetheless is experiencing severe and unremitting refractory suffering that will 
in all likelihood never be alleviated, the options available to treat that patient are 
greatly constrained. Here one might ask, what is to be done when a patient whose 
suffering is otherwise refractory refuses to undergo a possibly effective treatment? 
A good example of this would be someone who declines to undergo 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) for severe depression. Should the patient be 
denied medical aid in dying if she refuses to try ECT? Although she may have 
good reasons for declining – e.g. not wanting to deal with the pain and side-
effects like memory loss – I hold that the patient should be denied medical aid in 
dying in such a case.  
While her fear of the pain of treatment and its side-effects are warranted, if 
the patient is at the point where she’s considering ending her life she ought to try 
all reasonable available treatment options. There is simply too much at stake not 
to, namely decades of life that could potentially be rendered bearable by ECT. If 
there is the chance of drastically improving the patient’s life rather than ending it, 




The potential benefit is proportional to the risk, and while it would be perfectly 
justified for the patient to decline to undergo that treatment, it would also be 
perfectly justified to make ECT a requirement for providing medical aid in dying 
to someone who is, in temporal terms, far from her projected natural death. In the 
same way that a practitioner is not obligated to prescribe opiates to relieve 
obesity-related pain in a patient who is unwilling to undergo bariatric surgery out 
of reasonable concerns about long-term side-effects and the danger of the surgery 
itself, so a practitioner is not obligated to provide medical aid in dying to a patient 
who is unwilling to undergo ECT out of reasonable concerns regarding side-
effects. This analogy might not be perfect, but the point is that one ought not to go 
straight to a drastic treatment for symptoms when there is an available – albeit 
risky – treatment with a reasonable likelihood of success to address the underlying 
cause. In both cases, the patient could potentially have years of low-quality life 
drastically improved, and in both cases the patient could still receive her preferred 
method of treatment if the recommended treatment fails.  
In order to support the rational entailment from EOL PST to early PST, let 
us now consider the following hypothetical example of “Alice”: 
Alice is a 35-year-old occupant of the United States who suffers from 
severe clinical depression. She is not terminally ill. Her depression started 
in puberty and has lasted for over twenty years. Alice cannot work or 
maintain friendships due to her total lack of motivation and is in a constant 
state of affective misery. Her family is supportive and loves her, but she 




their help and knows intellectually that she cares a great deal for them. 
Alice has tried every possible cocktail of psychiatric medication to treat 
her condition, but to no avail. Occasionally, a new medication will lead to 
a few days of lessened dysphoria, but these always give way to the same 
state of deep unhappiness as before. Alice has further tried talk therapy 
with many different professionals, but to no avail. She has tried to make 
lifestyle changes regarding diet and exercise, and even sampled different 
religious practices in an attempt to find something to make her feel better. 
None of these interventions worked either, and merely felt like going 
through the motions with little to no payoff. Finally, Alice tried 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) as a last-ditch effort to alleviate her 
depression. This also failed. Alice has considered suicide many times but 
could never find the motivation to go through with it, and further didn’t 
want to cause her family any trouble or distress upon discovering her 
body. She has resigned herself to the fact that she will never be happy and 
over the years has persistently and consistently expressed a desire for her 
life to end. The psychiatric consensus is that Alice’s depression is severe 
enough to seriously compromise her quality of life, as well as being 
genuinely refractory. 
What should be done to help Alice? If her pain truly is refractory and she has 
exhausted all her treatment options, then it seems that medical professionals in the 
United States are left with the choice of either allowing her suffering to continue 




Alice is sedated and continues to receive food and fluids, then she will likely live 
for quite a long time, ultimately dying of some complication related to being 
hospitalized, which will likely take the form of an infection. If food and fluids are 
withheld, Alice will pass away sooner.  
The case of Alice illustrates how all the central moral considerations 
behind EOL PST can apply far in advance of a person’s projected natural death. 
Alice has expressed a persistent wish to die. If given this choice, she would 
autonomously consent to have her life ended with medical aid. The reason she 
wishes to die is that her subjective quality of life is so low as to be worse, on her 
own evaluation, than death. Her unremitting and severe psychological suffering is 
such that Alice cannot derive any joy or hope from life, and since it has been 
judged refractory, there’s no prospect for that pain to be alleviated, apart from a 
completely unexpected breakthrough in treatment or change in the way her brain 
is ‘wired’. In light of this, it seems that it would be justified to use PST to end 
Alice’s suffering and the suffering of patients like her. This further shows that our 
commitment to the moral permissibility of PST at the end of life rationally 
commits us to endorsing the moral permissibility of PST earlier in life, when the 
conditions of very intense and unremitting refractory suffering and informed 
consent obtain. 
While it may seem a bit far-fetched to imagine non-terminally-ill patients 
who are tired of life coming to the hospital in droves and requesting to be sedated 




very similar could at least be possible.67 Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking 
(VSED) can take place at any point of life by individuals who have decided it 
would be better to die for whatever (competent) reason. Savulescu argues that, 
since it would be immoral to compel a competent individual who has made the 
reasoned decision to refrain from eating to eat, and doctors have the obligation to 
care for patients regardless of whether harm is self-inflicted or not, a patient who 
voluntarily chooses to starve herself in order to die has the right to receive 
palliative care:  
[A]ny competent person has the right to refuse to eat and drink, leading to 
their death. And given that they will certainly die if they do not eat and 
drink, they are entitled to relief of their suffering as a part of medical 
treatment as they die. This can be achieved through palliative care 
involving sedation and analgesia, perhaps even so-called ‘terminal 
sedation.’68 
In such cases, PST (terminal sedation) would presumably take place when 
suffering from starvation becomes refractory. A patient who voluntarily stops 
eating and drinking and who receives such palliative care will thus be in the 
process of what Savulescu terms “Voluntary Palliated Starvation” (VPS).  
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Now, while I think this is a novel and potentially useful solution to certain 
end-of-life problems in places where voluntary euthanasia is not yet legal, 
Savulescu and I disagree on a few grounds. Savulescu bases his claim that a 
competent person ought not be compelled to eat on a ‘moral principle of 
inviolability of the person’: “It is impermissible for one person, A, or several 
people B-D, to insert any part of their body, object or substance into the body of 
another competent person, X, without X’s valid consent”.69 I am skeptical that 
such a principle applies to force-feeding under the wide range of circumstances 
which Savulescu takes it to, especially when it comes to his claim that “[s]ome 
anorexics, perhaps many, are competent” when it comes to a reasoned desire to 
starve.70 There is a difference between using voluntary starvation as a means to 
die when life has become unbearable and assigning not eating itself such a high 
priority in and of itself that resulting death does not matter to one as much as the 
importance of refraining from eating. Savulescu wrongly conflates the two 
situations. As the Mayo Clinic characterizes it, anorexia involves “an abnormally 
low body weight, intense fear of gaining weight and a distorted perception of 
body weight.”71 If an anorexic person prioritizes not eating over living on the 
basis of her fear of gaining weight or inaccurate conception of her body as being 
too heavy, then she is making her decisions on the basis of a skewed perception of 
the world that is rooted in psychological illness, which would preclude her from 
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being able to make a reasoned and competent decision. There is evidence that 
decision-making in general is impaired in people with anorexia nervosa, 
manifesting specifically in “a preference for immediate reward despite the long-
term adverse consequences”.72 Additionally, “there is a broad consensus that 
involuntary treatment of patients with eating disorders is ethically and legally 
justifiable when the patient is at acute risk of death from the medical 
complications of his or her disorder”.73 So there is good reason to think that an 
anorexic patient cannot competently opt for VPS as a means to persist in a state of 
starving herself. 
However, if an anorexic chooses to die rather than eat on the basis of the 
suffering generated by her psychological illness being unbearable to her, this 
might be a situation where she could make a competent decision to opt for VPS. 
After all, anorexia is a painful illness to suffer from, especially when one is in the 
latter stages of starvation. So, it might be the case that an anorexic could 
competently choose to end her life rather than eat because her illness itself has 
rendered life intolerable to her. And, if her suffering could be proven severe and 
refractory, then she would possibly be a candidate for early PST as well under the 
entailment I’ve built in this paper. 
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I take the motivation of anorexics who would prioritize not eating over 
remaining alive to show that the intention behind VPS matters when it comes to 
determining whether or not (a) the person making the decision is in fact 
competent to make that decision, and (b) whether a case of VPS is chosen with 
the aim of permanently relieving suffering (physical, psychological, or 
existential). It’s not out of the question that an anorexic might judge that a world 
in which she must eat, given the pain of her psychological illness and little to no 
prospect of a cure in her particular case, would be worse than death, and rationally 
choose VPS as a means to death. However, this is importantly different from 
using VPS as a means to persist in a state of starving oneself with death as a mere 
side-effect (there is here a novel reversal of the sort of argument which applies the 
rule of double effect to distinguish between PST and euthanasia).  
There would, of course, be a significant chance of error in determining the 
intentions of any particular anorexic. And this uncertainty alone might provide 
reason to judge anorexics incompetent in general to make such a choice. 
However, it might also be the case that, if the anorexic were suffering greatly and 
likely to die soon of her illness regardless of whatever intervention might be 
taken, granting her request might make the most sense morally, all things 
considered. However, at this point we come up against the problem – which will 
be discussed in section 2d – of when psychological illness precludes competent 
medical decision making and whether, in some cases, the presence of extreme 





PART 2: CHALLENGES TO EARLY PST 
Clearly, a lot rides on the severity and refractoriness of a patient’s pain 
when determining whether PST is morally permissible, but how are we to 
determine genuine refractoriness of psychological pain? Whether or not pain is 
refractory will depend upon whether it is resistant to the available treatments, but 
it is not the case that literally all treatment options need be considered. Some 
treatments may be unproven and experimental, and some may constitute heroic 
measures – i.e. measures that are so burdensome or so risky as to fall outside the 
category of treatments that medical professionals are obligated to provide to their 
patient (when it is within their power to do so). How we answer the question of 
how to determine the genuine refractoriness of psychological pain in candidates 
for early PST will thus depend in part upon the answer to the following question: 
how are we to define heroic measures when it comes to treating psychological 
pain in candidates for early PST? Both questions grow more difficult to answer 
the further away the patient under consideration is from the end of life. I will 
consider these questions in sections 2a – 2c. 
There are further questions regarding the potential effect of psychological 
illness on decision-making competence to consider here. As I will argue, 
decision-making competence is rooted in a person’s ability to make a reasoned 
choice based on an at least minimally-consistent set of values or conception of the 
good and an accurate understanding of the facts of the situation at hand. But it 
seems that psychological suffering is the sort of thing that, at least under certain 




rationally and consistently. And, further, even if there is some straightforward 
way to make competence determinations in patients suffering from psychological 
illness, we have a related question of whether some cases where patients clearly 
cannot give consent but whose suffering is severe and who clearly desire to die 
warrant ending those patients’ lives through medical means. I will consider these 
questions in sections 2d and 2e. 
2a. Determining Severity 
Before addressing the question of how to determine refractoriness of pain, 
it is worth saying something about the severity of pain that warrants PST. In the 
Netherlands, in order to obtain medical aid in dying, physicians must “be satisfied 
that the patient’s suffering is unbearable”.74 However, opinions on what exactly 
constitutes unbearable suffering may differ from physician to physician and have 
been shown to differ significantly in situations of psychological rather than purely 
physical suffering.75 It is difficult to know how exactly to understand what it 
means for a patient’s suffering to be unbearable. Should a patient’s suffering 
being unbearable mean something akin to its being intolerable to her, or should 
unbearableness be understood in a stronger sense, as something that would 
eventually drive the patient to madness or literally render her unable to function? 
One would rely largely on subjective QOL evaluations on the part of the patient in 
order to determine the former. If the latter sense were understood strictly enough, 
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it would mean that the patient would – due to physical and/or psychological 
suffering – be rendered either unremittingly hysterical, catatonic, or in a state 
resembling paralysis as a result of her suffering. Even understood more loosely, 
unbearableness in anything approaching a literal sense would set a very high bar 
for suffering. In practice, unbearableness seems to be understood more closely to 
the former more subjectively patient-dependent sense, although there is no 
concrete universally accepted definition of unbearable suffering.76 There is 
significant variation in how unbearableness is interpreted by different medical 
providers. In one survey, for example, it was found that a patient’s being able to 
read despite her pain was taken as evidence by her physician that this pain was 
not, in fact, unbearable to the extent that warranted medical aid in dying.77 If there 
were interpretive agreement on what constituted unbearable suffering that 
accorded with this particular understanding, that would be very high bar to set for 
a patient’s suffering to be unbearable. 
 I’m not convinced that an unbearable degree of suffering – especially if 
this is understood in anything resembling the strong sense sketched above – is 
required in order for one to properly be a candidate for medical aid in dying, 
regardless of one’s age and proximity to death. I suspect the unbearableness 
requirement is present in the Netherlands’ legislation because they do not have a 
requirement that the patient be terminally ill or at the end of her life, and so the 
degree of pain which may warrant ending a life ought to be of an extreme sort in 
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order to be taken to warrant ending an otherwise sustainable quality of life (I will 
say more about this later).  
In cases of PST, I hold that the pain necessary to warrant sedation needn’t 
be strictly-speaking unbearable. But suffering does need to be sufficiently severe 
that the patient would want drastic measures to be taken in order to alleviate that 
pain. That is, suffering should generally be understood in terms of intolerability to 
the patient. If the patient is competent to opt for PST herself, then determinations 
of severity of suffering will depend upon her own stated evaluation of her 
suffering as intolerable to her. If the patient is not competent to consent to PST, 
then behavioral indicators of pain along with stated intolerableness or similar 
statements on the part of the patient (when possible) will be taken as evidence for 
the presence of suffering which either is or would be intolerable to the patient (if 
she were aware enough to process and/or articulate this). In practice, the 
determination of whether the patient’s pain is severe enough to warrant PST is left 
up to the medical professionals involved. And, so, there may be much variation in 
practice in the sort of suffering that warrants PST. However, I think that 
understanding sufficient severity in terms of the sort of suffering which would 
bring about a state that the patient would find intolerable is the best way to go in 
moral terms. This leaves room for variation between patients in the sorts of states 
which might warrant PST, variation which would presumably align with the 





However, such a patient-centered determination of sufficient severity 
should be tempered by professional and commonsense judgment. For example, a 
patient who is unusual to the point of not taking any degree of pain to be tolerable 
should probably not be able to opt for PST due to finding intolerable (or claiming 
to find intolerable) the minor stiffness that accompanies her daily walks around 
the hospital ward. In this case the absence of any objective level of pain that could 
reasonably warrant PST would weigh against the patient’s judgment that the pain 
she does experience is intolerable. In the same way, a patient who is otherwise 
mostly content but who undergoes intermittent episodes of despair ought not to be 
able to opt for PST in the midst of one of these episodes. The fact that she is 
prone to such episodes might ultimately provide good reason to opt for PST, but 
the persistence and consistence of her preferences must be established before such 
a request can be carried out.78 However, if the patient falls into an episode of 
despair and is likely to die before cycling out of it, PST would be warranted.  
                                                          
78 One might here ask what should be done if the patient persistently and 
consistently requests PST while in the midst of such intermittent episodes. 
Perhaps every time the patient is in an episode of despair, she persistently and 
consistently requests PST, even saying something like “I don’t care what I want 
or say when I don’t feel like this; right now and every time I do feel like this, I 
would do anything to make it stop.” Why should we give priority to the decisions 
she makes when she is not experiencing such suffering? One might say that in the 
midst of an episode she is not thinking as clear-headedly as she would were she 
not in pain, but perhaps she will have forgotten the severity of the pain when she 
is not actively suffering. So, it might be perfectly reasonable to want to die in 




In determining that suffering sufficiently severe to warrant PST is present, 
expressed and/or apparent intolerableness of pain must be considered along with 
whether there is good reason to think that the patient’s pain – both in terms of 
degree and persistence – is at all proportionate to this sort of appearance and/or 
expression of intolerableness. Here would ideally be where professional and 
commonsense judgment come into play. Relevant factors to account for in 
determining whether the stated intolerability of a patient’s pain corresponds to 
reality should include the patient’s level of functioning regarding basic physical 
and cognitive tasks, behavioral indicators of suffering, and the patient’s general 
disposition and mental/emotional state. Of course, a default attitude of suspicion 
towards patients’ expressions of intolerability doesn’t seem as if it would be the 
best sort of orientation to take towards those to whom one has a professional duty 
of beneficence. And it is also clear that the attitudes of medical providers 
regarding medical aid in dying and the circumstances under which it is warranted 
may lead differing standards of proof regarding intolerability, in the same way 
that the standard of unbearableness that warrants medical aid in dying has been 
interpreted and applied quite differently across individual medical providers in the 
                                                          
cycles out of it. It is difficult to say what to do under such circumstances, but I 
think it might be best to take into account both how much longer the patient has 
left to live and how much of that remaining lifespan is likely to be spent in the 
midst of an episode. If she will spend the majority of that time in the midst of an 
episode, then granting a request for PST ought to be considered. If episodes are 
likely to be infrequent, then the desire to stay alive of her non-suffering self ought 




Netherlands.79 Some basic parameters should be put in place to ground a 
reasonable standard of intolerability. Defining such parameters will be a 
challenge, as they must be flexible enough to accommodate variation across 
patients while at the same time ruling out statements of intolerability that seem to 
accord not at all with reality. However, it is important to note that the timeframe 
in which PST typically takes place is quite short. The patient is usually 
imminently dying, and the fact that the patient is suffering greatly will usually be 
apparent. In such situations, in which the patient is already dying and clearly 
suffering, erroring on the side of pain relief makes sense, even when persistent 
preferences cannot be established, or the patient is not lucid enough to express 
whether or not she finds her pain intolerable. While determinations of severity 
may be complicated in practice, I maintain that the severity of pain which 
warrants PST is that which could reasonably (both in professional and 
commonsense judgment) be found intolerable by the patient. 
2b. Determining Refractoriness 
PST ought only to be employed in circumstances where the patient’s pain 
is genuinely refractory. This is something that may be determined relatively easily 
at the end of a patient’s life. The temporal limitations that imminent death places 
on the treatments available to medical professionals to relieve their patients’ pain 
make it so that there are only a few options. This is why, for example, the 
                                                          





addictiveness of opioid pain relievers does not factor into the decision of whether 
to prescribe them to patients who will be dead within days to weeks. Of necessity, 
at the end of life, the emphasis is on relieving pain and facilitating a comfortable 
death rather than considering future consequences of treatment. This is so for 
psychological pain as well as physical pain.  
As a rule, the further one is from death, the more difficult it becomes to 
determine whether one’s pain is genuinely refractory. After all, sometimes time 
itself does heal certain wounds. Many biophysical ailments and disabilities may 
be adapted to psychologically.80 However, when the illness itself is psychological, 
it makes at least intuitive sense to think that adaptation would be less likely. In 
fact, rather than adaptation, it seems that what would be required to alleviate pain 
from a psychological disorder would be a lessening in severity of the disorder 
itself. But major mental illness is notoriously treatment-resistant.81 And, despite 
the seemingly intractable nature of many mental disorders, determining the 
refractoriness of suffering for psychological problems can be immensely 
challenging. This is because psychological suffering is often a multifactorial 
problem with unclear causes and even less clear solutions. It is a challenge to 
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81 Major depression is one representative mental illness that may cause refractory 
pain in those who suffer from it: “There are many individuals (up to 15% of 
patients [treated for major depression]) for whom multiple interventions will be 
unhelpful and who will have significant depressions despite aggressive 





determine, for any particular patient with a major mental illness, what 
combination – if any – of medication, talk therapy, lifestyle, environmental, or 
social changes, and/or more extreme measures such as ECT will prove effective. 
It is thus difficult to successfully treat mental illness, and it is also difficult to 
determine when all reasonable treatment options have been exhausted in any 
particular case. This complexity leaves us with substantial uncertainty in making 
determinations of refractoriness in cases of mental illness, an uncertainty that 
compounds the further a patient is from her projected natural death. 
2c. Defining Heroic Measures 
Whether a patient’s suffering is genuinely refractory can be reasonably 
thought to depend upon what treatments are available and whether all those 
treatments have been tried. However, it may be the case that some treatments fall 
under the heading of “heroic measures” which would be too uncertain and/or too 
burdensome to reasonably justify subjecting a patient to. For instance, it is clear 
that, although the River Ganges is taken by many to have extraordinary healing 
properties, it would be totally unreasonable to fly every patient for whom all other 
treatment has failed over to India to give bathing in the river a try. This would 
constitute an enormous investment of resources in the hope of bringing about a 
totally unproven and unlikely cure. However, it is difficult to know where to draw 
the line regarding what sorts of treatments would count as “heroic” when the 





It is accepted that heroic measures are unnecessary (and often undesirable 
in terms of patient quality of life) in care for patients at the end of life. This is 
largely because experimenting to find the absolutely optimal treatment for a pain 
condition at the end of life will expose the patient to unnecessary stress and pain. 
However, what constitutes a heroic measure changes depending on how much 
time one has to work with when treating a condition. This is why long-shot 
surgeries ought not to be performed at the end of life; they are unlikely to help the 
patient and very likely to make the patient’s last days or hours more 
uncomfortable than they would be otherwise. Not to mention, such surgeries are a 
substantial waste of resources. 
It is difficult to determine which interventions ought to be characterized as 
“heroic” the further one is from the end of life. Recall the example of Alice, the 
35-year-old woman who suffers from severe and unremitting major depression. 
She has struggled with this for about 20 years; it began roughly when she hit 
puberty. Alice has tried every conventional treatment for her condition: a wide 
range of  medications and combinations of medications, lifestyle changes, talk 
therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, even hypnosis and ECT. She has been 
conscientious about taking medications as prescribed and waiting an appropriate 
amount of time to see if an intervention worked. Nothing has worked to alleviate 
her depression. Considering this, she is tired of life and wishes for it to end. 
However, she can’t work up the motivation to kill herself and doesn’t want to 
impose the burden and legal risk of assisting in her death on any of her loved 




In order to clarify the question of what constitutes a heroic measure in 
Alice’s case, let’s focus on one example of a candidate heroic measure: 
psychosurgery, specifically in the form of lobotomy. Were Alice hospitalized at 
the end of her life due to some biophysical comorbidity, she would likely be 
sedated, or at least persistently drugged to the point that her sense of self 
disappeared enough to make her psychological problems disappear along with it. 
Psychosurgery would be out of the question because the potential benefits 
wouldn’t outweigh the risks, given the limited timeframe. But Alice is in perfect 
biophysical health. The conventional treatment options have been exhausted. 
Despite being perfectly healthy, she nonetheless wishes to die. Her depression and 
anxiety have proven genuinely refractory in conventional terms. The question 
here is whether, with at least 30 years more of expected life in good health, this 
patient would need to try psychosurgery in order to determine that her condition is 
absolutely refractory. Put another way, do 30 future years of life render otherwise 
heroic measures reasonable?  
In general, I think they do, but much will depend upon the individual 
patient’s particular circumstances. Given the current medical landscape, I would 
suggest as a rule of thumb that psychosurgery like lobotomy should only be tried 
if the patient expressly and persistently requests it and, even then, this request 
should be heavily scrutinized and might reasonably be denied. This is because, 
even after decades of research and practice, lobotomy remains a procedure that 




and/or further decreasing her quality of life.82 However, experimental treatments 
that would ordinarily be considered heroic and would pose less of a risk of further 
compromising the patient’s well-being ought to at least be considered for patients 
like Alice.  
2d. When Does Psychological Illness Preclude Competent Decision Making? 
Another challenge regarding early PST for patients with psychological 
suffering is determining whether the patient is competent to rationally opt for 
PST. Cases of extreme psychological suffering pose a unique challenge to 
obtaining informed consent. Psychological illness doesn’t necessarily preclude a 
patient from possessing the capacity necessary to give genuine informed consent, 
but it often may do so. Doernberg et al. explain that “although psychiatric 
diagnoses should not be equated with incapacity, some neuropsychiatric 
conditions are known to increase its risk. These include psychotic illnesses, 
neurocognitive disorders, some forms of depression, anorexia nervosa, and mental 
retardation”.83  
Decision-making competence in medical settings requires certain 
capacities. I will here adopt Buchanan and Brock’s account of decision-making 
competence in medical setting wherein such competence requires “the capacity 
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considered anymore except if no other alternative is available due to […] 
complications, low rates of success, and irreversibility.” (Andrade et al., 2010: 
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for understanding and communication and the capacity for reasoning and 
deliberation”.84 In addition to these capacities, decision-making competence 
requires that the patient “have a set of values or conception of the good”.85 What 
the capacity for understanding and communication amounts to is prima facie 
straightforward (at least in theoretical terms; in clinical reality, as with most 
things, matters may be less clear cut); the patient must be able to understand the 
content being relayed to her and be able to express her preferences and decisions 
and ask questions when necessary. Understanding requires that the patient have 
the cognitive abilities required to take in and process information, along with the 
ability to do at least some basic perspective-taking and mental time travel when it 
comes to envisioning what the future might be like in the face of different 
treatment alternatives. The capacity for reasoning and deliberation again requires 
certain cognitive abilities. The patient must have at least some ability to draw 
inferences and reason probabilistically and must be able to retain information long 
enough to run through a process of deliberation. Finally, the patient’s possession 
of some (at least minimally stable and consistent) set of values or conception of 
the good is required for decision-making competence because without these, the 
patient would be unable to reasonably and consistently assign weights to different 
considerations and options in terms of goodness or desirability. For example, the 
relative weights assigned to four additional weeks of life in great pain would be 
                                                          





radically different for a patient with a strong Protestant work ethic as opposed to 
one who greatly valued hedonic goods.  
In order to rationally choose between options, a patient must first be able 
to evaluate those options in terms of her own values and the preferences which 
arise from those values. However, merely possessing a minimally consistent set of 
values and conception of the good seems not to be enough to ground a satisfying 
conception of decision-making competence. If one’s conception of the good is 
warped by mental illness, for example, this may preclude one from being able to 
choose competently. Figuring out how to determine whether all of the criteria for 
decision-making competence are met by particular patients in a rigorous and 
standardized way is a daunting challenge (and one which physicians in the 
Netherlands seem largely to have failed at) but it is imperative we get it right, 
given the immense and irrevocable import of a decision to seek medical aid in 
dying. 86   
2e. Should Decision Making Competence Always Matter? 
However, in requiring individual competence for medical decisions of 
great import, we come up against a dilemma. Sometimes the people who are 
suffering the most are also those who aren’t competent to make their own 
decisions. Consider Jukka Varelius’ example of Mary: 
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Mary is a psychiatric patient who has repeatedly tried to kill herself. Once 
again, her suicide attempt failed. […] Though they are unable to have 
meaningful contact with her, the mental health care providers are also 
convinced that, when she is not sedated to near unconsciousness, Mary is 
suffering unbearably. And they deem her condition incurable. 
Consequently, although this would be against the common psychiatric 
goal of suicide prevention to which they have adhered to so far, some of 
the mental health care providers treating Mary have started to wonder 
whether they should assist her in ending her life rather than aim to prevent 
her from killing herself.87 
Mary is clearly suffering greatly, her condition has been deemed incurable, and 
although she does not possess the mental capacity to give genuine informed 
consent or to even make a request for physician-assisted suicide, Mary has clearly 
and persistently expressed a wish to die through her actions. 
This presents the following problem: ending one’s life early is an 
irrevocable decision of immense import, the sort of decision that seems to require 
that the person making it be able to do so rationally and in accordance with her 
own values and aims. Ending one’s life early is also the sort of decision that 
requires weighty reasons in order to be justified. In medical contexts, extreme and 
intractable pain is often considered to constitute such a reason. However, in 
                                                          




Mary’s case, it seems that she has a very good reason to opt to end her life early 
in that she is suffering greatly, but the very thing causing her suffering also 
precludes her from being able to give informed consent to have her life ended.   
It’s unclear what we ought to do in a case like Mary’s. On the one hand, 
she is clearly suffering greatly and wishes to die. This is apparent, even though 
she is incompetent to consent to medical aid in dying. And, it seems that medical 
professionals do have a duty of beneficence to Mary, a duty that would be best 
fulfilled in such a case by aiding her in dying, either through PST or more direct 
means. On the other hand, providing medical aid in dying to suicidal but 
incompetent psychiatric patients seems like an undesirable and even dangerous 
precedent to set. This is not to assume some nefarious motivations on the part of 
medical professionals. Rather, it is a hesitancy that is rooted in a concern for 
human fallibility. It would be unfortunate if patients whose suffering could have 
eventually been alleviated or who would in fact regain competence at some point 
were aided in dying before this change had the opportunity to take place. Note 
that this does not mean that competent patients who are able to autonomously 
consent to PST due to psychological suffering ought to be kept alive in the hope 
of some treatment, however unlikely, being developed to alleviate their suffering. 
In such cases, the patient is consenting not only to receive medical aid in dying, 
but also to receive such aid in dying while knowing that there is the possibility, 
however slight, that her pain may someday be alleviated. Because there is no way 




considerations of eventual expansion of treatment options should take a greater 
role in deciding whether aid in dying is warranted.  
One might be inclined to say here that the problem could be solved in 
many cases by simply allowing proxy consenters to choose a medically-assisted 
death for patients like Mary. If such proxies are choosing out of a concern for 
Mary’s interests and well-being, then they could make this choice on the 
assumption that it is best for those patients and in line with what those patients 
themselves would want, were they competent. (Although, if the patients were 
competent, they likely wouldn’t have the same weight of circumstances pushing 
them towards choosing death, so this may be seen as a bit of a puzzling standard 
under the circumstances.) However, I do not think that allowing a proxy consenter 
to make such a decision solves the underlying problem, at least not entirely. This 
is so for a couple of reasons. First, it may be unfair to saddle proxies with such a 
decision. While making life and death decisions on behalf of loved ones is always 
difficult, doing the same in a situation where not only is no terminal illness 
present, but additionally there is so much epistemic uncertainty regarding 
refractoriness of suffering and what the patient would want were she competent 
seems even more difficult. Second, the special relationships between most 
patients and their proxies (who are often parents, guardians, or other family 
members) may seriously and troublingly complicate decision-making. For 
instance, the emotional and sometimes financial toll that severe mental illness can 
take on relationships and the lives of those who support mentally ill family 




in situations that might be borderline, or in which medical aid in dying might be 
inappropriate, out of sheer exhaustion or frustration. This is especially so in places 
like the United States where mental healthcare is inadequately funded and so the 
financial burden of illness must be largely shouldered by families. Such 
circumstances compound the unfairness of saddling proxies with making this 
decision.  
As uncomfortable as I am with such philosophical positions in general, I 
am inclined to say that in this sort of case providing medical aid in dying to 
incompetent psychiatric patients whose suffering is refractory, severe, and 
continuous, and who have expressed a consistent, persistent, and unwavering wish 
to die through their actions and/or words might be the morally best choice on the 
part of individual medical providers. However, I am not sure I could accept the 
implications of legislating such aid and/or explicitly incorporating it into medical 
practice. Here I am endorsing something similar to something David Velleman 
proposed where medical euthanasia is permitted “by tacit failure to enforce the 
institutional rules that currently serve as barriers to justified euthanasia” rather 
than “an explicitly formulated permission” in the form of policy or law.88 In 
Mary’s case, her medical providers might be morally justified in assisting her 
suicide, but it might nonetheless set a dangerous precedent to incorporate such 
assistance into hospital or legal policy. 
 
                                                          





 I have argued that a moral commitment to the permissibility of PST to 
treat psychological suffering at the EOL further rationally commits us to the 
moral permissibility of PST to treat psychological suffering earlier in life and in 
the absence of terminal illness. However, this entailment raises a whole host of 
problems, among them how to determine sufficient severity and refractoriness of 
psychological pain, how to know which treatment measures to characterize as 
heroic and thus unwarranted, when and whether psychological illness precludes 
informed consent, and whether PST might ever be justified in the mentally ill who 
are suffering greatly but are not competent to give informed consent. In the face 
of such challenges, the solution is not to ban PST wholesale and thus break the 
entailment. This would cause great unnecessary suffering for some of our most 
vulnerable patients and would further make the already unpleasant process of 
dying even more arduous for patients in the United States for whom PST is often 
the only legal available option for medically-assisted dying. 
 Instead, a better route to take in resolving the difficulties posed in this 
project would be to compensate for the unique epistemological uncertainties that 
apply to cases of early, but not EOL, PST. Given that refractoriness of suffering 
especially is so much more difficult to determine with certainty when the patient 
is not imminently dying, it makes sense to approach determinations of whether 
early PST is warranted with more caution than we would in making such 




make explicit the application of different standards for the severity of pain that 
warrants medically assisted dying depending on the patient’s proximity to death.  
That is, we might require a higher severity of suffering (perhaps even 
approaching the level of literal unbearableness) to employ PST earlier in life in 
someone who is not terminally ill than we would apply to someone who is elderly 
and/or terminally ill and is expected to die within weeks or months (for whom 
discomfort judged intolerable would provide a sufficient standard of severity). 
This might in a way “correct” for the uncertainty issues that accompany 
determinations of refractoriness in non-terminal situations of severe psychological 
suffering.  
Perhaps at a certain distance from death and/or in the absence of terminal 
illness, one’s suffering would need to be the sort of thing that is the focal point of 
her entire life in order to warrant ending her life on that basis. This degree of 
suffering would seriously compromise the patient’s autonomy and well-being to 
the point that she could not do much of anything aside from suffer. The 
importance of alleviating such debilitating psychological pain would be so great 
as to outweigh future-oriented considerations such as the possibility (which, in the 
cases under consideration where pain is judged to be refractory, would likely be 
exceedingly slight) of the discovery of a way to ameliorate the patient’s 
symptoms or cure the underlying issue. That is, suffering so severe as to 
constitute the entirety of a person’s perception of her existence would justify PST 
in cases where there is substantial uncertainty regarding the accuracy of 




contained therein. Further, it seems that the uncertainty surrounding 
determinations of decision-making competence would pale in importance when 
compared to a sufficiently high degree of suffering. If a patient is suffering to 
such an extent that she cannot focus on anything beyond her suffering, and if this 
suffering is unlikely to ever abate, then it seems that the possibility that this 
suffering might cloud the patient’s decision-making judgment is less important 
than the fact that the patient’s suffering ought to be relieved, even if to do so 
would necessitate ending the patient’s life. In this way, the severity of pain 
required to justify early PST would compensate for the uncertainty inherent to 
judgments of refractoriness and decision-making competence outside of an EOL 
context.  
But, the closer a patient gets to death, the laxer such standards for 
suffering should grow, until a patient who is expected to die within days or hours 
might be able to opt for PST due to any sort of discomfort. After all, if someone’s 
imminently dying, what’s the point of making things more difficult on her? The 
severity of suffering required to warrant PST will thus correspond inversely to a 
patient’s expected remaining lifespan. It is of course difficult to determine the 
precise severity of suffering, but a patient’s expressed level of pain combined 
with a questionnaire designed to measure health-related quality of life like the 




disorders) could enable us to make some reasonable ballpark judgments regarding 
severity.89 
 A natural question to ask as this paper draws to a close is whether I think 
there is any reason to favor PST for patients who are experiencing severe and 
refractory suffering over voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). The answer to this 
question understood in general moral terms is no. I don’t see any fundamental 
moral difference between PST and VAE, so in all of the cases where PST will be 
morally permissible, so will VAE. However, I think there may be good reason to 
favor PST over VAE under particular circumstances. That is, while PST and VAE 
may both be morally permissible, PST may be preferable in light of a situation’s 
particulars (there will also be situations where VAE is preferable). I will give 
some examples of situations where PST may be preferable to VAE, although both 
would be morally permissible. Firstly, in EOL situations, if there is a real chance 
that the patient’s condition may be reversible, it may make sense to employ PST 
rather than VAE in order to allow the time necessary to determine whether there 
is any way to solve the underlying problem and prolong the patient’s life 
(assuming a resulting QOL that would make life extension desirable to the 
patient). For instance, suppose an experimental medication that might prove 
helpful to the patient may or may not be approved for use within the near future. 
In such a case, PST might be employed to relieve the patient’s suffering 
temporarily while waiting to see if the medication will be made available. Further, 
                                                          




in situations where the patient or her family may be uncomfortable with the 
explicit idea of euthanasia or assisted suicide, PST may be a useful tool for 
alleviating the patient’s suffering without causing guilt on the part of the patient 
or her family.  
There may also be situations where (painlessly) prolonging death may be 
indicated for non-medical reasons. Perhaps opting for PST rather than VAE 
would allow family members to come say goodbye to a patient (although this 
would clearly only be valuable for those family members since the patient would 
be unconscious). Even if the patient herself is not aware that this is taking place, if 
before her deterioration she would have found it valuable for those family 
members to be able to say goodbye and get a sense of closure through this, 
perhaps we could assume that the patient would have consented – were she 
capable – to dying more slowly in order to allow this to happen. Perhaps this is 
even something that a particularly family-oriented patient would want included in 
an advanced directive (although given the reality of advance directives and the 
lack of fine distinctions included in most, I doubt this would actually become 
common in practice).  
 My aim in this paper has been to show that a commitment to the moral 
permissibility of PST to alleviate severe and refractory suffering in terminally ill 
patients further rationally commits us to the moral permissibility to alleviate 
severe and refractory psychological suffering in the absence of terminal illness. I 
take this to be a troubling entailment and explored exactly why it is troubling by 




obtaining informed consent. In light of these challenges, I have sketched out a 
solution wherein the severity of suffering necessary to warrant PST should be 
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CARDIAC PACEMAKERS AND WITHDRAWAL OF CARE AT THE 
END OF LIFE90 
1. Introduction 
Cardiac implantable electronic devices (CIEDs) are a part of life for 
millions of patients.91 Given the advanced age of most of this patient population, 
many individuals with CIEDs face end-of-life decision making in medical 
contexts. By this I mean that many patients with CIEDs (or their proxy consenters 
if patients are incompetent to make their own decisions) must make decisions 
regarding the circumstances under which they would like to receive or forego 
care, and circumstances under which they would like care to be withdrawn at the 
end of their lives. These decisions are ideally made while working out an advance 
directive covering such situations, such as a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order 
which stipulates that the patient does not wish to be resuscitated if he is found 
unconscious and/or undergoes cardiac arrest while in care. In practice, however, 
advance directives rarely mention CIEDs.92  
 
                                                          
90 Special thanks to Dr. Robert Gipe, MD, PhD for medical advising on this 
project. His input on drafts has been invaluable. 
91 “More than 4.5 million people worldwide live with an implanted pacemaker, 
including >3 million in the USA alone. Also, >0.8 million people in the USA 
have an implantable cardioverter defibrillator.” (Benjamin and Sorkness, 2017: 
157) 




Compassionate end of life (EOL) care often necessitates foregoing or 
withdrawing treatments which become burdensome or simply unnecessary as the 
patient draws closer to death. As the body shuts down, burdens of many 
treatments become more pronounced and benefits become reduced to nonexistent. 
This paper deals with the ethical complexities surrounding one type of withdrawal 
of care: the deactivation of implantable cardiac electronic devices, specifically 
pacemakers, at the end of a patient’s life. I hold, roughly, that pacemakers are 
unique in their function among CIEDS and this gives them a unique moral status 
when it comes to situations of withdrawal of care at the EOL. 
I will argue that deactivating a pacemaker at the EOL is importantly 
morally different from, for example, deactivating the shocking function of an 
Internal Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD) or removing a patient from a ventilator. 
Specifically, deactivating a pacemaker at the EOL will characteristically either 
impose additional quality of life related burdens on the patient or will have the 
same moral status as voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) performed at the EOL. 
This is so for a few central reasons: (1) There is good reason to conceive of 
pacemakers as “biofixtures” (in contrast to a feeding tube or – as I will argue – 
even an implantable cardioverter defibrillator). A pacemaker is more analogous to 
a biofixture like a porcine valve than it is to a ventilator. And, the fact that one 
(the pacemaker) is easier to “deactivate” than the other (the porcine valve) does 
not mean that the pacemaker should not be understood as a biofixture; (2) A 
pacemaker is a low-burden intervention that does not warrant removal in a 




pacemaker, unless the express goal is to bring about or hasten the patient’s death. 
While it is true that the express goal in some standard cases of withdrawal of care 
may be to lead to the patient’s death, what is different in the case of pacemakers is 
that there is no good reason for deactivation aside from hastening or bringing 
about death in a highly dependent patient. This is because considerations of the 
patient’s discomfort that often drive withdrawal of care in standard cases do not 
apply in the case of pacemakers.93 If a patient is highly dependent upon the 
pacemaker, he will pass away quickly after deactivation. And, if he is not highly 
dependent, deactivating the pacemaker is likely to adversely affect his quality of 
life. There seems to be little reason to deactivate a pacemaker at all for a patient 
who is not dependent upon it to live, and the motivation behind deactivating a 
pacemaker that a patient is dependent upon to live seems to be clearly to end that 
patient’s life. If, as I will argue, deactivation of pacemakers at the end of life is 
typically either useless (and even harmful) or akin to VAE, this will have 
important implications for the conditions under which such deactivation is 
morally permissible and, ultimately, what guidelines ought to be put into place for 
dealing with pacemakers at the end of life. I will assume that most if not all cases 
of non-pacemaker-related autonomously patient (or proxy)-chosen withdrawal of 
                                                          
93 It is true, of course, that other motivations may drive withdrawal of care. For 
instance, one may withdraw care at the end of life out of respect for a patient’s 
autonomy in accordance with an advance directive, or with the sole aim of 
allowing the patient to die of his underlying disease. However, the burdens of 





care at the end of life are morally permissible. I will also assume that there is a 
moral difference between withdrawal of care and VAE or physician-assisted 
suicide.  
Suppose a patient’s family requests that a physician deactivate their 
relative’s pacemaker at the end of life. What should the physician do? Bioethicists 
have characteristically argued that deactivating a pacemaker at the end of a 
patient’s life would be no more morally problematic than taking the patient off 
ventilator support or removing a feeding tube.94 Moreover, a recent expert 
consensus statement from the Heart Rhythm Society (HRS) states that 
deactivation of CIEDs at the end of life is legally and morally permissible. They 
argue this on the basis of nine basic ethical and legal principles, most of which I 
find acceptable. However, this statement misguidedly lumps together cardiac 
devices with importantly different functions and relations to the patient’s body. I 
take particular issue with two of the principles to which the HRS appeals, but only 
in their specific application to cardiac pacemakers as distinct from other CIEDs. I 
will briefly highlight central problems with these principles and then proceed to 
argue for the status of pacemakers as biofixtures, the uselessness of deactivating 
pacemakers in comfort care situations, and the inaccuracy (and even 
disingenuousness) of characterizing pacemaker deactivation as just another case 
of EOL withdrawal of care when their status as biofixtures makes pacemaker 
deactivation morally akin to removing a transplanted organ, which would seem to 
                                                          




constitute VAE rather than withdrawal of care. Here are the two HRS principles 
under consideration and my preliminary responses to each: 
• [a] Ethically and legally, there are no differences between refusing CIED 
therapy and requesting withdrawal of CIED therapy.95 
I will challenge this premise by conceptualizing pacemakers as biofixtures. 
One can refuse an organ transplant but not have a transplant withdrawn. This is 
because the organ transplant, being a biofixture, is bound into and plays a 
constitutive replacement role in the patient’s body. So, withdrawing that 
transplant (or even compromising the functioning of that transplant through 
medication), would be akin to introducing a new pathology rather than a simple 
case of withdrawal of care. If, as I will argue, pacemakers likewise have 
biofixture status and are related to the patient’s body in the same way as an organ 
transplant would be, then withdrawing pacemaker therapy (through either 
deactivation or removal) would be likewise akin to introducing a new pathology. 
In this way, there is an important moral difference between refusing and 
withdrawing pacemaker therapy that is akin to the moral difference between 
refusing and withdrawing an organ transplant.    
One of the possible concerns on the part of clinicians that the authors of the 
HRS guidelines address is the question of whether withdrawing a CIED therapy is 
akin to assisted suicide or euthanasia. As Lynn Jansen notes, many clinicians take 
there to be an important moral distinction between killing and letting die and thus 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide on the one hand and withdrawal of care 
                                                          




on the other; moreover, hospital policy and law often take seriously the moral 
importance of such a distinction.96 Those who support the claim that pacemaker 
deactivation at the EOL is morally akin to withdrawal of care also typically 
assume that there is a morally important distinction between VAE and withdrawal 
of care and the authors of the HRS guidelines take such a distinction seriously. In 
this paper, I will operate under the assumption that this distinction is correct and 
will argue that pacemaker deactivation at the EOL is morally akin to VAE rather 
than withdrawal of care. The second of the HRS’s principles under consideration 
here explicitly makes such a distinction: 
•  [b] Ethically, CIED deactivation is neither physician-assisted suicide nor 
euthanasia. When carrying out a patient’s request for withdrawal of a life-
sustaining treatment that a patient perceives as unwanted (including CIED 
therapies), the clinician’s intent is to discontinue the unwanted treatment 
and allow the patient to die naturally of the underlying disease - not to 
terminate the patient’s life.97 
This principle appeals to the clinician’s intent in order to differentiate CIED 
deactivation from euthanasia. And, intent is often what grounds a moral 
distinction between withdrawal of care and VAE.98 But, it is important to also 
account for the wider landscape in which CIED deactivation takes place, namely 
when the patient is already at the end of his life. As I will argue, it doesn’t make 
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any sense to say that deactivating the pacemaker would allow a highly pacemaker 
dependent patient to die naturally of the underlying disease that is actually killing 
him. This is because, in correcting for slow heart rate (bradycardia) the pacemaker 
serves to prevent heart failure from developing in the first place. In a highly 
dependent patient, deactivation would serve to cause the patient to die of a 
chronic underlying illness, but one that had been managed – often for years – by 
an implanted biofixture. In such a context, deactivation is more akin to the 
introduction of a new pathology which kills the patient than to allowing the 
patient to die of an underlying terminal illness. And, if the patient is not highly 
dependent upon his pacemaker, all that deactivation would accomplish would be 
to worsen the patient’s quality of life unnecessarily.  
2. Pacemakers vs. ICDs 
 It is important to be clear on what exactly is under discussion here. 
“CIED” is a blanket term which covers all implantable electronic cardiac devices. 
Both pacemakers and Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) are 
implantable devices that help to control arrhythmias (abnormally slow, fast, or 
irregular heartbeat). Pacemakers provide a pacing function wherein they regulate 
slow heart rhythms. ICDs monitor the heart’s rhythm and deliver a shock if the 
heart reaches a dangerously fast rate. Current ICD devices always have a pacing 
function as well, although pacing is neither used nor needed in most ICDs. In 
ICDs, the shocking mechanism and the pacing function can be deactivated 
independently. For the purposes of this paper, when I refer to pacemakers I will 




and the pacing function of ICDs. The conclusions I draw regarding pacemakers 
will thus apply equally to the pacing function of ICDs, although most ICDs do not 
perform an ongoing pacing function. 
Much of the literature on the moral status of deactivating cardiac devices 
at the end of life has focused on the less controversial case of implantable 
cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs).99 Deactivating an ICD is less morally fraught 
than deactivating a pacemaker because near the end of life ICDs can often give 
the patient a series of painful shocks which provide clear justification for 
deactivating the ICD out of a concern for the patient’s comfort: “In the last weeks 
of their lives, twenty percent of ICD patients receive shocks which are painful and 
known to decrease quality of life, and which greatly contribute to the distress of 
patients and their families.”100 Understood in terms of burdens, the pain of shocks 
at the EOL overrides the potential benefits. This is especially true in the most 
common cases where the patient is shocked multiple times. Here the ICD attempts 
to correct for arrhythmias that cannot be permanently corrected for as the patient’s 
heart is failing. This leads to a series of repeated and painful shocks.  
Further, in cases where a patient has an advance directive with a DNR 
specifying that resuscitation be foregone in cases of cardiac arrest, it makes sense 
that this would apply to an ICD as well. If the patient wants to forego external 
defibrillation due to the potential burdens (especially pain of shock) of such, it 
                                                          
99 See, e.g., Daeschler et al., 2015; Lampert, 2015; Strömberg et al., 2014; 
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makes sense that the patient would also want to forego internal defibrillation that 
would deliver a series of painful shocks to him. In both cases, patients do not 
want their lives extended by treatment of a cardiac arrest and would rather expire 
rapidly.  
3. Pacemakers as Biofixtures 
The moral status of pacemakers and the moral permissibility of 
deactivating them depends heavily upon the relation that these devices have to the 
patient. Assuming a moral distinction between killing and letting die, stopping a 
patient’s heart with an injection at the end of life would be morally different from 
withdrawing care such as ventilator support. This is because the actions taken are 
different, the justification behind these actions are typically different, and (of 
special relevance to the argument at hand) the nature of the component being 
compromised in or removed from the patient is different. Withdrawal of ventilator 
support constitutes a situation where an artificial method of life support is 
discontinued in order to allow the patient to die of his underlying illness. Stopping 
the patient’s heart is a situation where a native fixture of the patient’s body is 
being actively compromised in order to cause the patient’s death. It is clear in the 
latter case that such interference with the functioning of a bodily system would 
uncontroversially amount to euthanasia. It is further clear that stopping a 
transplanted heart through the same method would likewise be tantamount to 
euthanasia.101 There is no morally significant difference between the heart a 
patient is born with and the heart a patient receives as a transplant when it comes 
                                                          




to questions of cessation or withdrawal of treatment at the end of life. A 
transplanted heart is a paradigm example of a biofixture – something that has 
become a part of the patient such that the way we are morally permitted to treat 
that thing will not differ from the way in which we are permitted to treat other 
parts of the patient that are necessary to sustain life. In the same way as 
compromising the functioning of an organ in order to bring about a patient’s death 
would amount to euthanizing the patient, so would doing the same to a 
transplanted organ. But what about deactivating a pacemaker? The pacing that 
would be stopped upon deactivation serves the same function that would be 
stopped by an injection to a healthy heart. In both cases, an abnormal heart 
rhythm is produced through intervention and, in the case of pacemaker 
deactivation, the patient will likely die of severe bradycardia (slow heart rate) or 
asystole (‘flat line’), at least if the patient is highly dependent upon his pacemaker 
to live. Does this mean that a pacemaker is a biofixture like a transplanted heart? 
In order to answer this question, we must pin down what is required in order to 
count as a biofixture and determine whether pacemakers fulfill those criteria.   
The notion of a biofixture was first put forward by Frederick Paola and 
Robert Walker.102 Paola and Walker draw on the notion of property law to draw 
an analogy between fixtures of property and biofixtures in human beings. Daniel 
Sulmasy proposes criteria for determining whether a technological intervention is 
a part of the patient (i.e. a biofixture).103 According to Sulmasy, for a 
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technological intervention to be a part of the patient, it must be a constitutive 
therapy which is also a replacement therapy. A therapy being constitutive is best 
understood by contrast with regulative therapies. An ICD is a regulative therapy 
because it only operates intermittently to shock and reset the heart when 
necessary; in doing so the ICD “coax[es] the body back towards its own 
homeostatic equilibrium”.104 Constitutive therapies, by contrast, “take over a 
function that the body can no longer provide for itself”.105 A pacemaker is a 
constitutive therapy because it stimulates a continuous heart rhythm in essentially 
the same way the heart would; pacemakers replace the function of the conduction 
system of the heart in much the same way that a heart transplant replaces the 
overall function. 
Under the heading of constitutive therapies, Sulmasy draws a further 
distinction between substitutive therapies and replacement therapies. He argues 
that for something to count as a part of the patient, it must constitute a 
replacement therapy, which he characterizes as follows: “The most important 
feature of a replacement therapy is that it provides the function that has been 
pathologically lost, more or less in the same manner in which the patient was once 
able to provide this function when healthy”.106 A substitutive therapy, by contrast, 
provides a substitute for some function in the body that does not resemble the way 
in which the body provides that substitute for itself. Hemodialysis for kidney 
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failure and insulin injections for diabetes are examples of substitutive therapies. 
Sulmasy provides the following indicators of whether something constitutes a 
replacement therapy: 
Additional signs suggestive of an intervention being a replacement therapy 
might include: (1) its responsiveness to changes in the organism or its 
environment, (2) properties such as growth and self-repair, (3) 
independence from external energy sources and supplies, (4) 
independence from external control by an expert, (5) immunologic 
compatibility, (6) physical integration into the patient’s body.107 
Sulmasy characterizes these properties as indicators and so it seems like they are 
meant to be used essentially as rules of thumb for identifying replacement 
therapies. Nonetheless, it is evident that HRS has adopted Sulmasy’s indicators as 
criteria for replacement therapies.108 Others in the debate (e.g., Kay and Bittner 
2009; Zellner et al. 2009) also seem to understand Sulmasy’s indicators as 
criteria.109 In light of this misunderstanding, it is worth looking at the entailments 
                                                          
107 Ibid: 71-72. 
108 E.g., “A replacement therapy (e.g., kidney transplantation) literally becomes 
“part of the patient” and provides the lost function in the same fashion as the 
patient did when healthy. Replacement therapies also respond to physiologic 
changes in the host and are independent of external energy sources and control of 
an expert. Removing or withdrawing a replacement life-sustaining treatment has 
been characterized as euthanasia.” (Lampert et al., 2010:1012) 
109 E.g., “[A] “replacement” must be capable of growth and self-repair and must 
be independent from external energy sources and expertise. Pacemakers are not 




of accepting these indicators as individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
criteria for pacemaker status. Moreover, even if these are just meant to serve as 
heuristics for identifying biofixtures, I take issue with the implications of 
indicators (2-5).  
Indicator (2) basically amounts to a presupposition that a biofixture must 
be made of flesh, blood, and/or other organic materials (or something similar 
enough to them) to be integrated into the body in the same way that an organ, 
bone marrow, blood, or stem cells would. This is too restrictive a definition to be 
plausible and will not serve for the future. It seems merely to reinforce unfounded 
pre-theoretical intuitions about the importance of material over function and is not 
based in a reality where progressively better artificial therapies and materials are 
being developed. Both growth and self-repair serve as inadequate focal points 
when what is of far greater importance to biofixture status is the relation between 
the fixture in question and the surrounding body. Integration to the body is 
something that is universal to biofixtures, while growth and self-repair apply to 
only a limited class of biofixtures. Artificial joints cannot grow or repair 
themselves, but they are surely a part of the patient’s body in the sense relevant to 
biofixture status.  
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Now suppose that a permanent artificial heart developed out of entirely 
synthetic materials were approved for widespread use in patients in need of heart 
transplants. (Although artificial hearts are now mostly used as a temporary 
measure while patients await heart transplants, the technology is developing at 
such a rate that I think it would not be surprising to see permanent artificial heart 
transplants become widespread within our lifetimes.)110 Suppose further that this 
artificial heart (being implanted only in adults) remained one size and, rather than 
repairing itself, if damaged had to either be repaired by the surrounding body or 
through surgery. It seems that this artificial heart would clearly be a biofixture, 
despite lacking the capacity for growth and self-repair. It would be bound into the 
body both by vascular pathways and scar tissue and would fulfill the same role in 
the body that a heart made of organic tissue would. The only substantive 
difference would be what the heart was made of, and this alone does not seem 
enough to call the biofixture status of this artificial heart into question.    
 Indicators (3-4) would require further specification in order to be 
genuinely helpful in identifying biofixtures. Depending on how dependence upon 
external energy sources and expert control are characterized, this could have the 
effect of ruling out many interventions that require charging and/or monitoring, 
even if this is infrequent and only takes place during regular check-ups. Of 
course, if there were some sort of device that required constant remote control by 
a professional or had to be plugged into a wall in order to function, this would 
seem to call into question its status as a replacement therapy. However, devices 
                                                          




with batteries can run for months or even years without needing to be recharged in 
some cases. Typical pacemakers, for instance, have 8-12 years of battery life and 
most pacemakers require very little adjustment after the initial three months.111 
And, some devices, while they may require regular calibration from a 
professional, may not need the sort of constant control or adjustment that would 
seem to make a fixture a substitutive therapy rather than a replacement therapy. 
Further, indicator (5) immunologic compatibility, understood strictly, may 
rule out most organ transplants from counting as biofixtures. This would be an 
undesirable result since it seems that if anything should count as a biofixture, 
organ transplants should. However, with organ transplants, in all but the most 
exceptional cases of immunologic matching, the patient must take 
immunosuppressants for the rest of his life in order to keep his body from 
rejecting the transplant.112 By contrast, something like a titanium knee 
replacement would, strictly speaking, be more immunologically compatible with a 
patient than would a standard organ transplant, since an artificial knee does not 
require that the patient take immunosuppressants in order to keep the body from 
rejecting it. The immunologically benign nature of such inorganic materials leads 
to the odd entailment that if we chose to adopt immunologic compatibility as one 
of the individually necessary and jointly sufficient criteria for something to count 
as a biofixture, and further construed this requirement in terms of strict 
immunologic compatibility, then immunologically benign fixtures made of metal 
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or plastic would count as biofixtures while organic ‘fixtures’ like organ 
transplants would not count as biofixtures unless they were a near-perfect 
immunologic match to the patient. 
I hold, like Sulmasy, that a biofixture must constitute a constitutive 
therapy and a replacement therapy. That is, a biofixture must fulfill a constitutive 
function and be a replacement that does so in roughly the same way the system it 
is replacing would. However, I disagree on how exactly replacement therapies 
ought to be characterized. I will here endorse a wider conception of what it is to 
be a replacement therapy. This conception neither implicitly nor explicitly implies 
that for something to count as a replacement therapy it must be constituted of 
organic material. To this end, I will adopt and expand upon two of Sulmasy’s 
indicators: (1) “responsiveness to changes in the organism or its environment” 
and (6) “physical integration into the patient’s body” as indicators of something 
counting as a replacement therapy. I will further stipulate that, in order to be a 
biofixture worth having, a fixture ought not impose burdens on the patient 
disproportionate to the burdens imposed by the systems or functions that it is 
replacing, and further that the burdens imposed by the biofixture ought not be 
disproportionate to the benefits of having that fixture in place.   
 Regarding indicator (1), I want to specify that for an object to count as a 
replacement therapy, it must respond to changes and it must respond roughly in 
the way that the function it is replacing would. It needn’t be responsive to each 
and every change in the organism. Many systems operate more or less 




of other systems. A replacement therapy need only be responsive within the 
ordinary domain of the function it is replacing. This means that a knee 
replacement would only need to be responsive to changes in the adjoining bones 
and muscles (e.g. adjusting to shifting weight, moving with muscle tension, etc.) 
and a porcine valve would only need to be responsive to changes in the 
surrounding heart (e.g. accommodating higher or lower blood pressure). In the 
same way, a pacemaker replacing the pacing function of the heart would need to 
be responsive to fluctuations in heart rhythm and not (at least not in any direct 
way) to, e.g., changes in muscle tension in the patient’s foot. 
Regarding indicator (6), I hold that while it is the case that something 
needn’t be strictly or wholly internal to the patient in order to count as a 
biofixture, it must be integrated with the patient in such a way that it is attached 
the patient’s body in a semi-permanent to permanent manner and removal would 
be invasive. There are constitutive therapies that are more or less integrated into 
the patient’s body. Hemodialysis or ECMO rely on machines that must be 
“hooked up” to the patient and which, aside from an access point, are entirely 
external to the patient. Something like a hip replacement, porcine heart valve, or 
pacemaker seems to be more integrated into the patient’s body, and, further, they 
would be even if part of them were external. If there were some sort of pacemaker 
that had an external display that sat on top of the patient’s skin or a line that 
connected the device to a small console (as ill-advised as this might be in light of 
infection concerns) the mere fact that the entire device is not internal to the patient 




integrated to the patient and removing the part below the skin would be invasive, 
requiring surgery. Pacemakers sit below the skin and become further integrated 
into the patient’s body by the encapsulation of the pacemaker itself and connected 
leads by scar tissue, so the integration requirement for counting as a replacement 
therapy has been met in this case.  
Someone might argue that the reason one cannot request that an organ be 
withdrawn is that to do so would be expensive and difficult, which would render 
it untenable in practical terms.113 However, deactivating a pacemaker is neither 
expensive nor difficult. So, biofixture or not, a pacemaker may be deactivated in 
situations where removing an organ would be pragmatically untenable. Regarding 
pacemakers, there is an important distinction to be made between the invasiveness 
and challenges of removal and those of deactivation. A pacemaker is easy to 
deactivate (although far more complicated to physically remove from the patient’s 
body), and other candidates for biofixtures may be as well. However, when we’re 
talking about something being integrated into the patient’s body, the ease with 
which it can be made to quit working – as opposed to the ease of removal – is not 
a consideration relevant to the level of integration. Plenty of native body parts can 
be incapacitated and caused to fail by relatively easy and minor interventions like 
                                                          
113 One representative example of such an argument: “Deactivating a pacemaker 
is non-invasive and does not introduce a new pathology. Removing an implanted 
porcine valve, however, is invasive and introduces a new pathology (i.e., a sternal 
wound). Thus, in this context, it is permissible to carry out requests to withdraw 
CIED therapies from patients who no longer want these therapies.” (Lampert et 




the administration of certain drugs. This does not mean that those organs and 
systems are less integrated into a patient’s body than other less easily 
compromised organs and systems. In the same way, the fact that a pacemaker is 
convenient to deactivate and a porcine valve would require surgery either to 
remove or otherwise seriously compromise its functioning does not mean that the 
pacemaker is somehow less integrated into the patient’s body than the porcine 
valve. The mere ease with which someone could stop a patient’s heart or cause 
liver failure through drug-induced means does not mean that doing so would be 
different in moral terms from removing the patient’s heart or liver surgically. In 
the same way, the mere fact that pacemaker deactivation is easy and cheap does 
not mean that it is different in moral terms from surgically or medically 
compromising the functioning of a patient’s heart. The ease with which a 
pacemaker can be deactivated may make the decision to deactivate a pacemaker at 
the end of life less psychologically difficult than the psychotic-seeming removal 
of a porcine heart valve in the name of withdrawal of care would be, but this 
psychological phenomenon does not point to anything morally significant.  
Comparable Burdens 
 I will now move from expanding upon two indicators I have adopted from 
Sulmasy as criteria for biofixture status to a criterion of my own. In the same way 
that, in order for a heart to be a heart worth having, it ought to fulfill the basic 
functions of a heart without imposing disproportionate burdens on the patient, so 
in order for a transplanted heart to be a heart worth having, it ought to do the 




a biofixture worth having, it ought not impose disproportionate burdens on the 
patient.114 If a native heart is failing, it ought to be either repaired or replaced. A 
biofixture that replaces the function of a failing heart should be at least competent 
to stave off death or serious suffering, and, ideally would bring the patient up to 
                                                          
114 Now, it’s important to note here that burdens can be understood in different 
ways. One straightforward way a device or treatment might be burdensome would 
be by inflicting pain on the patient. An intervention might also be burdensome in 
the way that it interferes with the patient’s normal functioning - even if it does not 
inflict pain on the patient. A device that physically interferes with a patient’s 
movements but does not actually cause the patient pain would fall under this 
heading. An intervention might likewise be burdensome in virtue of the time it 
requires from the patient in terms of maintenance and upkeep. If an intervention 
didn’t have any effect on the patient’s physical normal functioning but required 
the patient to travel to a clinic constantly for checkups, this would impose a 
burden on the patient. An intervention that required a patient to be hospitalized 
would likewise be burdensome, regardless of whether or not the intervention itself 
were cumbersome or painful to the patient. And, of course, there is the matter of 
financial burdens of treatment. While I will be largely bracketing financial issues 
in the current paper, it is important to bear in mind that financial considerations 
may weigh heavily in EOL decisions on the part of patients and their families. 
However, such financial burdens are imposed by an often dysfunctional health 
economic system rather than being a result of the intervention or treatment itself. 
While it may be totally rational to choose to withdraw care on financial grounds, 
explicit consideration of financial burden is best left out of the current project. 
Suffice it to say that a patient’s being forced to choose between an intervention 
that is unobjectionable to her and the financial solvency of her family is an 





the quality of life he would have enjoyed with a healthy heart. Functioning well 
qua biofixture requires that such a fixture not be the sort of thing that the patient 
would be better off not having. Now, in the same way that a heart’s functioning 
poorly and painfully in a patient doesn’t undermine that heart’s status as a body 
part, a biofixture that functioned poorly and/or painfully would not necessarily 
thereby lose its status as a biofixture. However, a biofixture that functioned poorly 
enough or imposed enough burdens on the patient might rightfully lead us to 
question whether it can be properly characterized as a biofixture at all. On the 
account I propose here, some devices might perform so poorly as to fail to qualify 
as biofixtures, and some devices, although they perform well enough to strictly-
speaking qualify as biofixtures, will not perform well enough to count as 
biofixtures worth having.  
The requirement that something reach a threshold of proper functioning in 
order to be properly considered a biofixture can be made sense of, at least in part, 
in light of the requirement (adopted from Sulmasy) that in order for something to 
count as a replacement therapy, it must serve the function of the thing it is 
replacing in roughly the same way that thing originally fulfilled (or would have 
fulfilled) the function. If a transplanted heart had a weird defect where it made an 
earsplitting and persistent whistling noise every time the patient’s heart rate went 
above 80 bpm, one might be led to question how adequate a replacement that 
heart actually was, despite clearly seeming to be integrated into the patient’s body 
and sensitive to the relevant changes in the body. The same might be asked of a 




transplanted kidney which somehow produced urine that – despite causing no 
lasting physical harm to the patient – had roughly the consistency of wet sand. 
These sorts of shudder-inducing examples are admittedly fanciful, but the point 
here is that burdens of a thing may actually compromise that thing’s functional 
status, despite the defects or additional burdens in question not strictly 
compromising the essential functioning of that thing. Crafting scissors that cut 
paper like a dream but also had a 40% chance of removing a fingertip or two 
might be very good qua paper cutting scissors but not qua scissors, period. And, a 
particularly creaky church pew might be good at holding one’s body up in a 
sitting position, but one would probably call its fulfillment of its function into 
question while trying one’s best not to shift one’s weight around at a particularly 
solemn funeral. In the same way, a pacemaker that made an obnoxious noise or 
had flashing LED lights that constantly shone through the patient’s skin might be 
good qua heart-rhythm-replacer but not necessarily qua biofixture. Presumably 
one important part of replacing the function of something in roughly the same 
way the original thing functioned is that the replacement doesn’t come along with 
additional disproportionate or even intolerable drawbacks.  
In the same way that there are better and worse functional objects of all 
sorts, there are surely better and worse biofixtures. This is evident from the fact 
that a highly immunocompatible organ transplant is surely better than a less 
immunocompatible organ transplant, in that the former will not impose the 
lifelong burden of immunosuppressant therapy on the patient. However, both of 




criteria of being constitutive replacement therapies and having benefits that 
clearly outweigh their burdens. I will here take no stance on just how poorly 
something must function in order to compromise its status as a biofixture. I will 
only state that a biofixture worth having ought not to impose burdens 
disproportionate to its benefits or disproportionate to the burdens that would be 
imposed by the system it is replacing. And, if something fulfilled its function 
poorly enough in terms either of its direct medical function or burdens imposed 
apart from its direct function, that thing might, as a result, not warrant the status 
of biofixture. 
I hold that, for it to be worth incorporating into the patient’s body, a 
biofixture must not be burdensome to the patient to an extent that is substantially 
greater than the burdens that the system or function it is replacing would impose. 
Further, a biofixture must at the very least not impose burdens on the patient that 
outweigh the benefits of having it. Now, depending on the status of the system or 
function being replaced, and thus the burdens imposed by the patient prior to 
implantation of a biofixture, the latter may be an easier or more difficult 
requirement to meet. After all, if a patient has a heartbeat so slow as to make even 
the ordinary activities of daily life a challenge, a device that imposed significant 
burdens but allowed the patient to perform the activities of daily life would be 
preferable to the status quo. Ideally, the biofixture will impose burdens not much 
more substantial than those imposed by a basically normally-functioning (and 
normally aging) instantiation of the system or function it is replacing. By this I 




may require medication or supplementation or exercise or various lifestyle 
changes (especially as the patient ages), upkeep of a biofixture might require 
things to be done of a similar degree of burden or inconvenience. Of course, if the 
patient would receive only marginal benefit from having a fixture implanted, the 
risks of surgery should not be undergone. But this is a background consideration.  
In order to illuminate this burdens-related requirement, let us return to the 
example of a transplanted heart. In cases of organ transplant, in all but the most 
exceptional cases, the patient must take immunosuppressants for the rest of his 
life. While this is a burden that the patient would not have if his organs functioned 
normally, the burden imposed here seems proportional to the benefit derived from 
the transplanted organ. Further, especially as we age, different bodily systems 
may develop dysfunctions that require medications and monitoring. The burden of 
having a heart that doesn’t work perfectly (as happens with many aging hearts), 
which may require lifelong medication, seems comparable to the burden of taking 
immunosuppressants to keep one’s body from rejecting a transplanted heart. 
Medications will have side effects, some more severe than others, but the benefit 
derived from having a bodily system that functions normally will outweigh these 
downsides. So, in the case of a transplanted heart, the requirement of 
immunosuppressants is comparable to the burdens imposed by the system it is 
replacing, and the benefits of having the transplanted heart outweigh the burdens 
it imposes. As will be made clear in the next section, pacemakers also impose 
burdens comparable to the system they replace and the benefits of having a 




A pacemaker is a low-burden intervention. When a pacemaker is 
implanted, the surgery itself presents risks to the patient. The healing period lasts 
about six weeks, in the course of which the patient may potentially dislodge leads 
or develop an infection. But these complications are rare and can be rectified, 
although this usually requires surgery.115 There are risks to having a pacemaker, 
even once the healing process is over, but these risks are minimal.116 A patient 
will have to return in 8-12 years once the pacemaker’s battery runs out and the 
standard of care regarding regular monitoring is to check every three to four 
months to insure the pacemaker is working properly.117 These checks can take 
place either at a clinic or in the patient’s home (through a remote monitoring 
system). Ideally, patients will go through their daily lives forgetting that the 
pacemaker is even there.  
Pacemakers clearly have benefits that outweigh their burdens. A patient 
characteristically opts for a pacemaker because he is suffering from symptomatic 
bradycardia, which may cause shortness of breath, loss of consciousness, severe 
lightheadedness, and fatigue.118 These symptoms can have a substantial negative 
impact on the patient, and so the burdens imposed by surgery, recovery, and 
                                                          
115 See Ellenbogen et al., 2000: 669-694 for a thorough treatment of potential 
complications of pacemaker implantation. 
116 One such risk, which is rare, is of the pacemaker eroding through thin skin and 
thus causing a situation where the pacemaker and leads must be removed and re-
implanted. (Ellenbogen 2000: 673-4, 676) 
117 See Ganz and Hayes, 2018. 




check-ups will be outweighed by the improvement in the patient’s day-to-day 
functioning and quality of life. Moreover, these burdens, and especially the long-
term burdens once the patient has healed from surgery (remote or in-person 
checkups every three months, replacement in 8-12 years) are comparable to and in 
some cases less than the burdens imposed by a normally aging heart. A 
pacemaker is thus clearly a biofixture worth having. 
I have argued that pacemakers are biofixtures on the basis that they meet 
the criteria I’ve endorsed of responsiveness to changes in and physical integration 
into the patient’s body. Additionally, pacemakers are clearly biofixtures worth 
having since they impose burdens comparable to the burdens imposed by the 
bodily function being replaced, as well as proportional to the benefit derived from 
the fixture. Now I will make the case that pacemakers additionally do not impose 
the sorts of burdens on the patient that, at least in part, motivate withdrawal of 
care in EOL situations. In order to support this claim, I will use as examples two 
common types of care that are typically withdrawn at the EOL: ventilator support 
and artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH).  
4. Pacemakers vs. Other EOL Interventions 
One of the main justifications for withdrawal of care at the EOL is the 
burdens imposed on the patient by such care. Simply put, if withdrawal of a 
treatment would make the patient less comfortable, this counts against 
withdrawal. And, if continuing a treatment would keep or put the patient in a state 
of discomfort, this counts in favor of withdrawal. These are not the only 




but the effect that the care is having on patients in terms of burdens and benefits is 
a weighty consideration. Moreover, if a treatment is substantially improving the 
quality of life of the patient and also sustaining the patient’s life, it is clear that 
withdrawal cannot be justified on straightforward quality of life grounds. Rather, 
it seems that the primary motivation for withdrawal would be to cause the 
patient’s death. Even if withdrawal of care were performed by a clinician out of 
respect for a patient’s autonomy in accordance with an explicit request or advance 
directive, withdrawal of an extremely low-burden life-sustaining intervention 
would be the sort of thing that (assuming the patient understood what he was 
asking for) would be requested by the patient with the aim of having his life 
ended, because there would be no other reasonable rationale for making such a 
request. 
Let’s start by considering standard interventions which are withdrawn at 
the end of life in terms of the burdens they impose on patients that are alleviated 
when care is withdrawn. One common form of withdrawal of care at the EOL is 
removing a patient from ventilator support. In order to get an accurate idea of the 
burdens that a ventilator may impose on a patient, it is important to know exactly 
what being on ventilator support entails. There are both invasive and noninvasive 
methods of ventilator support. In cases of invasive ventilator support, the patient 
will either be intubated (if she is to be on ventilator support short-term) or have a 
tracheostomy put in (if she is to be on ventilator support longer-term). Usually an 




be put for longer-term ventilator support.119 Having an endotracheal tube inserted 
is painful, requiring sedation, and as such imposes a clear burden in quality of life 
terms on the patient. Further, the endotracheal tube is characteristically poorly 
tolerated by patients, there is a risk of dislodgement so heavy sedation is required, 
and the patient’s communication is severely limited, both by the presence of the 
tube itself as well as the accompanying sedation.120 Having a tracheostomy is less 
obviously a burden, once the healing process is complete. The patient is more 
mobile and can communicate much better than he would be able to if intubated. 
However, a tracheostomy still imposes burdens on the patient. Having a 
tracheostomy can be inconvenient in terms of speaking and can be a source of 
embarrassment to the patient. And there are some serious potential complications, 
including “misplacement or displacement of the tube, bleeding, infection, failure 
of the stoma to heal, and tracheal stenosis [narrowing of the trachea].”121 
Noninvasive ventilator support requires that the patient wear either a mask or a 
helmet and also imposes some significant burdens on the patient. Common 
problems associated with noninvasive ventilator support include discomfort to an 
extent that may require sedation in poorly tolerant patients, ulceration across the 
nasal bridge, unpleasant patient-ventilator dyssynchrony (where, simply put, the 
patient’s breaths and the assistance from the mask or helmet don’t ‘sync up’ 
                                                          
119 See Shelly and Nightingale, 1999:1675. 
120 See Hasan, 2010: 305-341 for the full extent of complications from mechanical 
ventilation with an endotracheal tube. 




correctly), and carbon dioxide rebreathing.122 The burdens imposed by both 
invasive and noninvasive methods of ventilator support negatively impact patient 
well-being to an extent that may clearly warrant withdrawal of such support in 
many EOL cases.  
Another example of EOL care which imposes substantial burdens on the 
patient is the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH). This is so 
regardless of method of delivery. Artificial nutrition and hydration can take place 
intravenously, through a tube inserted down the throat of the patient, or through a 
tube inserted directly into the stomach of the patient.123 Intravenous nutrition and 
hydration runs a high risk of infection and requires surgical insertion of a port for 
long term care. Having a feeding tube inserted down one’s throat is 
uncomfortable and may be painful, and is at best a temporary solution. A tube 
inserted directly into the stomach of the patient requires surgery, which runs a risk 
of infection, and leaves the patient with a stoma that is susceptible to further 
infection and can cause long-term discomfort. Further, "patients with advanced 
dementia who receive ANH through a gastrostomy tube are likely to be physically 
restrained and are at increased risk of aspiration pneumonia, diarrhea, 
gastrointestinal discomfort, and problems associated with feeding-tube removal 
by the patient" and “when a patient’s renal function declines in the last days of 
life, ANH may cause choking due to increased oral and pulmonary secretions, 
                                                          
122 See Esquinas, 2010: 107-117 for the full extent of complications from 
noninvasive pressure support ventilation. 




dyspnea due to pulmonary edema [fluid in the lungs], and abdominal discomfort 
due to ascites [which cause swelling]."124 These burdens on the patient, combined 
with the marginal to nonexistent benefit of (and sometimes active harm caused 
by) most artificial nutrition and hydration once the patient reaches an advanced 
stage of the dying process, justify foregoing or withdrawing artificial nutrition and 
hydration for many patients at the end of life.125 There are no such considerations 
in cases of pacemaker deactivation. Pacemakers are extremely low-burden 
interventions; if anything, a pacemaker will improve the patient’s QOL. A 
pacemaker will not impede a patient’s ability to ambulate or communicate. It will 
not impose burdens on the patient in terms of pain or discomfort and has a low 
risk of infection once the initial healing process is complete. It is thus clear that 
the sort of burdens that typically drive withdrawal of particular therapies at the 
EOL do not apply to pacemaker therapy.  
It is worth here considering whether a patient’s already having the surgery 
for artificial nutrition via the stomach prior to being hospitalized at the end of life 
would change the moral status of withdrawing this care. Speaking in general 
terms, I believe that it would not. This is for a couple of reasons. First, even if the 
burdens imposed by artificial nutrition in this sort of case were minimal, there is 
still enough of a burden to justify withdrawal of care if the patient or his family 
requests it. There is a negative impact on the patient on a daily basis in terms of 
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discomfort and limited movement, along with continuous risk of infection.126 
Further, the fact that artificial nutrition is a usually futile intervention at the end of 
life makes imposing these burdens on the patient doubly unreasonable. Second, if 
the reason the patient received artificial nutrition were related to his terminal 
illness, such as dementia, debilitating stroke, or cancer, then removal of such 
nutrition would constitute removing an impediment to dying of that terminal 
illness rather than introducing or enabling a new (or otherwise well-managed and 
largely unrelated) pathology to end the life of the patient. 
I have argued that a pacemaker is a biofixture because it is a constitutive 
replacement therapy that is integrated into the patient, sensitive to changes in the 
patient’s cardiac state, and has burdens comparable to upkeep of a healthy (albeit 
aging) heart as well as benefits that far outweigh these burdens. Further, when 
compared to the burdens of other characteristic interventions that may be 
withdrawn or foregone at the EOL, pacemakers do not impose comparable 
burdens on the patient. I will now turn to argue that pacemaker deactivation at the 
end of a patient’s life is either inconsistent with the purpose and aims of comfort 
care (in non-heavily dependent patients) or morally akin to VAE (in heavily 
dependent patients). 
 
                                                          
126 Broadly speaking, whether burdens are substantial enough to justify 
withdrawal of care will have to do with proximity to death along with the 
patient’s own perception of how heavily these burdens weigh on him. Generally, I 
hold that the closer the patient is to death, the less weighty burdens must be in 




5. Pacemaker Deactivation and the Purpose of Comfort Care 
The point at which interventions are withdrawn at the end of life is often 
when physicians determine that a patient should receive comfort care - that is, 
care in which the ultimate priority is to make the patient comfortable as he dies, 
even if doing so might potentially hasten the patient’s death. In such situations, 
alleviating pain is the primary goal. However, there are two likely options 
regarding outcomes if a pacemaker is deactivated in the name of comfort care: 
either the patient will not die and feel worse as a result of losing the pacing 
function (in a patient who is not highly dependent upon his pacemaker, or at any 
rate less dependent than previously thought before deactivation) or the patient will 
die of an arrest shortly after having the pacemaker deactivated (in cases where the 
patient is highly dependent upon his pacemaker).127 The decrease in quality of life 
                                                          
127 Freddy M. Abi-Samra explains in more detail: 
The benefits of antibradycardia pacing are threefold: 
1. Preventing sudden cardiac death in patients with sinus node dysfunction 
(rarely) or complete heart block without any escape rhythm (pacer-
dependent patients) 
2. Preventing syncopal or near syncopal spells [loss or near-loss of 
consciousness] in patients who have existing but unreliable escape 
rhythms 
3. Preventing general constitutional symptoms resulting from reliable but 
slow heart rates (fatigue, malaise, shortness of breath, etc) 
Patients who are completely pacer dependent make up a minority 
of patients receiving CIEDs. Deactivation in these patients would provide 
the intended result of shortening an uncomfortable dying process. 




in a non-highly-dependent case may be variable; a patient may feel significantly 
worse or only slightly worse, but regardless of the specific degree to which the 
patient’s quality of life is lessened in particular cases, losing the pacing function 
will likely have a negative effect on the patient’s well-being. It is important to 
emphasize that the reason the pacemaker was originally implanted was to correct 
for symptomatic bradycardia (slow heart rate), typical symptoms of which are 
shortness of breath, intermittent syncope (loss of consciousness), severe 
lightheadedness, and fatigue. These quality of life reducing symptoms would 
return upon cessation of pacemaker therapy. 
When it comes to highly dependent cases, the patient will likely die 
shortly after deactivation, and the manner in which the patient will die is likely to 
be uncomfortable. The effect of cessation of pacemaker function is not to let the 
patient drift gently into that good night. On the contrary, the patient will likely die 
in distress, gasping for breath, and panicked from loss of pacing. Unless the 
patient is heavily sedated, this will be a deeply unpleasant death. Now, in all 
fairness, it is important to note that medication is often required to make patients 
                                                          
immediate that death would result in a matter of minutes, placing a great 
psychological burden on the provider, who must be completely at ease 
with the concept that his or her actions are not tantamount to assisted 
suicide or euthanasia. 
In contrast, deactivating pacing in patients whose conditions 
coincide with 2 or 3 above is problematic at best, cruel at worst, and in 
most cases would not seem to promote the goals of comfort care. (Al-




comfortable in other cases of withdrawal of care at the end of life.128 So, needing 
such palliation is not unique to death from loss of pacing. What is morally and 
substantively different about pacemaker deactivation is that, along with 
potentially rendering the dying process less comfortable, the underlying rationale 
for deactivation does not cohere with the typical, generally morally-acceptable 
rationale behind withdrawal of care.  
Withdrawal of care in a comfort care situation is the sort of thing that 
ought to be undergone with the aim of facilitating a good death (or as good a 
death as possible) for the patient. Withdrawal of care may also be done out of 
respect for a patient’s autonomous request. And, generally speaking, competent 
requests for withdrawal of care should be honored. But what I am trying to show 
here is that a request for pacemaker deactivation at the EOL is akin to a request 
for VAE in highly pacemaker dependent patients rather than a standard case of 
withdrawal of care. If a patient is competent to request withdrawal of care and 
does so, then the medical professionals involved have strong reason to honor this 
request out of respect for the patient’s autonomy. However, in many EOL cases 
the patient will have deteriorated to the point that he cannot make such requests 
on his own. Under these circumstances (and in the absence of an advance 
directive or less formal knowledge of the patient’s wishes), a concern for patient 
well-being comes to the fore and ought to serve as the primary consideration in 
EOL decision making. A patient’s proxy consenters should make decisions which 
give great weight to minimizing the patient’s suffering as his life draws to a close. 
                                                          




If the patient is suffering or simply not experiencing a quality of life worth 
having, then care may be foregone or withdrawn with the aim of allowing the 
patient to die of his underlying terminal illness. And, if the medical interventions 
which could sustain the patient’s life would impose burdens deemed unacceptable 
to the patient, then this provides additional reason for withdrawing or foregoing 
such interventions.  
As I have argued, having a pacemaker active does not in itself impose 
burdens on the patient in the same way that ventilator support or artificial feeding 
and hydration might. Often the only burden that could be reasonably attributed to 
a pacemaker at the end of life would be the fact that, in correcting for the patient’s 
bradycardia, it contributes to sustaining a life that has itself become burdensome 
to the patient. And, perhaps, in conjunction with an autonomous request from the 
patient, deactivation would be justified on such grounds. Respect for patient 
autonomy may justify pacemaker deactivation under some circumstances. But, I 
suspect that a request for pacemaker deactivation would fall into one of the 
following two categories. Either the patient (or proxy consenter) will be confused 
about the details and reality of what pacemaker deactivation entails and thus not 
choosing based on the information required to make a genuinely informed 
decision in such a case, or he will be essentially requesting VAE.  
I maintain that pacemaker deactivation would not constitute a standard 
case of withdrawal of care. If medication would be required to make a death from 
pacemaker deactivation comfortable (as it likely would be), and if deactivation is 




what justifiable purpose is being served by deactivation apart from causing death 
in heavily dependent patients?129 And, if that is the goal, pacemaker deactivation 
seems to be a disingenuous and inefficient way to go about facilitating a good 
patient death. And, as I will now argue, deactivating the pacemaker is not 
consistent with an intention to allow the patient to die of his underlying terminal 
illness.  
Are We Allowing the Patient to Die of Underlying Illness? Does this Matter? 
One motivation for withdrawal of care at the EOL that pacemaker 
deactivation does prima facie cohere with is the desire to allow the patient to die 
from an underlying illness rather than unwantedly prolonging his life. In highly 
pacemaker dependent patients, deactivating the pacing function will most likely 
lead to the patient’s death from his underlying conduction disorder. However, the 
terminal illness from which the patient was actually dying may not necessarily be 
at all related to the bradycardia being corrected for by the patient’s pacemaker. It 
is important to bear in mind that pacemakers only correct for bradycardia. They 
cannot restart a stopped heart, prevent heart attacks, or correct for the underlying 
causes (commonly ventricular tachycardia, i.e. fast heartbeat) of the sort of 
                                                          
129 It should be noted here that, while a death resulting from withdrawal of 
ventilator support might require medication in order to keep the patient 
comfortable, the relevant difference between that and pacemaker deactivation is 
that ventilator support characteristically imposes a substantial burden on the 





cardiac arrest (ventricular fibrillation) that commonly kills people.130 So, a 
pacemaker is not sustaining the patient’s life or preventing a natural death apart 
from the very limited role it plays in correcting for bradycardia – a role it will 
have played for years in many patients. 
In the absence of whatever terminal illness the patient is suffering from, he 
could go on to live comfortably (assuming no other QOL-reducing comorbidities 
are present) with the help of a pacemaker. Non-terminally-ill patients with 
otherwise lethal bradycardia often feel perfectly fine with the aid of a pacemaker. 
Further, deactivating a pacemaker in a highly dependent patient who was not 
dying of a different terminal illness would be correctly understood as an instance 
of killing that patient. So, if one wishes to justify pacemaker removal by 
appealing to the aim of allowing the patient to die of his underlying illness, this 
sort of justification will not fit the sort of situations under discussion. In these 
situations, in order to allow a patient who is terminally ill to die, his pacemaker is 
deactivated, thus removing vital treatment for a chronic but not terminal cardiac 
illness, which is ultimately what kills the patient. The patient’s pacemaker is an 
impediment to his death by chronic and fatal-if-left-untreated bradycardia, which 
would be removed upon deactivation, but this does not equate to allowing the 
patient to die of the terminal illness that was already killing him and thus led to 
this EOL decision.  
 
                                                          




Here I would like to call into question both the accuracy and importance 
of characterizing a death from pacemaker deactivation as ‘dying naturally’ as 
characterized in the HRS’s principle [b]. It would make little sense to say that a 
patient is in fact terminally ill from cardiac disease (since the patient’s cardiac 
disorder could indeed be fatal in the absence of treatment) when that patient had a 
pacemaker implanted to deal with the symptoms and underlying cause of 
bradycardia.131 This is so in the same way that it would make little sense to say 
that a patient is terminally ill from diabetes when a regimen of insulin injections 
or an implanted insulin pump is managing the disease perfectly well. And it is not 
                                                          
131 However, let us suppose that a patient’s body is weakened by terminal 
illness to the point that the patient becomes heavily dependent on his pacemaker 
when he wasn’t before the onset of his otherwise unrelated terminal illness. In 
reality, causation would be difficult to prove since patients generally become 
more pacemaker dependent as they age. Nonetheless, let us take as our example a 
patient where acute myocardial infarction takes out the atrioventricular node and 
causes that patient to become highly pacemaker dependent. This case is 
complicated. Would the fact that the pacemaker was implanted beforehand have 
any bearing on the moral status of deactivation? If a pacemaker were implanted 
after the onset of terminal illness for a reason related to that terminal illness, 
would this make it morally the same as a ventilator when it comes to withdrawal 
of care? I’m inclined to say that in this particular sort of case, if the patient’s 
underlying terminal illness led to the patient becoming highly dependent on his 
pacemaker, then deactivation would be in accordance with the intention to allow 
the patient to die of his underlying illness. The fact that the pacemaker was 






just the availability of these treatments that is relevant here, but also the role they 
play once integrated into the patient’s life. Plenty of individuals live for many 
years in what seems on the surface to be perfectly adequate health while having 
chronic illnesses that, when well-regulated, don’t actually pose a threat to that 
patient’s life or even quality of life to any great extent. To characterize such 
chronic fatal-when-untreated illnesses as terminal would be disingenuous and 
even willfully obtuse.  
It may be true in a sense that, in deactivating a patient’s pacemaker at the 
EOL, “the clinician’s intent is to discontinue the unwanted treatment and allow 
the patient to die naturally of the underlying disease.”132 But we ought not 
equivocate here between allowing a patient to die of an underlying disease which 
has been managed by a pacemaker, often for years, and thus in most cases need 
never have proven fatal, and allowing a patient to die of the effects of whatever 
terminal illness prompted a decision regarding withdrawal of care to begin with. 
The patient is at the end of his life due to a particular terminal illness that, unless 
it is tied to the patient’s underlying bradycardia, will not be prevented from taking 
its course by the presence of a functioning pacemaker in the patient’s body. So, 
while a death resulting from pacemaker deactivation may be strictly-speaking 
‘natural’ in the same way that any death that results from bodily disfunction is 
‘natural’, it will not be the natural outcome of the patient’s actual dying process 
in the context of which the decision to deactivate was made. 
                                                          




One might ask here whether this position I’m taking might have implications 
for more conventional instances of withdrawal of care. After all, couldn’t the 
patient be on a ventilator for something unrelated to the underlying disease which 
is killing him? If so, wouldn’t I then be committed to saying either that removing 
a patient from a ventilator under such circumstances would be akin to VAE, or 
that standard cases of withdrawal of care might involve allowing a patient to die 
of an underlying issue which was not actually killing him? There are a couple of 
ways to sidestep such an entailment. First, at the end of life patients are usually 
placed on ventilator support because their underlying terminal illness has rendered 
it a challenge to breathe on their own. Even if a patient’s underlying terminal 
illness isn’t explicitly respiratory in nature, bodily systems shutting down as a 
result of terminal illness at the end of life often necessitate ventilator support in 
order for the patient to go on living. This means that removing a patient from 
ventilator support will, in nearly all cases, amount to letting the patient die from 
his underlying terminal illness, even if the causal relation is a bit indirect. Second, 
the manner in which a pacemaker regulates an otherwise lethal illness is different 
from the way in which a ventilator would do so, and different in a way that might 
justify removing someone from ventilator support under circumstances where it 
would be unjustified to deactivate the patient’s pacemaker. This is because, as I 
have argued, a pacemaker is a biofixture and thus part of the patient’s body in a 





I have argued that pacemaker deactivation at the EOL is inconsistent with the 
aims of comfort care. Deactivation will either lead to a decrease in the patient’s 
quality of life or lead to the patient’s death from a chronic but not terminal cardiac 
conduction disorder. In non-heavily-dependent patients deactivation will likely 
only serve to make the patient less comfortable, and in heavily dependent patients 
deactivation will likely directly lead to the death of the patient. However, this 
death is not consistent with a burdens-based justification typically given for 
withdrawal of care at the EOL. This is because, instead of allowing the patient to 
die of his underlying terminal illness, pacemaker deactivation leads to the 
patient’s death from a chronic but not terminal cardiac illness, one that would 
likely be well-managed and never prove fatal were the pacemaker allowed to 
continue functioning. Because of this, I have argued that pacemaker deactivation 
is more akin to introducing a new pathology to end the life of the patient rather 
than removing an impediment to death from the patient’s underlying terminal 
illness. And, as such, deactivation is inconsistent with an intention to allow the 
patient to die of his underlying terminal illness. While it is true that it allows a 
patient to die of an underlying illness, to say that this is a ‘natural’ death in the 
sense of facilitating or according with the death that patient is already 
experiencing would be disingenuous. If the patient were not already terminally ill, 
deactivating the pacemaker of a heavily dependent patient would be rightly seen 
as euthanasia or murder (depending on the intentions and circumstances 




transplanted heart through an injection would. This makes pacemaker deactivation 
at the EOL morally akin to VAE rather than withdrawal of care.133 
It is possible that withdrawal of care may be justified on grounds apart from 
the aim to allow the patient to die of his underlying illness. For instance, 
withdrawal of care may be justified by appeal to the obligation produced by a 
patient’s autonomous request for it. In such situations, is it the case that a patient’s 
request for pacemaker deactivation should be honored? While there may be 
reason to honor the patient’s request, I hold that to do so would nonetheless 
amount in moral terms to VAE rather than a standard case of withdrawal of care. 
This is because (as I argued earlier) deactivating a pacemaker, as it is a biofixture, 
would be akin to stopping a heart with an injection or removing a porcine valve 
rather than removing a patient from ventilator support. So, the patient’s 
autonomous request should be taken seriously, but it should also be clear what the 
patient is requesting, namely a form of euthanasia. 
6. Conclusion 
 Let us now return to the principles put forward by the HRS with which I 
take issue: 
• [a] Ethically and legally, there are no differences between refusing CIED 
therapy and requesting withdrawal of CIED therapy. 
                                                          
133 It is worth considering here whether refraining from giving a diabetic insulin 
because the diabetic has requested to have it withheld would be likewise morally 
akin to VAE. I maintain that it would not. This is because, while a pacemaker has 
the role of a biofixture in the patient’s body, insulin, whether administered 




•  [b] Ethically, CIED deactivation is neither physician-assisted suicide nor 
euthanasia. When carrying out a patient’s request for withdrawal of a life-
sustaining treatment that a patient perceives as unwanted (including CIED 
therapies), the clinician’s intent is to discontinue the unwanted treatment 
and allow the patient to die naturally of the underlying disease - not to 
terminate the patient’s life.134 
While these may be true with regard to many CIEDS, I have called both of these 
principles into question as they relate to pacemakers specifically. On an 
understanding of pacemakers as biofixtures, there is a difference between refusing 
a pacemaker and requesting deactivation, in the same way that there is a 
difference between refusing a life-saving organ transplant and requesting that a 
transplanted organ be compromised by medication or removed entirely. This is 
because the pacemaker has become a part of the patient in a manner analogous to 
the way in which a transplanted organ is part of the patient. Both are constitutive 
replacement therapies that are bound into the patient’s body and sustain the 
patient’s life by replacing a function that would have been lost otherwise. Because 
of this role and integration in the patient’s body, compromising the function of 
either would be akin to introducing a new pathology. A heart transplant may be 
refused and pacemaker implantation may likewise be refused by a patient. A 
patient may allow his native heart to fail and also may opt to allow the batteries 
on his pacemaker to run down and forego replacement. Both refusing a biofixture 
and allowing one to fail are importantly morally different from actively 
                                                          




compromising the functioning of a biofixture.  Correctly conceptualizing 
pacemakers as biofixtures works against the applicability of principle (a) to 
pacemakers. Further, when pacemakers are understood as biofixtures and we look 
at the underlying rationale behind deactivation at the EOL, deactivation of 
pacemakers does not just morally amount to another instance of withdrawal of 
care. While deactivating a pacemaker may allow the patient to die of an 
underlying disease, the disease in question is not what was actually killing the 
patient; the underlying rhythm disorder that would lead to a highly dependent 
patient’s death upon deactivation is importantly unrelated to the terminal illness 
that actually prompted deactivation in order to allow the patient to die. 
Presumably, were the patient not already dying of some other illness, pacemaker 
deactivation would not have been considered. I have argued that, rather than being 
a standard case of withdrawal of care at the EOL, pacemaker deactivation in a 
highly dependent patient is akin to VAE. This is counter to principle (b) as it 
applies to pacemakers. Life-sustaining biofixtures such as pacemakers fall under 
the heading of treatments where discontinuation should be considered morally 
akin to VAE rather than standard withdrawal of care. Therefore, whatever ethical 
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